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Abstract: The functions of the somatosensory system are multiple. We use tactile input to localize and experience the various qualities
of touch, and proprioceptive information to determine the position of different parts of the body with respect to each other, which
provides fundamental information for action. Further, tactile exploration of the characteristics of external objects can result in
conscious perceptual experience and stimulus or object recognition. Neuroanatomical studies suggest parallel processing as well as
serial processing within the cerebral somatosensory system that reflect these separate functions, with one processing stream
terminating in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and the other terminating in the insula. We suggest that, analogously to the
organisation of the visual system, somatosensory processing for the guidance of action can be dissociated from the processing that
leads to perception and memory. In addition, we find a second division between tactile information processing about external
targets in service of object recognition and tactile information processing related to the body itself. We suggest the posterior
parietal cortex subserves both perception and action, whereas the insula principally subserves perceptual recognition and learning.
Keywords: body image; body schema; crossmodal; insula; parietal; proprioception; tactile object recognition
1. Introduction
The somatosensory system is involved in many aspects of
our behaviour. It provides information about the position
of different parts of the body with respect to one
another. It allows characterisation and localisation of touch,
stroking, and pain, and it is important for all motor
action involving the body and limbs. Furthermore, tactile
exploration informs us about the characteristics of external
objects, resulting in a conscious perceptual experience of
the stimulus which may lead to object recognition. The
central question addressed in this review is how cortical
somatosensory processing is organised to subserve these
different functions.
We present a model that specifies the separable func-
tional entities and their neuroanatomical correlates
(Fig. 1). We suggest that separate cortical processing
streams exist. One projects from the anterior parietal
cortex (APC) (Brodmann areas 3a, 3b, 1, and 2) via the sec-
ondary somatosensory cortex (SII) to the posterior insula,
whereas the second terminates in the posterior parietal
cortex (PPC). We propose that action-related processing
occurs mainly in the PPC, whereas recognition and
perception involve the insula, as well as the PPC. The
model also distinguishes between somatosensory proces-
sing about the body (where you have been touched) and
about external stimuli (e.g., surface features of objects).
This distinction is reflected in largely separate bodies of
literature. A final characteristic of the model is the pro-
gressive integration of different stimulus features. Thus,
whereas early processing in the APC is mainly concerned
with relatively simple features such as stimulus location
and duration, subsequent processing involves detection
of the direction and velocity of a target moving over the
body surface. Higher association areas combine these fea-
tures to provide information about the shape of an object
or integrate it in a representation of the body.
Our starting point when developing this model was the
idea that the anatomical and physiological organisation of
the somatosensory system should reflect the eventual use
of the somatosensory information rather than the detail
of stimulus characteristics. This idea has been proposed
previously for the visual system (Goodale & Milner
1992; Jeannerod & Rossetti 1993; Milner & Goodale
1995). An important aspect of this model of visual cortical
processing is that, in addition to describing the function of
certain brain regions in terms of the perceptual character-
istics (e.g., spatial or object-centred), it is just as important
to state the way in which we use this information (e.g., to
store for later recognition or to program a motor action).
We suggest that a similar approach would be useful
when describing the processing characteristics of the
somatosensory system.
Mishkin and colleagues have described a pathway of
higher cortical somatosensory processing running from
the APC via the SII to the posterior insula and subserving
perceptual learning and memory (Friedman et al. 1986;
Mishkin 1979; Murray & Mishkin 1984; Pons et al.
1987), and they have suggested that this pathway might
be conceptualised as a somatosensory equivalent of the
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visual ventral stream (Mishkin 1979). We have incorpor-
ated this proposed pathway in our model, but have
expanded the neural mechanisms involved in tactile
object perception to include the PPC, based on more
recent patient and functional imaging studies. In addition,
we suggest that the posterior insula plays a role in the per-
ceptual representation of the body.
A third source of inspiration about the functional organ-
isation of the somatosensory system has been the work on
different body representations. The idea of a body schema
as an internal representation for action and a body image
involved in perceptual identification of body features, as
described by Paillard (1999), was particularly important.
The studies of patients with residual tactile processing
for action without perceptual awareness, as reported by
Paillard et al. (1983) and Rossetti et al. (2001) were
especially relevant.
Taking these sources together, this article incorporates
existing ideas about the organisation of the cortical somato-
sensory system into one coherent model. In the following
sections, we review evidence for this model in more detail.
First, in section 2, we describe the characteristics of
processing in the anterior parietal cortex (APC). Higher-
order somatosensory processing is the focus of the next,
section 3; after which, evidence for separate processing
for perception and action in healthy individuals is
described in section 4. Similarities and differences
between the cortical somatosensory system and other
sensory modalities are discussed in the following section,
5, while crossmodal interactions form the final topic
(section 6). Our intention is to provide a model that
incorporates a large body of the currently available evi-
dence, from which testable hypotheses can be derived.
2. Feature processing in the anterior parietal
cortex
The main processing pathways of the somatosensory
system from peripheral receptors to the cortex that are
concerned with touch and proprioception are well
known. Input from peripheral receptors ascends through
the dorsal column in the spinal cord and subsequently
arrives in the medulla. The fibres then decussate in the
medial lemniscus and terminate in the ventral posterior
lateral nucleus (VPL) of the thalamus (Martin & Jessell
1991; Mountcastle 1984). In addition, there are projec-
tions to the ventral posterior inferior nucleus (VPI) and
the posterior nuclei group of the thalamus (Mountcastle
1984). A second ascending system, the anterolateral
system, mainly deals with thermal and noxious stimuli,
but also relays some pressure information. The antero-
lateral system also projects to the VPL in addition to
smaller projections to VPI and centromedian (CM)/para-
fascicular complex and the intralaminar nuclei (Berkley
1980; De Vito & Simmons 1976; Sinclair 1981).
Most somatosensory information enters the cerebral
cortex through projections from the VPL to the anterior
parietal cortex (APC) (Jones & Powell 1970; Jones et al.
1979; Whitsel et al. 1978). This area was originally referred
to as the first somatosensory cortex (SI), but more recently
it has been suggested that only Brodmann area (BA) 3b
can be considered to be the homologue of the primary
area SI in non-primates (Kaas 1983; 2004). In addition,
there are projections from the ventroposterior superior
nucleus (VPS) to areas 3a and 2 (Cusick et al. 1985).
Finally, small projections exist between the VPL and
other thalamic nuclei to the secondary somatosensory
cortex (SII), the posterior parietal and insular cortex
(Burton & Jones 1976; Friedman & Murray 1986; Jones
et al. 1979; Whitsel & Petrucelli 1969).
The organisation of the APC can be characterised by
several principles. First, it consists of four different Brod-
mann areas, BAs 1, 2, 3a, and 3b, containing several somato-
topic maps of the contralateral half of the body (Chen et al.
2005; Kaas et al. 1979). Neurophysiological studies suggest
that one somatosensory aspect tends to dominate the input
to each area. In area 3a, the dominant input originates in
the muscle receptors (Phillips et al. 1971; Tanji & Wise
1981), although the hand and digit areas of BA 3a also
contain a significant number of cutaneous neurons. In
BA 3b (Tanji & Wise 1981) and BA 1, the main input
originates in cutaneous receptors (Whitsel et al. 1971).
Within these areas, specific cortical domains are activated
by different types of stimulation, such as vibration,
pressure, or flutter (Friedman et al. 2004). Lesions in
each of these areas cause perceptual impairments on
tasks that require processing of the relevant modality. In
monkeys, area 3b appears to be involved in most tactile
discrimination tasks. Removal of area 3a severely impairs
performance on several discrimination tasks, including
hard-soft, roughness, concave-convex, and square-
diamond discriminations (Randolph & Semmes 1974).
The neurons in area 1 are predominantly cutaneous, but
respond to more complex stimuli, such as movement
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detection and the direction sensitivity (Gardner 1988;
Hyva¨rinen & Poranen 1978). In humans, area 1 contains
larger representations (Overduin & Servos 2004).
Removal of area 1 impairs discriminations involving
texture (e.g., roughness, hard-soft) (Randolph & Semmes
1974). The main input to BA 2 originates in deep receptors
(joint and muscle afferents; Merzenich et al. 1978).
Indeed, removal of this area in primates results in
impaired performance on tasks involving kinaesthetic
input, such as discrimination of concave versus convex
and diamond versus square shapes (Randolph &
Semmes 1974). Area 2 also contains modules of cutaneous
neurons with complex receptive fields and response pro-
perties in the hand and digit areas (Gardner 1988;
Hyva¨rinen & Poranen 1978; Pons et al. 1985). In the
early stages of cortical processing, the neuronal responses
represent the characteristics of stimuli applied to peri-
pheral nerves relatively accurately (Phillips et al. 1988).
Neurons situated further away from the thalamic input
have more complex response properties, which suggests
that advanced processing occurs. For example, electro-
physiological studies showed that direction-sensitive
neurons were found less commonly in area 3b, but more
densely in areas 1 and 2 (Gardner 1988; Hyva¨rinen &
Poranen 1978). Indeed, lesions of areas 3b, 1 and 2
cause impairments in distinguishing the speed of tactile
movement (Zainos et al. 1997). In humans, lesions affect-
ing the postcentral gyrus cause deficits in two-point dis-
crimination; position sense and point localisation; object
size, shape, and texture discrimination (Corkin et al.
1970; Kaas 2004; Roland 1987).
The combined lesion and neurophysiological literature
suggests that the APC is important for the processing of
simple somatosensory features related to both the stimulus
and the part of the body that has been stimulated. More-
over, recent optical imaging of a tactile illusion suggests
that the APC codes the perceived rather than physical
location of peripheral stimuli (Chen et al. 2003). This
finding suggests that neural processing is related to what
the information is processed for (e.g., perception) rather
than the stimulus characteristics. Thus, it is consistent
with the idea that the purpose is at least as important
when discussing the neural basis of sensory processing.
Indeed, certain types of input may be more important
for certain tasks, with proprioceptive input contributing
more to action-related processes, and the skin receptors
providing more information for perceptual purposes.
However, this mapping of different somatosensory sub-
modalities to output is by no means absolute.
With respect to somatosensory processing for the gui-
dance of action, the findings of neuropsychological
studies suggest that damage to the APC does not necess-
arily abolish accurate pointing movements. Several inves-
tigators have reported patients with damage to the
primary somatosensory cortex who showed severe impair-
ments in tactile perception while their motor deficits were
surprisingly mild (Brochier et al. 1994; Halligan et al.
1995; Pause et al. 1989; Volpe et al. 1979). In a seminal
study, Volpe et al. (1979) reported four patients with
tactile and proprioceptive deficits following a stroke, who
were nevertheless able to perform spatially oriented move-
ments with the de-afferented hand. In the study by Pause
Figure 1. An outline of the proposed model. Dark grey boxes and broken lines depict areas and projections involved in somatosensory
processing for action. Light grey boxes and lines show the areas and pathways involved in somatosensory processing for perceptual
recognition. Note also the distinction between somatosensory processing pertaining to the body (internal, shown in the bottom of
the figure) and tactile processing of information concerning external stimuli such as objects (top). APC, anterior parietal cortex; SII,
secondary somatosensory cortex; and PPC, posterior parietal cortex.
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et al. (1989), the patient, who had a total loss of sensibility
and tactile recognition with the contralesional hand,
remained able to perform several motor acts, including
the pincer grip and exploratory movements. Brochier
et al. (1994) observed that their patient could touch the
thumb of the insensate hand with each finger individually
(similar observations were made also in a patient assessed
by Halligan et al. 1995) and could crumble a piece of paper
with this hand, while having severe difficulties in recogniz-
ing the direction of movements on her skin and letters
drawn on her hand.
Spared sensorimotor guidance to targets on the
impaired arm that were not perceived, has been reported
in other studies. In a first description of this kind, Paillard
et al. (1983) reported a patient with a left posterior cortical
lesion who could point to tactile targets on her right hand
that she was unable to detect. They suggested that there
were striking similarities with blindsight. A similar dis-
sociation was reported by Rossetti and colleagues (see
Rossetti et al. 1995b; 2001), who investigated a patient
with a lesion affecting the thalamic nucleus VPL. They
assessed his ability to use touch and proprioception for
verbal and pointing localisation responses. Localisation
of targets by using both touch and proprioception was
above chance only when a pointing response was made
aimed directly at the target (see Fig. 2). Verbal responses
or pointing responses on a drawing of the arm were at
chance. Delaying the motor response also reduced per-
formance to chance levels. Rossetti et al. argued that
their patient showed a dissociation between the what
(object recognition) and the how (sensorimotor) systems
and coined the term “numbsense” for this phenomenon.
Another study, by Aglioti et al. (1996), reported similar
findings. In addition, Aglioti et al. found above-chance
performance when subjects pointed with their insensate
hand to the location of stimulation applied to their
normal hand.
Thus, lesion studies suggest that somatosensory infor-
mation can be used for the guidance of movements after
lesions to the APC or the VPL, although the stimuli
cannot be detected consciously. While some “numbsense”
studies assessed pointing to proprioceptive or tactile
targets on the insensate arm (Aglioti et al. 1996; Rossetti
et al. 1995b), others showed that movements with the
impaired arm were still possible despite the absence of
proprioceptive feedback (Brochier et al. 1994; Pause
et al. 1989; Volpe et al. 1979).
Regarding the neural substrate of these unconscious
residual sensorimotor abilities, several possibilities have
been suggested. Brochier et al. (1994) and Rossetti and
colleagues proposed that thalamic projections to the
PPC, bypassing the APC and the VPL, may be responsible
(Rossetti 1998; Rossetti et al. 2001). Brochier et al. (1994)
and Rossetti et al. (2001) identified projections from the
posterior lateral nucleus and medial portion of the pos-
terior complex to the PPC (cf. Jones et al. 1979; Pearson
et al. 1978) as possible substrate. A second possibility
may be that direct projections from the VPL to the
motor cortex are involved (Jeannerod et al. 1984),
although this may be less likely in the case of Rossetti
et al. because their patient’s lesion primarily affected this
thalamic nucleus. A final suggestion is that small ipsilateral
pathways to the intact hemisphere may be responsible
(Rossetti et al. 1995b; 2001). Supportive evidence for
this notion comes from studies with hemispherectomized
patients who usually do retain some crude somatosensory
function on the side contralateral to the removed hemi-
sphere (Dijkerman 1996; Holloway et al. 2000; Muller
et al. 1991). Whether these pathways are also involved in
certain basic aspects of conscious perception, such as
stimulus detection, remains as yet to be determined.
The main lesson to be learned for the issue at hand is
that – as is the case for the visual system – the execution
of a motor action towards a spatially defined target does
not necessarily depend on conscious awareness of that
target. This observation supports the idea of two separate
somatosensory pathways for action and conscious
perception.
3. Higher somatosensory cortical processing
Processing of somatosensory input beyond the APC occurs
in several cortical areas. These include the secondary
somatosensory area (SII), the insula, and the PPC.
Overall, somatosensory projections involving these areas
are characterised by serial, as well as parallel, processing
(Iwamura 1998; Knecht et al. 1996). The APC maintains
reciprocal connections with the SII (Barbaresi et al.
1994; Disbrow et al. 2003; Friedman et al. 1980; Pons &
Kaas 1986), although the projections from the APC to
the SII are more important than those from SII to the
APC (Pons et al. 1987). Neurons in the SII have greater
stimulus selectivity, larger receptive fields, reduced
modality specificity, and respond to ipsilateral, as well as
contralateral, stimulation (Disbrow et al. 2001; Lin &
Figure 2. Performance of numbsense patient J.A. on two
pointing tasks. In the simple pointing task, the patient pointed
with his left hand directly towards a tactile stimulus on the
impaired right arm or hand (left picture). He clearly performed
this task at above chance levels. In the second task, he was
asked to indicate the position of the tactile target by pointing to
its location on a drawing of the right hand (right picture).
Performance on this task was not different from chance.
Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press
(www.oup.com) from Rossetti et al. (2001), Fig. 15.4, p. 275.
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Forss 2002; Ruben et al. 2001; Sinclair & Burton 1993).
The SII is reciprocally connected with granular and dys-
granular fields of the insula (Friedman et al. 1986). Neuro-
physiological recordings from the granular insula in rhesus
monkeys showed that a major portion of this area is exclu-
sively devoted to somatic processing (Schneider et al.
1993).
The SII has additional projections to the posterior par-
ietal area 7b, both ipsilaterally and contralaterally, and the
premotor cortex in the same hemisphere (Disbrow et al.
2003; Friedman et al. 1986). In monkeys, the PPC also
receives direct connections from the APC. Area 5
(superior parietal cortex) receives input from areas 1 and
2 (Pearson & Powell 1985; Pons & Kaas 1986), whereas
area 7b (inferior parietal cortex) receives direct input
from area 1 (Pons & Kaas 1986). Several thalamic nuclei
also project directly to the SII (Disbrow et al. 2002) and
to different parts of the PPC (Friedman & Murray 1986;
Jones et al. 1979). Major cortical outputs from the PPC
project back to the SII and to the premotor cortex, the
limbic cortex, and the superior temporal sulcus (Kaas
2004).
An important question is whether two processing
streams can be discerned in this network of connections,
analogous to the visual system (Milner & Goodale 1995;
Ungerleider & Mishkin 1982). Indeed, it has been
suggested that the projections from the APC via the SII
to the granular and dysgranular fields of the insula are
involved in tactile perception and learning (and thus
would constitute the somatosensory equivalent to the
visual “what” pathway; see sect. 3.1) (Friedman et al.
1986; Mishkin 1979). The tactile “dorsal stream” would
involve projections from the APC to the PPC (Westwood
& Goodale 2003), either directly or through the SII. In a
study of anatomical connections of two areas within the
SII (the SII proper and the parietal ventral area [VP]) in
monkeys, Disbrow et al. (2003) suggested that the inter-
connections between these two areas in the SII overlapped
considerably. They suggested that this was inconsistent
with the idea of two separate processing streams.
Indeed, Disbrow et al. (2003) indicated that the SII may
be involved in somatosensory processing for both percep-
tion and action. In our view, the data of Disbrow et al. are
not at all inconsistent with the idea of separate processing
pathways for perception and action, as segregation may
not occur until after the SII.
In a recent fMRI study, Reed et al. (2005) investigated
whether a “what” versus “where” dissociation also exists for
somatosensory processing. They compared tactile object
recognition with tactile object localisation while control-
ling for differences in exploratory finger movements.
Differential activation patterns were observed with
tactile object recognition activating frontal, as well as bilat-
eral, inferior parietal areas. In contrast, the tactile object
location task was associated with activation in bilateral
superior parietal areas. Note that these authors link their
investigations with to the distinction between spatial and
object vision made by Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982).
Indeed, Reed et al. (2005) specifically controlled for differ-
ences in the action component, e.g., exploratory finger
movements.
In the present review, instead of the “what” versus
“where” distinction, we discuss evidence from patient,
functional imaging, and neurophysiology studies for
separate processing for somatosensory perception and
action (“what” vs. “how”). As action and perception are
both broadly defined functions that can include many
different aspects, a further subdivision is made between
processing of external target features (e.g., for object rec-
ognition) and somatosensory input about the body (e.g.,
the body representations). Indeed, functional differences
have been found between judgements pertaining to the
position of the stimulus on the body and in external
space (Kitazawa 2002). Differences in perception and
action are therefore reviewed separately for internal and
external somatosensory information, respectively.
3.1. Tactile object recognition
One major function of the somatosensory system is the
recognition of external stimuli, such as objects. We fre-
quently make use of tactile perception to recognize
objects in our daily lives, for example, when retrieving
keys from our pockets. Recognizing objects by touch is
usually not a passive process (Gibson 1962). The stimulus
is typically explored actively by using finger and hand
movements to build a perceptual object representation.
The results of psychophysical studies suggest that the
finger and hand movements made are not random, but
depend on the object characteristics that need to be ident-
ified. Lederman and Klatzky (1987) observed that when
subjects were asked to discriminate a particular dimension
(e.g., texture, hardness, and weight), different types of
hand movements, named exploratory procedures, could
be identified. The exploratory procedures used depended
on the dimension to be discriminated. For example,
texture was mainly explored through sideway movements
between skin and object surface (lateral motion),
whereas hardness was determined by pressing the
object. When identifying objects, sequences of exploratory
procedures are executed that would enable a represen-
tation to be built that can be matched with object rep-
resentations in memory (Lederman & Klatzky 1993).
The selection of the exploratory procedures depends on
a number of factors, including its duration, breadth of suf-
ficiency (number of features that can be extracted through
this particular exploratory procedure), and compatibility
with other exploratory procedures. These findings
suggest a close relation between perceptual processes
and finger and hand movements that support these per-
ceptual processes. On the basis of these behavioural
characteristics, one would perhaps also expect the neural
pathways involved in tactile object recognition and the
performance of exploratory finger movements to be
highly interrelated. Evidence from monkey-lesion, neu-
ropsychology, and functional imaging studies suggests
that dissociable neural processes can be identified for
the sensory guidance of the exploratory finger movements
and for tactile object recognition.
With respect to perceptual processes, Mishkin and co-
workers (Friedman et al. 1986; Murray & Mishkin 1984)
proposed that, in monkeys, the cortical pathway projecting
from the APC via the SII to the insula is involved in tactile
discrimination and recognition (see also Burton & Sinclair
2000). Several studies suggest a distinct involvement of
each area in tactile memory. Recent studies implicate the
APC in working memory and learning of simple stimulus
features such as vibration, pressure, and roughness in
Dijkerman & de Haan: Somatosensory processes subserving perception and action
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humans (Harris et al. 2001a; 2001b; 2002). With respect to
the SII, monkeys with damage to the SII exhibit impair-
ments in tactile discrimination learning (Garcha&Ettlinger
1980; Murray & Mishkin 1984), and, in humans, lesions
including the SII may cause tactile agnosia (Caselli 1991,
1993; Reed et al. 1996). Furthermore, functional imaging
studies report activation in the SII after application of
simple stimuli (Hagen & Pardo 2002; Hodge et al. 1998;
McGlone et al. 2002; Ruben et al. 2001), as well as during
recognition of objects (Reed et al. 2004). Evidence for
insular involvement in tactile object recognition is mixed.
Studies with human patients reported tactile agnosia after
lesions that included the insula or the retroinsular cortex
(Bohlhalter et al. 2002; Caselli 1993). However, in all
these cases, the PPC was at least partly damaged, as well.
Furthermore, lesions sparing the insula, but affecting the
PPC, may also cause tactile object recognition deficits
(Knecht et al. 1996; Reed & Caselli 1994; Reed et al.
1996). Similarly, tactile discrimination deficits have been
observed following PPC lesions in monkeys (Moffett et al.
1967). Neurophysiological and functional imaging studies
suggest that the anterior part of the intraparietal sulcus
(AIP) is particularly involved in tactile, but also visual, rep-
resentations of objects and object manipulation (Binkofski
et al. 1999b; Grefkes et al. 2002; Seitz et al. 1991). A
study by Stoeckel et al. (2004) observed differences
between right and left superior parietal involvement in
tactile object discrimination. Activation on the right was
associated with kinaesthetic attention, whereas mainten-
ance of tactile information for subsequent object discrimi-
nation activated left superior parietal areas. Functional
imaging studies also provide some evidence for insular
involvement in tactile object recognition. Reed et al.
(2004) observed insular activation when comparing object
recognition with palpation of nonsense shapes. In addition,
activation in the insula and central opercular region has
been reported during tactile long-term and short-term
memory tasks (Bonda et al. 1996; Burton & Sinclair 2000)
during relatively simple stimulations, such as being
stroked, thermal stimulation (Davis et al. 1998), and vibro-
tactile stimulation (Hodge et al. 1998;McGlone et al. 2002).
Overall, these results suggest that the PPC as well as the
insula are involved in tactile object recognition. A possible
explanation is that, in contrast to the visual system which is
inherently spatial, tactile object recognition requires inte-
gration of spatial somatosensory information over time.
Damage to the inferior PPC may impair temporal inte-
gration of spatial somatosensory information, which is
crucial for tactile object recognition. In an earlier study,
Semmes (1965) found that tactile object recognition defi-
cits without primary sensory impairment were frequently
accompanied by spatial deficits. Vallar (1997) also
suggested that high-level spatial representations contrib-
ute to somatosensory performance and linked this to the
right PPC. Indeed, spatial distortions have been found in
tactile size matching in patients with hemispatial neglect,
which usually results from right inferior parietal lesions
(Bisiach et al. 2004). However, not all tactile agnosias
are a consequence of right parietal damage, nor do they
all exhibit spatial impairments (Reed & Caselli 1994;
Reed et al. 1996). Saetti et al. (1999) suggested that
tactile agnosia could be caused by disruption to two dis-
tinct mechanisms. It may arise from contralesional parietal
lesions, damaging somatosensory processing that
culminates in the structural description of the object. Or
it may be caused by a profound derangement of spatial
skills, affecting both hands to the same degree. The
latter is associated with right PPC damage.
With respect to the interrelatedness of tactile recog-
nition and manual exploration suggested earlier, neuro-
psychological studies show that impairments in tactile
object recognition can occur both with and without
deficient tactile exploration. Several studies reported
impaired tactile object recognition together with deficient
manual exploration after lesions affecting the PPC
(Binkofski et al. 2001; Knecht et al. 1996; Pause et al.
1989). However, others reported patients whose tactile
agnosia was independent of exploratory hand movement
deficits (Platz 1996; Reed & Caselli 1994; Reed et al.
1996). Basic somatosensory function was normal in all
these patients.
Exploratory hand movements can also be impaired
while tactile perception remains relatively preserved.
Pause et al. (1989) observed that patients with posterior
parietal lesions were severely disturbed in their ability to
perform exploratory movements, while having only mild
to moderate somatosensory perceptual disturbances.
Remarkably, these patients could produce the exploratory
movements imitatively. This suggests that the disturbance
of the posterior parietal patients is one of sensorimotor
transformation for the guidance of exploratory hand move-
ments that normally provide information required for the
identification of objects.
Valenza et al. (2001) described a patient with an intact
ability to perceive passively applied stimuli, but with
severe impairments when required to use exploratory
finger movements for object identification. The lesion of
this patient affected, among other regions, the inferopos-
terior parietal lobe, including the intraparietal sulcus.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) record-
ings with this patient showed a lack of activation in the
superior temporal and inferoparietal regions, compared
to control subjects during passive somatosensory
stimulation.
Functional imaging studies also indicate a role for the
PPC in exploratory hand movements. Seitz et al. (1991)
found increased regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) in
the superior PPC during tactile discrimination of unfami-
liar objects. fMRI recordings during manipulation and
exploration of complex meaningless objects showed acti-
vation of the superior parietal cortex (area 5), the opercu-
lar parietal cortex, including the SII, and the AIP
(Binkofski et al. 1999b; Ja¨ncke et al. 2001).
Overall, the studies reviewed here suggest an overlap, as
well as dissociation, between the neural mechanisms
involved in exploratory hand movements and those
responsible for perception of objects. Both the PPC and
the insula have been implicated in the perception of
objects. The PPC has been implicated in exploratory
hand movements, and patient studies suggest that explora-
tory finger movements are dissociable from perceptual
recognition of objects. We suggest that the APC–SII–
Insula route is responsible for conscious somatosensory
perception and recognition of objects, with the right
inferior PPC contributing to spatio-temporal integration.
However, often exploratory movements are necessary to
recognize an object and at this point the APC–PPC
cortex route is called upon to program these movements
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that constitute specific, well-rehearsed action sequences
depending on the type of information that is required.
This route may involve superior parietal areas (particularly
area 5). AIP seems to be involved in both perceptual rep-
resentation of the object and exploratory finger move-
ments. It, therefore, may act as an interface between
perceptual and motor-related processes and could be
involved in temporal and spatial integration of input
obtained during tactile exploration into an object rep-
resentation. Thus, recognition via hand and finger move-
ments depends on an intricate collaboration between the
parietal and the insular systems.
3.2. Cortical processing of somatosensory information
pertaining to the body
Perhaps an even more important function of the somato-
sensory system is informing us about the position of our
different body parts with respect to one another. To
achieve this, tactile and proprioceptive input needs to be
integrated with visual and vestibular input into a represen-
tation of the body. Evidence concerning body represen-
tations comes from different sources. Studies of
neurological patients show that a variety of lesions to the
peripheral and central nervous systems can result in
changes of body representations. For example, some
limb amputees report that their phantom limb can
change in size and form over time (Berlucchi & Aglioti
1997). Lesions to the central nervous system can
produce disorders such as anosognosia (denial of
symptom) for motor and sensory deficits after a stroke
(Berlucchi & Aglioti 1997; Levine et al. 1991), denial of
ownership of a body part, and misplegia (hatred of hemi-
paretic limbs) (Berlucchi & Aglioti 1997; Moss & Turnbull
1996). These disorders usually, but not always, are found
after right hemisphere lesions and may be accompanied
by reports of supernumerary limbs (Halligan & Marshall
1995), suggesting that negative and positive syndromes
share common neural mechanisms. Left posterior parietal
brain lesions can result in other impairments of body rep-
resentations, such as autotopagnosia (inability to localise
body parts), finger agnosia, and left-right disorientation
(Denes 1999).
The important question for the present review is
whether different representations of the body are used
for the guidance of movements, as compared to perceptual
judgements about the spatial relations of the different
body parts. Several authors have suggested that this
indeed may be the case. For example, Paillard (1999) dis-
tinguished between body schema and body image. Body
image was described as a “perceptual identification of
body features” related to an internal representation of
sensory and motor input of corporeal origin. This internal
representation would be accessible to conscious experi-
ence. In contrast, the body schema refers to the location
of different body parts in a sensorimotor map of body
space, which is not accessible to consciousness. In addition
to the two body representations described by Paillard,
other authors also distinguished a third representation
containing conceptual and semantic knowledge about
the body (Buxbaum & Coslett 2001; Guariglia et al.
2002; Schwoebel et al. 2001; Sirigu et al. 1991).
Evidence for separate body representations from
neuropsychological studies was first described almost a
century ago (Head & Holmes 1911–1912). More recently,
Paillard (1999) suggested that the “numbsense” patients
mentioned earlier in this review have a specific deficit in
the perceptual representation of target (body image),
while the sensorimotor representation (body schema)
remains unaffected. He described the opposite dissociation
in a patient who suffered from peripheral deafferentation,
but with an intact motor system. She was able to verbally
identify the location of tactile stimuli, but was poor at point-
ing towards the stimulus (see Fig. 3). This would be consist-
ent with an impairment in body schema, with preserved
body image. A similar pattern (impaired pointing in combi-
nation with intact verbal report) has also been reported by
Halligan et al. (1995).
Other evidence for separate body representations
involved in the guidance of action and perceptual recog-
nition of objects comes from patients with autotopagnosia.
Buxbaum and Coslett (2001) described a patient who was
unable to point to any of his body parts, or to those of
another person, yet could perform visually guided grasping
movements. The latter suggests that his impairment was
unlikely to be the consequence of an impairment in body
schema. Furthermore, he was able to point to objects
attached at different locations to the body (see also Sirigu
et al. 1991). Buxbaum and Coslett suggested that their
patient had an impaired “system of structural descriptions
of the body and its parts which defines the position of body
parts relative to one another in a perceptual . . . format”
(p. 302). In a recent study of body representation disorders
in a group of 70 stroke patients, Schwoebel and Coslett
(2005) observed a triple dissociation between measures
of three putative body representations (body schema,
Figure 3. Performance of peripherally de-afferented patient
G.L. on three pointing tasks. Cold tactile stimuli were applied
to various locations on her left hand. In the “without vision”
condition, GL was greatly impaired in pointing towards the
stimuli. Performance was considerable better when allowed
vision of her left hand. Remarkably, her performance was
similar to the “vision” condition when asked to point to the
location of the stimulus on a picture of the left hand. From
Paillard (1999) with permission from Academic Publishing
House, Sofia, Bulgaria.
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body structural description, and body semantics). They
linked the left temporal cortex to structural and semantic
knowledge, and the dorsolateral frontal and posterior par-
ietal lesions to body schema.
Other authors have implicated a network that includes
the APC, the PPC, and the insula to be involved in
bodily awareness and perception (Berlucchi & Aglioti
1997; Melzack 1990). Each area is supposed to play a
different role. Thus, lesions to the APC result in tactile
and proprioceptive impairments, but not in higher-order
body-awareness deficits. The SII appears to be important
for integration of information from the two body halves
(Hari et al. 1998; Lin & Forss 2002). Lesions to the PPC
can result in alterations in higher-order body awareness,
as mentioned previously, with lesions to the left and the
right PPC producing different types of deficits. Functional
imaging studies also suggest that the PPC is involved in
body representations. A positron emission tomography
(PET) study showed activation in the superior PPC,
intraparietal sulcus, and adjacent inferior parietal lobule
during mental transpositions of the body in space
(Bonda et al. 1995) In a more recent study, Ehrsson
et al. (2005b) used the vibrotactile illusion to study the
neural basis of body representations and, specifically,
body image. Participants were asked to hold their waist
while vibrotactile stimulation was applied to the wrist
extensors. They experienced predictable changes in waist
size. This illusion was related to activation in the left
postcentral sulcus, but also in the anterior part of the
left intraparietal sulcus, suggesting that this area is
involved in the perceptual experience of body size.
In addition to the PPC, the insula may be involved in
corporeal awareness. Patients with insular lesions may
experience somatic hallucinations (Roper et al. 1993) or
somatoparaphrenia (Cereda et al. 2002). A recent lesion
overlap study implicated the posterior insula in bodily
awareness (Karnath et al. 2005). Functional imaging
studies also suggest that the insula activation may be
related to a sense of ownership and agency (Farrer et al.
2003). Others have related the insula to subjective aware-
ness and affective processing of bodily signals (Craig 2002,
2004). Craig has proposed a separate pathway relaying
input regarding the ongoing condition of different organs
of the body (viscera, muscles, joints, skin, etc.). This
pathway mainly relays information through small-diameter
afferent fibres to the spinal dorsal horn and the solitary
nucleus in the medulla as part of the autonomic nervous
system. It not only provides input as part of homeostatic
mechanisms to the hypothalamus and brain stem, but
also projects through the ventral medial nucleus of the
thalamus to the posterior insula (see also Olausson et al.
2002). Further projections exist from the posterior insula
to the anterior insula. Craig has suggested that this
pathway is related to our subjective awareness of our
body and bodily emotions (“how you feel”). Thus, in this
model, emotional processing is related to activity of the
autonomic nervous system. Craig (2005) has additionally
suggested different roles for the left and the right
insulae. The right insula is suggested to be related to
“aroused” emotions linked to the sympathetic system. In
contrast, the left insula is considered to be involved in
“parasympathetic” or “enrichment” emotions.
Overall, the studies reviewed here suggest that the
insula is concerned with higher-order somatosensory
processing of the body that is either related to a sense of
ownership or to emotional experience. In contrast, the
posterior parietal cortex may be more concerned with
metric aspects of the body, such as its spatial configuration
and size. Although the data are not entirely consistent, the
overall picture that emerges is that the anterior part of the
intraparietal sulcus is consistently involved.
With respect to the neural basis of action-related body
representations, again a network of different neural struc-
tures appears to be involved. Activity related to arm move-
ment occurs already early in the somatosensory system.
Neurons in the postcentral gyrus have been found to
modulate their responsiveness to arm movement, depend-
ing on whether the arm movement was made passively or
actively (Prud’Homme & Kalaska 1994). Furthermore,
different sensorimotor channels can be detected in the
APC. Iwamura and Tanaka (1996) reported that certain
neurones in area 2 were activated only by self-generated
hand actions to reach or to grasp objects. These neurones
were preferentially active during reaching, a precision
grip, or a whole hand grasp. A recent fMRI study con-
firmed the involvement of the APC in somatosensory-
guided movements in humans (Wenderoth et al. 2006).
These areas may provide kinaesthetic information to the
multimodal visuomotor neurones in the PPC, although
another possibility may be the direct connections to the
motor cortex (Johnson et al. 1996; Marconi et al. 2001;
Rizzolatti et al. 1998) Of course, we also know that infor-
mation about the movement of the arm can bypass the
postcentral gyrus (see sect. 2).
The SII also seems to play a role in proprioception. Acti-
vation of the SII is modulated by isometric muscle con-
traction (Lin et al. 2000) and activation after electric
median nerve stimulation is enlarged bilaterally when
accompanied by exploratory finger movements (Huttunen
et al. 1996).
A third area that plays a particularly important role is
the PPC. Neurophysiological studies suggest that particu-
larly area 5 is involved in somatosensory processing con-
cerning the body during goal-directed arm movements.
Neurones in this area respond to somatosensory stimu-
lation that is reach-related (Colby 1998; Gregoriou &
Savaki 2001), whereas others have been found active
during prehension (Debowy et al. 2001; Gardner et al.
1999; Ro et al. 2000). Furthermore, integration of tactile,
and especially proprioceptive, input about the movement
of the arm with sensory information about the target prob-
ably occurs in the posterior parietal lobe. There is con-
siderable evidence that the PPC is involved in the
transformation of visual signal into motor commands
(Jeannerod et al. 1995; Kalaska et al. 1997; Milner &
Dijkerman 1998). Neurophysiological studies (Colby
1998; Sakata et al. 1973; Savaki et al. 1997) and neuroima-
ging studies (Clower et al. 1996; Kertzman et al. 1997)
suggest particular involvement of the area 7 in the inte-
gration of visual target information with proprioceptive
limb information (see also sect. 6).
4. Behavioural dissociations in studies of healthy
subjects
While the review so far suggests that there is considerable
evidence for dissociated neural processing for somatosensory
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perception and action, relatively few studies have investi-
gated possible behavioural dissociations in healthy partici-
pants. Westwood and Goodale (2003) assessed the effect of
a haptic version of a visual size-contrast illusion on percep-
tual size matching and grasping responses. Subjects were
required to explore with the left hand a flanker object
placed underneath a table and subsequently hold a target
object positioned adjacent to the flanker object. The
flanker object could be smaller, larger, or identical to the
target object. They were then asked to either perceptually
estimate the size of the target object by varying the index
finger–thumb distance of the right hand, or grasp an
object identical to the target object on the table with that
hand. Although the size estimates were influenced by the
flanker object (smaller for the larger flanker object), no
effect was found for the maximum grip aperture during
grasping.
Whereas Westwood and Goodale (2003) investigated
somatosensory processing of external objects, Kammers
et al. (2006) used a vibrotactile illusion to explore differ-
ences between matching and reaching involving the pos-
ition of a body part. The vibrotactile illusion is evoked by
repetitive stimulation of a tendon of a muscle in one of
the extremities. This stimulation induces the subjective
experience of a movement of that extremity congruent
with relaxation of that muscle. Two conditions were
used. The direct condition, in which the biceps brachii
tendon of the dominant arm was vibrated, created an illu-
sory extension of the underarm. The indirect condition,
wherein the ipsilateral knee was held with the vibrated
arm, caused an illusion of lowering of the leg. In each con-
dition, subjects were asked to make a reaching response
(point with the index finger of the non-stimulated arm to
the felt location of the ipsilateral index fingertip or top
of the kneecap), as well as a matching response (mirroring
the position of the non-stimulated arm or knee to the per-
ceived position of the stimulated arm or kneecap). The
illusion was significantly larger for the matching as com-
pared to the reaching response, with the largest difference
observed in the direct condition, suggesting that body rep-
resentations underlying perception and action may be dif-
ferentially sensitive to the illusion in healthy individuals. In
an earlier study, Sittig and colleagues observed that sub-
jects continued to reach to the correct target position
when vibrotactile stimulation was applied to the moving
arm (Sittig et al. 1985). In a more recent study, Marcel
(2003) also observed a difference in sensitivity to the vibro-
tactile illusion between the perceptual report and motor
response. In addition, he reported that, after several
seconds, the motor responses also became influenced by
the vibrotactile illusion. This intriguing observation
suggests that, with time, cognitive perceptual represen-
tations of limb position become dominant.
Overall, the findings of these behavioural studies are
consistent with the idea that somatosensory processing
for perception can be dissociated from those underlying
action, although the Marcel (2003) study suggests that
interactions between the two representations can occur.
5. Comparison with other sensory modalities
As mentioned before, the idea that the guidance of action
requires different sensory processing than does
recognition is not new and was first proposed about 15
years ago for the visual cortical system (Goodale &
Milner 1992; Jeannerod & Rossetti 1993; Milner &
Goodale 1995). Separate processing streams have been
also been proposed for the auditory system (Belin &
Zatorre 2000; Rauschecker 1998). These similarities in
proposed cortical organisation of the different sensory
systems may suggest a common plan of how sensory
input is processed by the brain (Belin & Zatorre 2000;
Rauschecker 1998). In this section, we compare the corti-
cal organisation of the somatosensory system with that of
other sensory systems. Although there are many simi-
larities, some important differences exist, as well.
One of the central premises of the “separate visual cor-
tical processing streams for perception and action” model
is that neural processing is related to the way in which we
use this information – for example, to store for later recog-
nition or to program a motor action (Milner & Goodale
1995). Support for this idea, rather than for a distinction
in terms of input characteristics (e.g., spatial vs. object
vision), was based on mainly two lines of evidence. First,
monkey neurophysiology suggested that posterior parietal
regions also process non-spatial characteristics (size) for
guidance of the hand (Sakata et al. 1995). Second, it has
been argued that patients with neurological lesions indi-
cate a double dissociation between visual processing for
perception and for action. Patient D.F., who suffers
from visual form agnosia, was impaired when required to
give a perceptual judgement about the size or orientation
of a visual stimulus, but was able to use the same stimulus
characteristics for the guidance of hand movements
(Goodale et al. 1991). In contrast, optic ataxic patient
A.T. was impaired when required to grasp an object,
while remaining able to judge the size of the object per-
ceptually (Jeannerod et al. 1994). More recent fMRI evi-
dence also seems consistent with this idea (Culham et al.
2003; James et al. 2003). Milner and Goodale (1995)
further suggested that perceptual and action-related
responses require different processing characteristics.
The visuomotor system requires information about the
position of the target in relation to the observer that is con-
tinuously updated. As a consequence, dorsal stream pro-
cessing is characterised by egocentric reference frames
and real-time computation with an inability to store the
input for longer than a few seconds. In contrast, the per-
ceptual system is able to recognize objects irrespective
of its viewpoint, and it stores this information over long
periods of time.
The visual ventral stream also plays a role in visuomotor
control when it involves aspects that are characteristic for
ventral stream processing, such as holding visual infor-
mation during a delay or retrieval of object knowledge
(Goodale 2001). Indeed, visual form agnosic patient
D.F. was impaired when required to wait for as little as
2 seconds after stimulus presentation when grasping an
object (Goodale et al. 1994). In contrast, optic ataxic
patients improved their performance after a delay
(Milner et al. 2001; 2003), consistent with the idea that
such patients are able to use to intact ventral stream to
overcome their visuomotor deficit when a delay is intro-
duced. A second example is that optic ataxic patient A.T.
improved in ability-to-grip scale when grasping familiar
as compared to unfamiliar objects (Jeannerod et al.
1994), whereas visual agnosic patient D.F. failed to take
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into account stored knowledge about the characteristics of
well-known objects when programming her grip (Carey
et al. 1996). Other studies suggest that the ventral
stream is also active when subjects must consciously ident-
ify the visual context and decide on the appropriate action
(Passingham & Toni 2001). Together, these findings are
consistent with the idea of two separate, but interacting,
visual cortical streams. The dorsal stream is involved in
the visual guidance of immediate goal-directed hand and
arm movements. The visual ventral stream is primarily
associated with visual perception and recognition;
however, it is also involved in certain aspects of the
visual guidance of movement that require delayed
action, object knowledge, or conscious decision making.
To what extent are similar processing characteristics
applicable to the cortical somatosensory system as pro-
posed here? As already described by others, for both the
somatosensory and the visual systems, response character-
istics become increasingly more complex the further away
the neurones are from the thalamic input into the cortex.
This involves increasing receptive fields (Lin & Forss
2002; Ruben et al. 2001; Sinclair & Burton 1993), more
complex stimuli required to activate the neurones
(Gardner 1988; Hyva¨rinen & Poranen 1978), and so on.
A second similarity is that residual unconscious processes
can occur after lesions affecting primary cortical areas or
the main thalamic relay station. Thus, implicit processing
of tactile stimuli for action in the numbsense patients is
very similar to the findings observed in the visual equival-
ent, that is, blindsight (Perenin & Rossetti 1996; Wei-
skrantz 1996) – as was indeed observed by the original
investigators (Paillard et al. 1983; Rossetti et al. 2001).
Third, there is some evidence that introducing a delay
between stimulus presentation and response has similar
effects in the visual and the somatosensory system.
Rossetti et al. (2001) reported that performance of their
numbsense patient reverted to chance levels when a
delay was introduced. Similar findings were reported for
action blindsight (Perenin & Rossetti 1996). In a study
with healthy participants, Zuidhoek et al. (2003) observed
that the introduction of a delay reduced errors on a haptic
parallel-setting task. They attributed the improved per-
formance to a shift from the egocentric towards the allo-
centric reference frame during the delay period. These
findings are consistent with a shift from dorsal to ventral
stream processing in the visual system.
Perhaps one of the most striking differences between
the two-visual-cortical-streams model and the present pro-
posal is the inclusion of body-related representations.
Whereas the two-visual-cortical-streams model deals
only with visual input concerning external stimuli, the
somatosensory system first and foremost provides infor-
mation about our own body. A model of somatosensory
cortical processing, in our opinion, would be incomplete
without incorporating ideas about the neural basis of
body representations. In contrast, a model of the visual
cortical processing does not necessarily include body rep-
resentations, as the optical array can provide direct infor-
mation about the structure and position of external stimuli.
Nevertheless, visual input about the observer’s body is an
important source of information, both during the guidance
of movements and for perceptual awareness and recog-
nition of your body. With respect to the neural basis of
visual body representations, there is ample evidence for
egocentric coding of external targets in a reference
frame linked to specific body parts (Andersen 1997;
Colby 1998; Graziano et al. 2000); however, the neural
correlates of visual representations of the observer’s own
body has received less attention. Recent functional
imaging studies have reported activation in the extrastriate
body area (EBA) when body stimuli have been viewed
(Downing et al. 2001). While activation in this area is
modulated by the position of the observer’s body (Arzy
et al. 2006b) and movement with the observer’s (unseen)
arm (Astafiev et al. 2004), activation responds mainly to
pictures of other people’s body and is therefore not specifi-
cally involved in own body representations.
A second possible difference between the visual and
somatosensory systems pertains to the degree of separ-
ation in the two cortical processing streams and the
amount of spatio-temporal integration that is required.
In the visual system, processing for action and for percep-
tion is clearly linked to separate cortical processing
streams. Although more recent work suggests that the
two processing streams are probably more interconnected
than originally was thought and the ventral stream plays a
(specific) role in several aspects of visuomotor processing,
functional characteristics can, nevertheless, be related to
separate neural processing streams. Our review of the
literature suggests that the separation between action-
related and perception-related processes may be less
distinct in the somatosensory system. We found evidence
for the involvement of both the PPC and the insula in per-
ception and again the PPC for action-related processes.
The involvement of posterior parietal processing for soma-
tosensory perception may be related to a fundamental
difference between somatosensory and visual systems.
Whereas the visual array enables simultaneous processing
of different stimuli and stimuli features, tactile exploration
of stimulus features occurs in a more sequential manner.
Increased temporal and spatial integration may be
required in order to be able to integrate the tactile input
into a coherent representation of the stimuli. The inferior
parietal cortex seems particularly important for such inte-
gration (Saetti et al. 1999). The role of the PPC in somato-
sensory perception may be related to these increased
demands on spatio-temporal integration. Interestingly,
higher-order visual spatial functions have also been
related to inferior posterior parietal processing. This has
also been described as the ventro-dorsal stream (Pisella
et al. 2006; Rizzolatti & Matelli 2003) and has been
related to disorders such as hemispatial neglect (after
right hemisphere lesions) and apraxia (after left hemi-
sphere lesions) (Milner & Goodale 1995; Pisella et al.
2006; Rizzolatti & Matelli 2003). Several investigators
have noted that somatosensory deficits often co-occur
with impairments in higher spatial processing such as
neglect (Semmes 1965; Vallar 1997). This indeed may be
the consequence of increased higher-order spatial proces-
sing that may influence visual, as well as somatosensory,
spatial representations (Saetti et al. 1999; Vallar 1997).
A third sensory modality for which separate processing
streams have been proposed concerns the auditory
system. These suggestions are based on recent neurophy-
siological data discerning separable cortical areas for the
processing of auditory input. These areas involve a core, a
belt, and parabelt regions arranged in a concentric
manner in the superior temporal gyrus (Kaas et al. 1999).
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An important model of the functional architecture of audi-
tory processing was proposed by Rauschecker and Tian
(2000), who argued that a ventral pathway running from
the auditory core area in a forward direction is involved in
analysing the stimulus characteristics. This route is import-
ant for object identification (e.g., a voice) and hence called
the “what” pathway. A second, more posterior dorsal,
pathway is thought to be sensitive to spatial location (the
“where” path). This distinction is further supported by
patient studies (Clarke et al. 2000) and neuroimaging exper-
iments (e.g., seeRomanski et al. 1999). Thismodel has been
challenged by Zatorre and colleagues (e.g., Belin & Zatorre
2000), who agree with the conceptualisation of the ventral
“what” pathway. However, they object to the idea that the
posterior dorsal route is mainly involved in spatial localis-
ation, because, among other reasons, there is little evidence
for spatial maps in the auditory system. In contrast, they
claim that the dorsal pathway is primarily involved in per-
ceiving the “evolution in time of the signal emitted by one
or several auditory objects” (Belin & Zatorre 2000,
p. 965). Hence, the processing characteristic is likened to
that of the visual area V5 or MT, processing time-related
change in the signal. According to Zatorre and colleagues,
the dorsal pathway processes the verbal message, whereas
the ventral route is responsible for the recognition of the
voice. In addition, they propose a lateralisation of function
with the left hemisphere system being better tuned for
speech perception (time sensitivity) and the right hemi-
sphere system for music perception (pitch sensitivity;
Zatorre et al. 2002).
Overall, there are clear similarities between the organis-
ation of the auditory and the somatosensory systems.
These systems share the increasing complexity of the
information processing while moving away from the
primary cortical areas (APC and the auditory core
[Heschl’s gyrus]). There is a reasonable agreement in the
literature that two distinct pathways can be discerned in
the auditory system. The equivalent of the “what”
pathway is comparable in that it is involved in the recog-
nition of external objects (as in vision), but there is no
active exploration of the objects as is the case in tactile
object recognition. The status of the “where” pathway is
controversial, with different competing views. So far,
there is little evidence for spatially organised cortical
maps in the auditory system and a link with action-
related processes.
Taken together, there appears to be substantial support for
the idea that the different cortical sensory systems share
overall organisational principles (Belin & Zatorre 2000;
Rauschecker 1998). In addition, there are clear indications
for a common organisational principle in the development
of the morphology, architecture, and connections in the
different modalities (e.g., see Pandya & Yeterian 1990).
These include specialisation of function, subserved by separ-
ate processing routes. This distinction is, however, relative,
because there are also clear differences resulting from the
input (nature of the sensory signal) and the output character-
istics (perception, action) of the particular modality.
6. Crossmodal interactions
Traditionally, the study of sensory systems has focused on
the processes and structure within a single modality. More
recent studies have demonstrated that the different senses
work closely together and strongly influence one another.
Neuroanatomy supports the notion of integration and
mutual influence. An example at a relative basic level con-
cerns the structure of the superior colliculus with close
proximity and common organisation among visual, audi-
tory, and somatosensory processing (May 2005).
Crossmodal processes have been found to affect a
variety of tasks. Early perceptual processing in one
modality may be modulated by input from another
modality presented shortly prior to or simultaneously
with the first stimulus. A dramatic example of this
phenomenon is the observation that a single light flash is
perceived as two flashes when the subject simultaneously
hears two short auditory stimuli. The effect of the auditory
stimulus alters processing in the primary visual cortex
(Watkins et al. 2006). There is now a substantial literature
on crossmodal links between auditory, tactile, and visual
stimuli in spatial attention (Maravita et al. 2003; Schmitt
et al. 2001). There are indications, however, that the
links between vision and audition are perhaps stronger
than between these modalities and touch (Eimer et al.
2002). Furthermore, cross-modality presentation may
influence the “experience of ownership.” Studies have
shown that normal subjects experience a rubber hand as
their own when it is stroked in a synchronous, but irregu-
lar, manner with their own unseen hand (Botvinick &
Cohen 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard 2005). Functional
imaging studies suggest that the ventral premotor cortex,
the intraparietal sulcus, and the lateral cerebellum are
involved in this illusion (Ehrsson et al. 2004; 2005a).
In another study, subjects experienced the hand seen on
a screen as their own when their hand and the one on the
screen are touched simultaneously. Using magnetoence-
phalography (MEG), it was demonstrated that the activity
in the APC was modulated depending on whether the
subject experienced ownership of the hand on the
monitor (Schaefer et al. 2006a).
Crossmodal interactions have also been observed for
somatosensory tasks in which non-informative vision was
provided. Non-informative vision has been found to influ-
ence performance on a variety of perceptual tasks, ranging
from spatial acuity (Kennett et al. 2001) to size constancy
(Taylor-Clarke et al. 2004) and parallel setting of bars
(Newport et al. 2002; Zuidhoek et al. 2004). The visual
information provided varied, from a view of the stimulated
body part (Kennett et al. 2001; Taylor-Clarke et al. 2004),
to the environment excluding the stimuli (Newport et al.
2002; Zuidhoek et al. 2004). Fewer studies have investi-
gated crossmodal interactions with respect to sensorimotor
action. Newport et al. (2001) showed that impaired proprio-
ceptive target information in a patient could be ameliorated
during a pointing movement through non-informative
vision of the surrounding environment.
The question relevant for this review is whether a
certain specificity in the visual-tactile interaction can be
observed. That is, are visual influences on somatosensory
processing for action different from visual-tactile inter-
actions during perceptual recognition? At a behavioural
level, this topic has received little attention, even though
neurophysiological and functional imaging studies
suggest that these crossmodal interactions involve differ-
ent neural processes. For example, a functional imaging
study by Prather et al. (2004) showed that mental rotation
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of tactile forms activates the visual dorsal stream, whereas
tactile form discrimination is associated with ventral
stream activation. Furthermore, several fMRI studies
showed activation of the lateral occipital complex (LOC,
part of the visual ventral stream) during visual and
tactile object recognition (Amedi et al. 2001; James
et al. 2002; Reed et al. 2004). On the other hand, neu-
rophysiological studies and functional imaging studies
show multimodal activation in the PPC that is related
to motor action (Clower et al. 1996; Kalaska et al.
1997; Kertzman et al. 1997; Savaki et al. 1997).
Indeed, it could be argued that the two processing
streams in both modalities project to the same higher-
order cortical areas that are involved in multimodal
sensory integration for the guidance of action (PPC) or
perception (LOC).
With respect to the PPC in action, different areas within
the superior parietal cortex and the intraparietal sulcus
appear to be related to different visuomotor channels,
including grasping, reaching, saccade, and pursuit eye
movements (Hyva¨rinen & Poranen 1974; Milner &
Dijkerman 1998; Mountcastle et al. 1975). Some of these
areas contain neurones that have bimodal response prop-
erties and are active during reaching (Colby 1998). Multi-
modal processing in the PPC also appears to be related to
distinct reference frames. For example, the bimodal
responsive neurones in area VIP appear to code stimuli
particularly in a head-centred reference frame (Duhamel
et al. 1998), while bimodal activity in area MIP is related
to arm-centred spatial representations (Colby 1998;
Duhamel et al. 1998; Graziano et al. 2000). In humans,
the PPC appears to be active when a conflict is created
between visual and proprioceptive signals during a reach-
ing movement (Clower et al. 1996). Overall, these findings
suggest the PPC to be involved in multimodal coding of
body-related and arm-related configurations used for the
guidance of action.
With respect to perceptual recognition of external
targets, activation of area LOC during visual as well as
somatosensory object recognition has been found. Several
possible explanations have been put forward for this
finding. Participants may use visual imagery when perform-
ing a tactile object recognition task (Deibert et al. 1999). A
second possibility is that LOC is a multimodal area related
to higher-order perceptual representations of objects
(Amedi et al. 2001; James et al. 2002). Amedi et al. (2001)
observed that activation in LOC during visual imagery
was less than during either tactile or visual object recog-
nition Furthermore, Pietrini et al. (2004) observed similar
activation during tactile recognition in congenitally blind
subjects, which suggests that visual imagery is less likely
to be the principal cause for the involvement of LOC in
tactile object perception. Together, these findings suggest
that LOC is a multimodal area involved in perceptual rep-
resentation of object-form features.
7. Conclusions
The present review has discussed physiological, neuropsy-
chological, and neuroimaging evidence concerning soma-
tosensory processing for conscious perception and
recognition, and for the guidance of action. Our hypoth-
esis is that separate neural pathways are involved in the
processing of somatosensory input for these two func-
tions. Support for dissociations between perception and
action has been found at several levels of processing
and on a variety of tasks. Numbsense reveals a dis-
sociation between detection of a simple touch and the
preserved guidance of action towards the same stimulus
based on processes that remained unaware to patients.
For higher somatosensory functions, a further distinction
can be made between somatosensory processing of
internal and external targets. With respect to the latter,
tactile recognition of objects may be impaired indepen-
dent of exploratory finger movements deficits, whereas
passive recognition of shape can remain preserved
when exploratory hand and finger movements are
impaired. In normal circumstances, however, perceptual
and action-based processes must operate in a coordinated
fashion during tactile object recognition, and damage to
either system might lead to deficits. Regarding internal
higher-order representations pertaining to the body,
there is considerable evidence, especially from neuropsy-
chological studies, that there are at least two different
representations: that is, body image and body schema.
Body image has been defined as a more stable and
internal perceptual representation of the body, whereas
the body schema contains a dynamic representation of
different body parts that can be used for sensorimotor
action.
These functional dissociations suggest that different
neural processes may subserve somatosensory action and
perception. Indeed, there is evidence for two separate
routes of tactile processing, one projecting through the
SII to the insula and another terminating in the posterior
parietal areas. We suggest that the system responsible for
somatosensory processing for the immediate guidance of
action is subserved by a route that runs from the APC,
either directly or via the SII, to the PPC. This area is sub-
sequently involved in crossmodal integration and the prep-
aration of movements. Somatosensory processing for
conscious perception and memory is performed by a
system that culminates in the insula. In addition, the
right PPC appears to be involved in spatio-temporal inte-
gration of somatosensory input during recognition of
objects and body configurations, whereas the left PPC
has been implicated in structural and semantic body
representations.
We have thus developed a model to describe the cortical
processing of somatosensory information (see Fig. 1).
Although our model is inspired by ideas about the organ-
isation of the visual cortical system, there are some import-
ant differences. First, we make a distinction between
processing concerning internal and external stimuli,
whereas the two-visual-systems model is concerned with
external targets only. Second, the two somatosensory pro-
cessing streams appear less independent than the two
visual streams. For example, the PPC appears to be
involved in processes subserving perception, as well as
action, although the double dissociations found suggest
that they involve neural circuits that are at least partly sep-
arate. Furthermore, it is clear that, at a behavioural level,
normal performance during tactile recognition of external
objects requires close coordination between action-related
and perception-related processes. Nevertheless, the evi-
dence presented in this review is consistent with dissoci-
able processes, and further studies should be aimed at
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delineating the specificity and interaction between the
functional entities proposed in the model.
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Abstract: In the haptic domain, a double dissociation can be proposed on
the basis of neurological deficits between tactile information for action,
represented by tactile apraxia, and tactile information for perception,
represented by tactile agnosia. We suggest that this dissociation comes
from different networks, both involving the anterior intraparietal area
of the posterior parietal cortex.
Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) suggest that, analogous to the
organisation of the visual system, somatosensory processing for
guiding actions (terminating in the posterior parietal cortex
[PPC]) can be dissociated from the processing that leads to per-
ception and memory (going through the secondary somatosen-
sory cortex and terminating both in the insula and in the PPC).
In the visual domain, the clinical conditions of optic ataxia and
visual form agnosia stand for two separate streams of visual infor-
mation: dorsal stream for action and ventral stream for percep-
tion. Analogously, in the haptic domain a similar dissociation of
information processing for external tactile stimuli can be pro-
posed: an action stream represented by tactile apraxia and a per-
ception stream represented by tactile agnosia. As suggested by
D&dH, there is also clinical evidence that, despite the parallel
processing, the haptic streams for perception and action interact
tightly because of functional and anatomical overlaps inside the
PPC. Accordingly, both haptic perception of objects and somato-
sensory guidance of action are processed in the anterior part of
the PPC: the human anterior intraparietal area (AIP).
AIP and action (tactile apraxia): Interaction with the ventral
premotor cortex. Tactile apraxia is defined as an affection of
explorative finger movements in absence of paresis or sensory
deficits (Klein 1931). The finger movements seem uncoordinated
and inadequate to the size and the shape of objects to be
explored (Binkofski et al. 2001). Typically, the intransitive (not
object related) and expressive movements (gestures) are well
preserved. Functional imaging studies show that manipulative
finger movements involve activation of the AIP, the superior
parietal lobule, the secondary somatosensory area, and the
ventral premotor cortex (vPMC) (Binkofski et al. 1999a; Ja¨ncke
et al. 2001). Especially the AIP is processing dynamic parameters
of ongoing hand actions (Tunik et al. 2005). Electrophysiology in
monkeys showed that AIP neurons discharge during object
holding and manipulation (Sakata et al. 1992; 1995) and that
those “motor dominant” neurons discharge during hand-related
actions in the dark (Murata et al. 1996). The tight interaction
between the AIP and the vPMC for coordination of goal-directed
hand movements has been already proposed on the basis of
monkey data (Jeannerod et al. 1995; for review, see also Rizzolatti
& Lupino 2001; Rizzolatti et al. 1998). Studies on human lesion
provide another argument in favour of this interaction in the
haptic domain. Lesions involving the AIP, contralateral to the
affected hand, cause tactile apraxia (Binkofski et al. 2001; Valenza
et al. 2001). Furthermore, lesions of the frontal operculum,
containing the vPMC, can also impair finely tuned finger
movements in a condition resembling tactile apraxia, that is, limb
kinetic apraxia (Binkofski & Fink 2005; Binkofski et al. 2001;
Dettmers et al. 2003). Thus, there is converging evidence that the
AIP constitutes the nodal point of a network for coordination and
integration of sensorimotor information for action.
The AIP and perception (tactile agnosia): Links with inferior
temporal cortex. For object recognition from tactile stimulation,
elementary cutaneous and proprioceptive sensations from the
exploratory hand have to be integrated to more complex
information reflecting textural and spatial patterns of a specific
object. O’Sullivan et al. (1994) and Roland et al. (1998) found
evidence for different information streams, depending on the
somatosensory submodalities from positron emission tomographic
activation studies of the human brain. Roughness discrimination
activated the lateral opercular cortex, but shape and length
discrimination activated the AIP. Accordingly, Bohlhalter et al.
(2002) reported two patients with tactile agnosia. One patient had
a lesion that affected mostly the anterior parietal lobe and caused a
pure aperceptive agnosia, and the second had agnosia for more
complex features (like shape) following a lesion of the anterior
intraparietal regions (Hoemke et al., in press). This is consistent
with neuroimaging data in human patients showing that the AIP is
involved in tactile, visual, and transmodal processing of object
features (Grefkes et al. 2002). The lateral occipital cortex (part of
the inferotemporal cortex) is known to be important not only for
visual, but also for tactile, object recognition (Amedi et al. 2001)
and maybe even for the supramodal object recognition (Binkofski
et al. 2004). Anatomical connections between the intraparietal and
inferotemporal areas have been found by the Van Essen group of
researchers (see Lewis & Van Essen 2000) in monkeys, and such
connections seem also to exist in people (Figure 1).
AIP the node. Tactile apraxia and tactile agnosia can occur
separately, indicating a possible dissociation. Indeed, clinical
cases have been reported of patients with tactile agnosia who
had intact exploratory hand movements and preserved basic
Figure 1 (Binofski et al.). Diffusion-tensor tractography data
showing anatomical connections of the anterior intraparietal
area (AIP) with primary sensory, ventral premotor, posterior
intraparietal, and inferior temporal areas. (Figure from Pisella
et al. 2006, with permission)
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somatosensory functions (Platz 1996; Reed & Caselli 1994; Reed
et al. 1996). In contrast, as mentioned by D&dH, Valenza et al.
(2001) described a patient with pure tactile apraxia who had an
intact ability to perceive passively applied stimuli, but showed
severe impairments when required to use exploratory finger
movements for object identification.
However, Delay (1935), while describing tactile apraxia, had
already referred to the association between apractic and agnostic
deficits. Accordingly, tactile apraxia is often accompanied by def-
icits in tactile recognition of objects (or astereognosia) (Binkofski
et al. 2001; Wernicke 1876). This underpins the tight interaction
of the action and the perception systems. Object characteristics
trigger appropriate finger movement patterns that serve the per-
ception of object features (action for perception – “feedback”).
At the same time, the object properties determine the movement
extent – perception in the service of action (perception for
action – “feed forward”) (Lederman & Klatzky 1997). As
shown by Bodegard et al. (2001), the AIP is activated by both
passive and active tactile shape discrimination.
Because the AIP receives somatosensory and visual infor-
mation about objects and is interconnected with the vPMC for
planning actions towards the objects and with the inferior tem-
poral cortex for recognising the objects, this area (or its human
homologue) seems to constitute one of the most important inter-
faces between action and perception in the haptic system.
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Abstract: A visual analogue, two-route model of somatosensory
processing is advanced in this commentary. Touch for perception is
seen as separate from, although interconnected with, touch for action.
Separate modules are additionally proposed for internal (body) and
external (object-related) somatosensation. Here we ask whether
dissociation (divide) guarantees better efficiency (impera) in terms of
the heuristic model within the somatosensory modality and across
modalities.
Tracing a parallel to the two visual streams model, Dijkerman &
de Haan (D&dH) propose a similar distinction in the somatosen-
sory processing system (SP), whose anatomical and physiological
organization would ultimately reflect the action-related use of
somatosensory inputs. Their model is built upon multiple evi-
dence showing that different body representations are used for
perceptual judgments about the structural relationships among
body parts (body image) and for the guidance of action (body
schema).
Somatosensation is highly complex, including different sub-
modalities besides discriminative touch, such as proprioception,
the information about the relative position of our different body
parts in space. It is thus important to describe the possible dis-
sociations, as well as the multiple interconnections, between
the different somatosensory streams, as the authors stress.
However, one may question the extent to which, nowadays, a
dissociation-based approach would help our understanding of
SP. For vision, this approach proved to be successful initially,
until the need to go beyond dissociations and transcend a
dichotomic model for a more interactive one was acknowledged
(Rossetti & Revonsuo 2000). The main argument for the dichoto-
mic view was the so-called double dissociation between visual
agnosia (patient D.F.’s deficit in visual recognition), and optic
ataxia (e.g., patient A.T.’s deficit in visuo-manual guidance), con-
sidered as consecutive to ventral and dorsal damage, respectively.
However, the empirical foundation of such a dissociation has
been largely reconsidered on the basis of both old evidence
(Pisella et al. 2006; Rossetti et al. 2003) and recent evidence
from the very same patient (Schenk 2006), making the ventral-
dorsal dissociation of functions less obvious than previously
thought (see also Coello et al. 2007). By showing that not only
visuo-motor processing, but also perceptual processing is
impaired in optic ataxia, Rossetti et al. (2005) have questioned
the perception-action dissociation classically described in optic
ataxia. By reporting that D.F.’s performance was impaired on
both perceptual and motor tasks in conditions tapping allo-
centric, but not egocentric, coordinates, Schenk showed that
D.F.’s behavior may actually reflect dissociation between differ-
ent modes of visuospatial processing.
Related evidence against purely encapsulated functional
modules in vision comes from studies on normal subjects’ grasp-
ing at illusory displays (Gentilucci et al. 1996), such as in the
Titchener circles illusion. In this size-contrast illusion, two iden-
tically sized disks are perceived as being different in size, depend-
ing upon the size of the surrounding inducers. It was recently
demonstrated that the supposed dorsal stream immunity to
visual illusion cannot be advocated to explain the different
effects found for perception and action in this and other illusions
(Coello et al. 2007). In addition, Pavani and colleagues showed
that both perceptual estimation and hand shaping while grasping
are similarly influenced by the illusion (Franz 2001; Pavani et al.
1999), challenging the conventional visual perception/action
model in the normal brain. So the question arises as to
whether action would resist somatosensory illusion (regarding
vision, see, Bruno 2001).
Take, as an example, the “fixed-set” method (Uznadze 1966)
whereby, for 30 consecutive trials, subjects have to grasp two
spheres of different size (one in each hand) simultaneously and
report which one is bigger. In the subsequent trials, when two
identical spheres are presented to the subjects, an aftereffect
emerges: Typically, the sphere held by the hand previously
holding the bigger sphere is perceived as being smaller than
the sphere in the opposite hand. How would subjects grasp the
illusory smaller sphere? Would the proposed two-route model
for touch predict that their kinematics reflect the veridical or
the illusory somatosensory percept? Besides its empirical inter-
est, the answer to this question might have important theoretical
implications for D&dH’s model, particularly when considering
neuropsychological evidence showing that this method can dis-
close unconscious residual somatosensory processing of objects’
size. A right-brain–damaged patient with left tactile extinction
(patient G.R.; see Maravita 1997) was unable to perceive the
left sphere, but was deceived by the perceptual aftereffect and
reported the size of the right, ipsilesional, sphere incorrectly.
As D&dH say, the notion of separation of functional modules
has to be taken with caution, and we think this would be the
case particularly for SP, which is composed of not only separable,
but also functionally and anatomically interconnected submodal-
ities, and integrated at multiple levels with other sensory
modalities (Calvert et al. 2004).
Orthogonal to the main dissociation, the proposed model
further distinguishes between somatosensory processing occur-
ring in the internal (bodily) space and external (extrapersonal)
space. In this respect, an aspect that the model seems to not
address fully is the following question: What is the relationship
between a touch on the body and the body position in space?
In other words, the “tactile where” is not only “where-on-the-
body” but also “where-on-the-body-in-the-space.” This issue is
tightly linked to the multisensory view of somatosensory
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perception (Brozzoli et al. 2006), because body position infor-
mation may also be provided by visual input (Rossetti et al.
1995a). Previous work on patients with cross-modal visuo-
tactile extinction (di Pellegrino et al. 1997) provided support
for multisensory representations of a third spatial medium, the
peri-personal space, linking the body to external space. In this
respect, Farne` et al. (2000) found that extinction of tactile
stimuli delivered on the contralesional hand is strongest when
visual stimuli are presented closest to the ipsilesional hand. A
comparable effect was obtained when the visual stimulation
was actually presented far from the patients’ ipsilesional hand
(concealed behind their back), but near a rubber hand that was
visible and aligned with the patients’ ipsilesional shoulder. Not
only visual, but also proprioceptive, information about the dis-
tance between hands (body schema) can alter static touch per-
ception, the subjects being faster and more accurate when they
perform tactile tasks while keeping their hands far apart (Brozzoli
et al. 2006; Driver & Grossenbacher 1996).
In sum, we suggest the model might benefit from a more inte-
grated approach to SP, and incorporating the multisensory peri-
personal space representation, to account for the aforementioned
phenomena – which are, in addition, tightly related to “acting” in
somatosensory terms. Sensorimotor non-conscious maps of the
body are plastic, as suggested by the behavioral effects of tool
use in human and nonhuman primates (Berti & Frassinetti 2000;
Farne` et al. 2005; Iriki et al. 1996), and their adaptive functional
role might be better captured within such a wider framework.
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Abstract: The dissociations among body representations that Dijkerman
& de Haan (D&dH) describe are also supported by developmental
evidence. Developmental dissociations among different types of body-
related representations suggest distinct functional systems from the
start, rather than progressive differentiation.
Taxonomies of human body representational systems are nearly
as numerous as the putative systems themselves. Neuroimaging,
neuroclinical, cognitive, and developmental studies over the last
15 years have established that human body knowledge is widely
distributed in the adult brain. The most consistently referenced
taxonomy of body representations includes at least three partially
independent levels (Gallagher 2005; Reed 2002; Sirigu et al.
1991): Sensori-motor body representations are primarily respon-
sible for on-line movement and perception of one’s own body;
visuo-spatial body representations specify the structure and
physical appearance of the human body; and lexical-semantic
body representations support conceptual, language-based knowl-
edge about the human body.
Dijkerman & de Haan’s (D&dH’s) model focuses on sensori-
motor body representations. Like Sirigu et al. (1991), the target
authors distinguish unconscious, own body representations that
control motor activity, from own body representations that
underpin conscious perception. These perceptual represen-
tations are then further distinguished by D&dH as to whether
originating from external stimuli (object exploration and
recognition) or from internal stimuli (proprioception). This last
level is referred to as “body image” in the target article, which
is rather unfortunate because this term is already fraught with
multiple confusing meanings and references (Gallagher 2005;
Reed 2002; Slaughter & Heron 2004).
D&dH offer convincing evidence for their taxonomy. Given
that multiple body-related representations exist in adults, at
least two developmental scenarios are possible. One is that, at
birth, humans are equipped with a supramodal representational
system that subsumes several types of body representations.
Meltzoff and colleagues (Gallagher & Meltzoff 1996; Meltzoff
& Moore 1995) have proposed this sort of a system, mainly to
account for neonatal imitation, which, they suggest, could be
accomplished only through coordination of visual perceptual
information about others’ body movements with proprioceptive
information about the infant’s own body positions and motor rep-
resentations that control the imitative act. On this view, develop-
ment of body representations would involve progressive
dissociation, from the supramodal format, into the distinct func-
tional representations evident in adulthood.
Another possibility is that at least some of the distinct body
representations described by D&dH are differentiated from
the start. Neonatal imitation aside (it should be noted that
there is a good deal of debate about whether neonatal imitation
exists as a flexible behavioural strategy as opposed to a fixed
reflex; see Anisfeld 1996), the developmental evidence suggests
that this is the more likely scenario.
Organized motor activity is evident prenatally (Myowa-Yama-
koshi & Takeshita 2006) and in the first several months of life.
A recent study employed four-dimensional ultrasonography to
examine the arm and hand movements that third-trimester foe-
tuses made towards their faces. More than half of the foetal
arm movements resulted in the hand touching the mouth, and
the majority of reaches to the mouth were preceded by the
mouth opening (Myowa-Yamakoshi & Takeshita 2006). Neonates
spend approximately 20% of their waking hours touching their
own face, and almost one-third of these movements result in
the infants touching their mouths (Butterworth & Hopkins
1988; Lew & Butterworth 1995). When infants touch their own
face, there is no rooting reflex, which suggests that even at this
early age the infants are capable of distinguishing external stimu-
lation from self-stimulation (Butterworth & Hopkins 1988),
though this is not yet as complex as the sort of perceptual
self-recognition defined by D&dH.
In the target article, perceptual self-recognition is defined as
an integration of proprioceptive, kinaesthetic, and visual infor-
mation. This is not evident until 5 months of age, at the earliest.
For instance, when infants were presented with a video playing a
contingent view of their own moving legs and a second video
playing a non-contingent view of legs (delayed feedback),
infants aged 5 months and older preferred to watch the non-
contingent view of themselves, as evidenced by longer times
spent looking at the unusual display (Bahrick & Watson 1985).
Furthermore, infants preferred to watch the non-contingent
view of themselves even when they could not also see their
own legs, which suggests that they could integrate the visual
and proprioceptive information. Thus, body representations
supporting self-perception appear to develop later than
representations that control motor activity.
D&dH distinguish between perceptual representations for self
and for objects. The literature on object exploration in infancy
suggests that exploration of the surface features of objects
becomes increasingly precise over the first year of life. At birth,
motor actions applied to different object sizes, textures, and
shapes are largely undifferentiated, which has traditionally
been interpreted as a consequence of a general inability to recog-
nize the self as a distinct causal entity (Piaget 1953). However,
another interpretation is that the somatosensory representations
that guide manual exploration do not develop until after 6 months
of age. It is only in the second half of the first year that infants
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show clear evidence of altering their manual exploration in
response to specific object properties (Bourgeois et al. 2005).
Thus, the behavioural evidence from developmental studies is
in line with the neuroimaging and neuroclinical evidence pre-
sented by D&dH. Whether the distinct processing streams pos-
tulated in the target article are evident in infancy and early
childhood, is, as yet, unknown, though there is some suggestion
that dorsal and ventral streams for object processing are func-
tionally distinct by 812 months of age (Newman et al. 2001).
Finally, the development of higher-level body representa-
tions – visuo-spatial and lexical-semantic – takes place even
later. Infants do not recognize the typical human body shape
until at least 12 months of age (Slaughter & Heron 2004). Fur-
thermore, a recent study failed to find evidence that the develop-
ment of representations for recognizing human bodies is related
to the maturity or complexity of infants’ own sensori-motor rep-
resentations (Christie & Slaughter, in preparation). Lexical-
semantic body knowledge is acquired later still – not until age
15 months at the earliest, when infants first learn names for
body parts (Witt et al. 1990).
We know bodies from inside and from without; we know them
as objects and as vehicles. It is not surprising that there are
numerous varied levels on which the brain represents bodies.
Taxonomies of body representations can be useful, but to date
there is no comprehensive system for organizing our knowledge
about body representations, or for communicating that knowl-
edge. This is an important next step.
How many representations of the body?
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Abstract: Based on functional differences, Dijkerman & de Haan
(D&dH) emphasize the duality of somatosensory processing, and
therefore of body representations. But how many body representations
do we really have? And what kind of criterion can we use to distinguish
them? I review here the empirical and conceptual difficulties in
drawing such distinctions, and the way to progress.
The way we use information determines the way in which we
encode it. Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) illustrate this
general principle with regard to somatosensory processing.
Like vision and audition, proprioception can be either action-
oriented or recognition-oriented. However, what characterizes
proprioception from other sensory modalities is the role played
by body representations. D&dH conclude that the dual somato-
sensory pathways give rise to two kinds of body representations:
the body schema and the body image. But what is the basis of this
dualistic distinction? How many body representations do we
really have?
One representation that integrates all of the different types of
information into a unified neuromatrix (Melzack 1992)? Two rep-
resentations that are either based on functional criteria dis-
tinguishing the body image for recognition and the body
schema for action (Gallagher 2005; Paillard 1999), or based on
temporal criteria distinguishing the actual body from the habitual
body (Merleau-Ponty 1945) or short-term and long-term body
images (O’Shaughnessy 1995)? Three representations that, for a
more fine-grained distinction within the body image, take apart
visuo-spatial body map and body semantics (Schwoebel &
Coslett 2005; Sirigu et al. 1991)?
The evidence provided to support the distinction between
different kinds of body representations relies mainly on neurop-
sychological dissociations: between deafferentation (disruption of
body schema) and neglect or numbsense (disruption of body
image); or between apraxia (disruption of body schema),
autotopagnosia (disruption of structural body description), and
body-specific aphasia (disruption of body semantics). However,
neuropsychological evidence is open to interpretation. First,
there are so many body deficits, and therefore so many possible
dissociations, that one may end up with almost an infinite list of
body representations. For instance, some patients are unable to
identify their own body parts only, whereas others are unable
to identify exclusively someone else’s body parts (Felician et al.
2003). One would then have to make a further distinction
between two types of structural description: for one’s own body
and for other people’s bodies. Second, without a clear definition
of what each type of body representation involves, it is hard to
find conclusive clinical tests to assess the different levels of
body representations in patients. For instance, autotopagnosia
has been diagnosed by asking patients to point toward body
parts, although one could argue that pointing requires not only
the body structural description, but also the body schema
(Schwoebel & Coslett 2005).
A further problem in validating the distinction between mul-
tiple body representations is that there is almost a complete
lack of experimentation outside of neuropsychology (except,
e.g., Kammers et al. 2006). D&dH emphasize the distinct neu-
roanatomical bases of somatosensory processing. However, the
differences in activations that they describe may depend on the
tasks, rather than on the underlying distinct body representations
(Holmes & Spence 2006). We have to disentangle two alterna-
tives: (a) one and the same representation used for different func-
tions, or (b) different representations specific to each function. In
order to prove the latter hypothesis, one would need to show that
what differs is not only the function, but also the content of the
representations. The function of body representation, whether
it is action-oriented or recognition-oriented, might not provide
such a clear criterion, contrary to what D&dH assume.
Action involves many different types of information about the
body, which may not be encoded in the same format. On the one
hand, one could distinguish the body as a target or as the mean
(grouped together in the body schema in Figure 1 of the target
article). Whereas the former is encoded in an egocentric frame
of reference, like any other goal, this might not be true for the
latter (Bermudez 1998). They are both action-oriented, but
their spatial perspectives are different. On the other hand, one
could distinguish short-term information about body posture
and long-term information about bodily constraints, such as the
size and the strength of the limbs (de Vignemont 2006). Again,
both types of information are necessary to plan a movement,
but the dynamics are different.
Recognition covers an even wider scope of bodily information,
including body posture and body size. The body image is said to
include body percept, body concept, and body affect (Gallagher
2005). The dynamics may vary, from short-term bodily sensations
to long-term bodily properties (O’Shaughnessy 1995). A further
level of complexity occurs for the body image, as it can be
applied both to one’s own body and to someone else’s body.
Why are all of these aspects part of one single category? The
unitary function of the body image is far from obvious. It is
often described as what is left over after the body schema. Break-
ing down the body image into pieces is not the optimal solution
either. Indeed, the triadic distinction leaves out the emotional
component of the body image. Does that mean that there
would be four kinds of body representations, or even more?
Shall we then give up on drawing distinctions between bodyre-
presentations altogether? No, but one must be careful to avoid
three main obstacles: (1) a lack of unity within each kind of body
representation, (2) a lack of positive definition, and (3) a risk of infi-
nite multiplication. D&dH have taken the first step by describing
in detail the distinction for somatosensory processing. Further
work needs to be done for body representations. To establish a
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taxonomy of body representations, one needs to describe not only
the specific functions of body representations, but also their input
(e.g., Does the weighting of each sensory modality in multimodal
integration depend on the type of body representation?), their
content (e.g., Are some body representations self-specific, and
others shared between self and other?), their dynamics (e.g.,
How quickly can body representations adjust to body changes?),
and their spatial frame of reference (e.g., Does the body
schema/body image distinction overlap with the egocentric/allo-
centric distinction?). One may then be able to provide a full
account of body representations.
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Abstract: The target article fails to disentangle the functional description
from the structural description of the two somatosensory streams.
Additional evidence and thorough reconsideration of the evidence cited
argue for a functional distinction between the how processing and the
what processing of somatosensory information, while questioning the
validity and usefulness of the equation of these two types of processing
with structural streams. We propose going one step further: to investigate
how the distinct functional streams are coordinated via attention.
The target article integrates an impressive amount of the relevant
literature into a model on how the brain processes somatosensory
information in two distinct streams. However, it fails to disentan-
gle the functional distinction from the structural distinction of
the two somatosensory streams.
In vision, two functional streams can be distinguished: One, a
visual-spatial processing stream for the control of spatial motor
actions (how), such as saccading, grasping, or pointing at external
target objects. The other, a visual-spatial processing stream for
perception, for example, for object and scene recognition
(what). From a functional and computational perspective, these
processing streams have to deal with quite different constraints
(e.g., timing, invariance) and produce quite different neurocompu-
tational solutions. For example, consider “how” functions such as
keeping the fovea on a moving target, versus “what” functions
such as recognizing an object at the basic level from various view-
points. Milner and Goodale (1995) introduced the functional
differentiation between what and how in vision. They also
equated this differentiation with a structural distinction between
dorsal and ventral processing in the primate brain. Recently, this
structural equation has become quite controversial (e.g., see
Franz et al. 2001; Glover 2002; Schenk 2006). For example, rel-
evant processing for some actions (e.g., memory-based – not onli-
ne – saccades) is carried out by both dorsal and ventral brain areas
(O¨zyurt et al. 2006) – there is a heavy interaction between areas
from both structural streams for performing a single function!
Given that the structural distinction has come under
sharp attack with regard to vision, we should beware of a corre-
sponding distinction in the case of somatosensation. The
somatosensory system should not be divided into two structural
streams – whether dorsal versus ventral or parietal versus
insular, whatever – but divided into functional streams of how
and what. The evidence provided in the target article speaks
the same language – including the patient examples at the
very core of the article: Numbsense patients, as “action-
without-perception” cases par excellence, suffer from lesions
that according to theory belong to structures shared by the
streams (and require the postulate of additional connections).
Therefore, they convincingly support the functional, but not
the structural, distinction. Even more obvious, the “perception-
without-action” patient G.L. suffers from lesions that are necess-
arily shared by both structural streams, namely, peripheral ones.
Functionally, however, we can distinguish between G.L. locating
cold points within a visual body image (what), but not being able
to point to them (how). Note, thereby, that effects of G.L.’s
lesions include proprioception, but exclude temperature percep-
tion (e.g., see Stenneken et al. 2006). Using temperature percep-
tion, G.L. is able to locate targets on the body. Precise pointing,
however, requires the integration of the target location on the
body with the actual position of the executing and the targeted
limb in space. Lacking proprioception, G.L. is not able to per-
ceive the actual position of her limbs in space and, so, G.L. is
not able to point to a location on her own body. Thus, G.L.’s dis-
sociation is probably a better example of different processing
requirements than of different structures in how and what
streams.
Haptic perception, at the very core of somatosensory
what-functions, requires strong interactions between structural
areas – and, as recognized by Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH),
it cannot even be conceptualized without assuming tight links
between sensory processing and control of exploratory move-
ments. The attempt to designate different structural areas as
being more responsible for one or the other part is understand-
able, but this should not mislead us into ignoring that the func-
tion, first of all, emerges from structural interplay. In this
context, it is also significant that structural networks similar to
those observed to be involved in (exploratory) haptic perception
(Binkofski et al. 1999a) have recently been seen as responsible for
a somatosensory-guided action (how); that is, for adaptive grip-
force control during lifting (e.g., Schmitz et al. 2005). Even if,
up to now, differences between the structural interplay in
haptic perception and in lifting actions might not have been
resolved in detail, a great overlap in networks casts additional
doubts on the usefulness of a structural distinction between
action and perception streams.
Note, besides, that adaptive grip-force control represents a class
of actions that is defined but otherwise neglected in the target
article: the manipulation of external objects. This includes
several actions that require fast and permanent online processing
of somatosensory information from the objects – as in throwing or
lifting. Differences between the online processing of sensory infor-
mation for time-constraint somatosensory-guided action in com-
parison to (probably) more precision-oriented haptic exploration
(e.g., in the case of lifting versus weight estimation), are definitely
worth future investigations in terms of functional dissociation. In
contrast, what the target article does discuss extensively are func-
tional dissociations between perception and cases of action for
which we have quite well established models, especially regarding
how limits in somatosensory processing are dealt with. Efference
copies, well-learned motor programs, and anticipatory parameter
control represent ways in which (coarse, as opposed to fine)
action control circumvents such limits (e.g., Drewing et al.
2004), and, in functional terms, may partly explain why deaffer-
ented patients can perform several spatially oriented movements
(such as pointing to a body location) but are not able to sense
stimuli with the deafferented limb. For example, the patient
cited in section 2 (para. 5) had a complete loss of sensibility, but
could still perform a “pincer grip and exploratory movements.”
Note that this patient’s “exploratory movement patterns . . . of
course were never performed in an adequate relation to the
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explored object” (Pause et al. 1989, p. 1611), and her pincer grip
was guided by vision (and was successful in 70%, but not 100%,
of trials). The aforementioned well-known “shortcuts” of the
how-stream can easily explain this performance because they
need not refer to actual somatosensory information. To take
another example from the target article, the weaker so-called
vibro-tactile illusions (that relate to proprioceptive receptors in
themuscle) in pointing, as compared to in perception, and the van-
ishing of this dissociation after some seconds: these findings agree
well with the use of the how-stream–related shortcuts (e.g., fast
updating of limb position by efference copy) until sufficient pro-
cessing time has passed to include actual sensory information
(i.e., the illusory information) – but these findings do not agree
with dissociated structures.
Taken together, the target article provides convincing evi-
dence of a functional dissociation between “how” and “what”
streams while failing to disentangle the functional description
from structure. The evidence also raises an urgent question
that is only marginally addressed in the article: How is the
interplay of the two streams in somatosensory processing coordi-
nated? From experimental work in vision, we know that the two
functional processing streams of how and what are coordinated
by visual attention. They do not work independently. Evidence
for this claim comes from behavioral work on the role of
attentional processes in perception and spatial-motor action
control (Deubel & Schneider 1996; Schneider & Deubel 2002).
Several studies have shown that the selection process of an
external target object for spatial movements, such as saccading
or grasping (how), is tightly coupled to the selection of the
same object for visual (conscious, reportable) perception
(what). When humans prepare a movement to an object in
space (i.e., select a movement target there), visual perceptual
processing resources are focused on that target object. It is
plausible to assume that a similar coupling holds for
somatosensory processing. Up to now, there are no correspond-
ing studies in somatosensory processing. This holds even more
with regard to the more complex, but highly relevant question
of coordinating different processing streams from distinct
modalities.
Where are somatosensory representations
stored and reactivated?
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Abstract: The studies cited by Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) stress the
distinction between perception and action within the somatosensory
system but provide little information about memory functions. Recent
findings by our group and by others show that the dorsal stream is also
activated during short-term memory maintenance and long-term
memory retrieval of haptic information. These data complement and
extend the proposed model.
In the visual system, the so-called what or ventral stream has
been found to be closely related to working memory functions
(Haxby et al. 2001; Ishai et al. 2000). Moreover, in a set of
fMRI studies, we found that both the dorsal and the ventral
visual stream are significantly involved when participants have
to reactivate representations from long-term memory that had
been visually encoded: Dorsal (parietal) areas light up when
participants retrieve spatial information and ventral areas (tem-
poral, inferior frontal cortex) do so when they retrieve object
information (Khader et al. 2005; 2007). These findings are in
line with the general idea that cortical areas are not only special-
ized for on-line processing of distinct types of information during
perception or action, but that the very same areas are also the
locations where information is permanently stored (McClelland
et al. 1995; Ro¨sler & Heil 2003). The question, therefore,
arises as to whether the areas identified by Dijkerman & de
Haan (D&dH) are also involved in haptic working memory and
long-term memory tasks. As a matter of fact, recent findings
demonstrate that networks within the dorsal action stream are
not functionally restricted to immediate guidance of hand
actions; rather, they are also recruited for storage and retrieval
of action-related spatial information. We briefly summarize the
evidence.
Stock et al. (2004; under review) studied blood-oxygen level–
dependent (BOLD) responses during long-term memory retrie-
val of proprioceptive and tactile knowledge (i.e., haptics). They
used an association learning paradigm that allows brain acti-
vations to be monitored during retrieval of specific types of infor-
mation without confounding the perceptual and mnemonic
processes. To this end, participants learned associations
between cues (auditorily presented words) and target stimuli.
The targets were either haptically explored three-dimensional
objects or haptically explored locations in three-dimensional
space. In the retrieval test, participants heard two cue words
and had to decide whether or not both were associated with
the same target. By manipulating the number of associated
targets, the difficulty of the retrieval situation was varied system-
atically. This procedure enforces memory activation of either
object or position knowledge in the retrieval situation, without
the necessity of processing different types of stimuli perceptually.
The results substantiate the functional distinction proposed by
D&dH: Retrieval of haptically encoded objects activated,
among other areas, the secondary somatosensory cortex (SII),
the insula, and the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), whereas
retrieval of haptically encoded spatial positions activated,
among others, the SII and the PPC but not the insula. Thus,
the functional dissociation proposed by D&dH is not only rel-
evant for perception and action, but it also applies to the retrieval
of permanently stored information.
In other studies (Fiehler 2006; in press), we investigated the
role of the dorsal action stream in a haptic working memory
task. Participants performed a purely haptic version of a
delayed-recognition task, in which they encoded, briefly main-
tained, and finally recognized hand movements without any
visual feedback. Task difficulty was systematically manipulated
by the number of complex hand-movement sequences per trial.
The BOLD response pattern revealed that haptic encoding of
hand movements activated the primary somatosensory cortex
and secondary somatosensory cortex, the PPC (dorsal stream),
premotor areas, and the right occipitotemporal cortex (ventral
stream). The majority of these regions responded to task diffi-
culty reflecting increased processing demands. Short-term main-
tenance of haptic information elicited load-dependent activity in
the left anterior intraparietal sulcus and closely adjacent areas
(dorsal stream). Consistent with the proposed theory of D&dH,
these data confirm that the PPC is recruited for haptic action
control, indicating haptic-motor coupling networks within these
areas. Moreover, the results demonstrate that the dorsal stream
is not only functionally related to online action control but also
to working memory maintenance of action-related spatial infor-
mation. Others (Macaluso & Driver 2003; Ricciardi et al. 2006)
observed activation in the PPC for both visual and tactile
spatial stimuli, which suggests that this region has multimodal
features and may be engaged in short-term maintenance of
spatial information irrespective of the input modality.
Evidence for a mnemonic function of the PPC in action pro-
cessing is also provided by intracranial recordings in monkeys.
Commentary/Dijkerman & de Haan: Somatosensory processes subserving perception and action
206 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 30:2
Murata et al. (1996) observed neuronal activity in the anterior
intraparietal cortex (AIP) during a delayed hand manipulation
task in which monkeys had to manipulate the remembered
object in the dark. The results indicate that monkey AIP, as
part of the dorsal action stream, is involved in working
memory maintenance of spatial characteristics that guide
hand actions in relation to objects. Studies using delayed
saccade tasks also indicate that the human PPC is involved in
representing spatial information for prospective guidance of
actions. Activity in the PPC was modulated by the length of
the delay period, which suggests a critical role of this area for
maintaining movement relevant spatial information (Curtis
2006). These findings are supported by brain-imaging studies on
delayed pointing movements (Connolly et al. 2003; Lacquaniti
et al. 1997).
At first glance, these findings seem to be at variance with
clinical studies demonstrating a performance deficit in a
patient with visual form-agnosia (ventral stream lesion;
Goodale et al. 1994) and performance improvement in a
patient with posterior parietal lesions (e.g., Milner et al. 2001)
when a delay was inserted in a grasping task. To explain these
results, it was assumed that patients used information processed
and stored in the ventral stream and that the dorsal stream
does not support memory functions. However, the grasping
tasks realized in these studies needed visuomotor integration,
and the results cannot be immediately generalized to purely
haptic memory tasks. The aforementioned studies by Stock
et al. and Fiehler et al. employed purely haptic tasks without
any visual feedforward or feedback component. Therefore, the
results clearly support the conclusion that the areas identified
by D&dH are not only recruited for online perception
and action control in the somatosensory modality, but that
they are also functionally involved in working memory main-
tenance and long-term memory retrieval of action-related
spatial information. Moreover, these findings substantiate
the general claim that areas specialized for online processing
of specific types of information are recruited for short-term
and long-term memory storage and retrieval (McClelland et al.
1995).
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Abstract: Support for the proposed dorsal-ventral distinction for the
somatosensory system is not yet convincing, nor is the anatomical
segregation of its pathways as clearly defined as the visual pathways.
Consideration of alternative organizational principles might reveal
critical differences across sensory processing systems. The role of
attention and manipulations that modulate functional systems might
also be worth considering.
The anatomical separation of dorsal and ventral pathways seems
clear for the visual system. However, the precise functional roles
of these putative pathways are still being debated. My starting
point for commenting on the present target article was to con-
sider the possibility that a general distinction between action
and perception might turn out not to be the correct organizing
principle for other sensory systems.
I see three possible organizational principles that together
seem to capture a host of findings cited as evidence in support
of functional differences between the dorsal and ventral visual
pathways. Briefly, these are, for dorsal versus ventral systems
respectively: (1) peripersonal versus extrapersonal, referring to
the space immediately surrounding the body versus more
distant space; (2) egocentric versus allocentric, referring to
representations of body coordinates versus environmental coor-
dinates; and (3) online versus memory-based, referring to real-
time versus delayed processing. [Some references that provide
more precise definitions include Previc (1998), Rizzolatti et al.
(1997), and some of those cited in the target article.] Importantly,
I see these not as absolute, but, rather, as relative distinctions that
might provide guiding principles for defining the general organ-
ization of brain systems.
Based on the careful synthesis of findings provided by
Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH), and related work, it seems
that for the visual pathways, all three of these principles are sup-
ported. Accordingly, these become candidates for consideration
for the other sensory systems, as well.
With respect to the somatosensory system, it seems that on the
basis of the neuroanatomical findings elaborated by D&dH, a
strict separation of dorsal and ventral pathways is somewhat
questionable. It might be just as reasonable to suggest that a
mosaic of areas are involved in somatosensory processing, with
greater reliance on the insula in the case of recognition (i.e., if
recognition turns out to be a defining property). In addition,
although some of the neuropsychological findings support the
authors’ proposal, many seem mixed and open to other
interpretations.
In terms of the function of putative somatosensory systems,
one might consider a different organizational principle than
that proposed by D&dH. Consider, for example, the peripersonal
versus extrapersonal space distinction. Most actions performed
within peripersonal space involve both visual and somatosensory
processes on objects manipulated within that space, although
other sensory systems such as auditory and gustatory often are
also involved. In contrast, when considering processing of
objects some distance from the body (e.g., outside of reaching
distance), it seems to be the visual system that does most of the
perceiving (e.g., perceiving which object to act on next) –
although, of course, audition is used to hear distant objects,
and other systems might come into play to a lesser extent.
Thus, with respect to peripersonal space, the visual and somato-
sensory systems are both primary; moreover, the involvement of
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) for both types of information
(visual and somatosensory) implies its crucial role in sensorimo-
tor transformations on multisensory input. In sum, it seems
that the visual and somatosensory systems show a rather nice
parallel in terms of proposed functions of the dorsal system(s).
For the proposed ventral system(s), however, this brief exercise
suggests far less similarity for visual and somatosensory
systems. One might ask: Does this lack of a parallel suggest
that the proposed organizational principle is the wrong one?
Or, does it suggest that general organizational principles might
more effectively reveal differences rather than similarities
across sensory systems? The point is that, perhaps the somatosen-
sory system parallels the visual system in terms of some functions
(those related to the dorsal pathways), but for other functions
there is no direct analogue.
My second point is basically that a complete discussion of these
putative systems might require some reference to the role of
attention, particularly given the emphasis on findings in
humans. For example, findings from our own neuropsychological
studies suggest that the flexible allocation of attention might
enable switches between egocentric and allocentric processing
systems of the brain (Franz 2003). One might extend this idea
to the present context by suggesting that the flexible allocation
of attention is likely to influence which pathway(s) is (are) utilized
at any particular moment in time. Perhaps more importantly,
though, attention might to some extent define the functions
of different systems; that is, attention itself might be a guiding
principle (Franz 2004).
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In relation to the visual and haptic systems, a recent study from
our lab demonstrated that visual and non-visual (haptic) attention
processes can show similar kinds of effects on motor output (i.e.,
attention results in measurable changes in output parameters
such as the size and shape of a drawn trajectory), although the
effects of visual attention were generally greater than the
effects of haptic attention (Franz & Packman 2004). These find-
ings could be accounted for by attentional modulations on dorsal
system processing (for example). In a different set of studies that
required subjects to estimate object sizes on the basis of internal
representations, we found that subjects with congenital or
acquired blindness tended to be more accurate in their esti-
mations than were sighted subjects. Perhaps even more interest-
ing, the blind subjects most often reported using strategies that
relate to the manual grasping of objects (even though they
were never asked to grasp the objects), whereas the sighted sub-
jects reported more visual strategies. In addition, a control con-
dition demonstrated that when visual memory processes were
not used, the sighted subjects performed similarly to the blind
subjects (Smith et al. 2005). These findings again suggest that
perhaps the dorsal stream mechanisms might actually be the
same (or shared) for visual and somatosensory information,
with flexible adaptations occurring based on strategy, attentional
influences, and the availability of sensory information.
In sum, it seems that preliminary steps toward elucidating
whether general principles apply to different sensory systems
are well underway. In my view, the present target article will
prove very valuable in generating useful discussion and insightful
directions toward this aim.
Revisiting parallel and serial processing in the
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Abstract: The issue of whether information is processed in parallel or in
series in the somatosensory system is complicated by a number of factors.
Included among these is the failure on the part of the scientific
community to reach a consensus as to what actually constitutes the
primary somatosensory cortex (SI) in higher primates. A second,
related issue is the marked difference in the organization of the cortical
areas subserving somatosensation across species.
In 1983, Jon Kaas published a paper titled, in part, “What, if any-
thing, is S-I?” This paper was published at a time when there was
a controversy raging about the functional organization of the
primary somatosensory cortex (SI). SI had been mapped in a
large number of species, as had a second somatosensory map
that came to be known as the secondary somatosensory cortex
(SII). The numerology denotes the order of the discovery of
these fields, and was meant by the founding fathers to convey
nothing with respect to whether the areas were organized hier-
archically or in parallel. Traditional, and rather crude, recordings
suggested that each of these representations contained complete
and separate representations of the contralateral body surface,
and SI and SII were thought to be homologous across species.
Kaas asked the question in 1983 because electrophysiological
mapping studies conducted in his laboratory suggested that the
four cytoarchitectonic areas of the primate SI (i.e., areas 3a,
3b, 1, and 2) each contains a separate and complete map of the
contralateral body. Kaas and colleagues showed that areas 3b
and 1 contained complete and separate cutaneous represen-
tations of the contralateral body, and, further, that there were
patterns of receptive field progression reversals at the border
between these two areas that were comparable to the reversals
that Allman and Kaas (1971) had found at the borders of separate
representations of the visual field in monkey extrastriate cortex.
In addition, they suggested that areas 3a and 2 contained maps
of deep (e.g., muscle spindle, joint) receptors. These findings
and suggestions complicated the issue of homology of SI across
species, and raised questions about information processing in
anterior parietal cortex. Similarities in somatotopic organization,
cytoarchitectural features, location relative to motor cortex, and
connections with the ventroposterior nucleus of the thalamus
led Kaas and colleagues to suggest that area 3b is the homologue
of SI in most other mammals. If one accepts that proposal, the
question remains as to how the remaining areas of anterior par-
ietal cortex (3a, 1, and 2) are contributing to somesthetic
sensibility.
Some years ago, Garraghty et al. (1990) suggested that area 1
represents a “higher” stage of processing than area 3b because
the receptive fields of neurons in area 1 are larger and have
more complex response properties than those of area 3b. To
test this idea, we recorded in the hand representation of area 1
before and after acute ablations of specific parts of the hand rep-
resentations in areas 3a and 3b. We found that such ablations
immediately deactivated the corresponding part of the hand rep-
resentation in area 1, and we concluded that area 1 is located at a
higher level in a hierarchically arranged processing sequence in
anterior parietal cortex. We further noted that this hierarchical
view of anterior parietal cortex was not novel, but rather was sup-
ported by a number of other observations. First, feed-forward
corticocortical projections typically terminate predominantly in
layer IV, and this is the pattern displayed by the projections
from area 3b to area 1. Second, relay cells in the ventroposterior
nucleus project in much larger numbers onto area 3b than onto
area 1, and the plexus of thalamic input to area 1 is sparser than in
area 3b and largely avoids layer IV. Third, stimuli are represented
less isomorphically by neuronal firing patterns and have more
complex receptive fields in area 1 than in area 3b, suggesting
additional processing in area 1. Fourth, area 1 ablations are fol-
lowed by less severe behavioral consequences than are area 3
ablations. Finally, in humans, the latencies of evoked potentials
attributed to areas 3b and 1 differ by an amount consistent
with sequential processing. Despite all of these observations, all
too often it is the case that “anterior parietal cortex” and “SI”
are used interchangeably as though nothing is transpiring in
these four cytoarchitectonic regions (for references, see
Garraghty et al. 1990). At least Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH)
devote two boxes to the anterior parietal cortex (APC) in their
Figure 1.
The issue of whether sensory information is processed serially
or in parallel has proven to be a thorny and complicated one.
The complications arise primarily because there is no general
consensus about what constitutes the appropriate level of analy-
sis; and because neural interconnections between the putative
parallel processing streams, and the temporal patterns of
neural responsiveness of neurons at different levels of a putative
serial processing stream, can introduce ambiguities. An
additional complication is the inclination to view this issue
rather myopically by concentrating only on data from “higher”
nonhuman primates and humans. This largely eliminates
evolutionary considerations – and, clearly, present-day sensory
systems are evolved solutions to the problem of detecting and
effectively responding to ecologically relevant stimuli. Adopting
an evolutionary perspective casts the issue in a different light,
and offers the opportunity to ponder the computational impli-
cations of somatosensory systems that differ fundamentally in
their organization, and what the concepts of “serial” versus
“parallel” processing actually mean.
In primates, SII is dependent upon inputs from the fields of
anterior parietal cortex for its activation (Pons et al. 1987). If
the hand representations in areas 3a, 3b, 1, and 2 are ablated,
neurons in the corresponding hand representation in SII can
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no longer be activated. Such is not the case in all mammals. In
cats, for example, ablation of SI does not deactivate the SII
cortex. Indeed, in cats, no fewer than five somatosensory cortical
fields (SI to SV) have been identified. Although each of these
fields may well modulate processing in neighboring areas, no
clear hierarchical arrangement exists for any of them. Interest-
ingly, comparable differences exist between the visual cortices
of cats and primates, with the lateral geniculate nucleus project-
ing almost exclusively to area 17 in primates, but to areas 17, 18,
and 19 in cats. Thus, sensory processing in general in primates
might rely more heavily on hierarchically arranged processing
modules, whereas parallel processing strategies might be predo-
minant in cats. While one might presume that some advantage
has been conferred on primates by the emergence of serial pro-
cessing capabilities, one can also note that cats, too, appear to
“fit” quite well into their niches. Finally, while we can imagine
that the somesthetic world of the higher nonhuman primate is
much like our own, we cannot begin to imagine what the cat’s sol-
ution to the problem would feel like. Perhaps, computational
approaches attempting to model these two quite different strat-
egies for processing somatosensory information might reveal
how their outcomes differ, as surely these must.
Coming to grips with vision and touch
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Abstract:Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) propose a convincing model of
somatosensory organization that is inspired by earlier perception-action
models of the visual system. In this commentary, we suggest that the
dorsal and ventral visual streams both contribute to the control of
action, but in different ways. Using the example of grip and load force
calibration, we show how the ventral stream can invoke stored
information about the material properties of objects originally derived
from the somatosensory system.
It is perhaps human nature to think in terms of contrasting dyads:
good and evil, left and right, or ying and yang. Cognitive neuro-
science has certainly not escaped this kind of dualistic thinking
and over the years has generated a number of dyadic concepts
such as explicit versus implicit knowledge, declarative versus pro-
cedural memory and, of course, perception versus action.
Although one has to be careful not to oversimplify things, such
distinctions can sometimes serve a useful function in emphasiz-
ing important differences in the way in which processing might
unfold. The distinction between vision-for-perception and
vision-for-action is a good example of this. By examining the
differences in the way in which visual information is transformed
for perceptual representation, on the one hand, and the control
of action, on the other, Goodale and Milner (1992) were able
to make sense of an otherwise confusing and apparently contra-
dictory set of observations in human neuropsychology and
monkey neurophysiology. In the target article, Dijkerman & de
Haan (D&dH) have used this same dialectic method and
applied it to the somatosensory system, synthesizing a clear and
compelling story from a literature that at first glance seems
equally disparate and unconnected. Indeed, the parallels drawn
between the organization of the somatosensory system and the
visual system are remarkably close, reflecting no doubt the funda-
mental differences in the nature of the demands that perception
and action put on any sensory system.
D&dH provide plenty of evidence that somatosensory
information is processed differently for perception than it is for
action – and make explicit the idea that this division of labour
is similar to that seen in the visual system. But they go on to
suggest that the separation in the pathways (and the transform-
ations they perform) may be “less distinct” in the somatosensory
system than in the visual system. Although it is true that the visual
streams appear to be more anatomically distinct than the soma-
tosensory streams, the dorsal and ventral visual pathways are
likely to be just as interactive as those in the somatosensory
system. Indeed, in their 1995 monograph, Milner and Goodale
made it clear that the two systems were not “hermetically
sealed” from each other, but were closely coupled in the pro-
duction of adaptive behaviour (Milner & Goodale 1995). Cer-
tainly, D&dH acknowledge that such interactions occur, but
perhaps it is worth emphasizing that the integration between pro-
cessing in the two visual streams is more intimate than widely
believed. A case in point is the way in which high-level visual pro-
cessing in the ventral stream plays a fundamental role in certain
aspects of action control. Moreover, as we shall see, this proces-
sing also depends on integrating visual and somatosensory
information.
When we reach out to pick up an object, we need to open and
orient our hand and fingers appropriately in flight – and when
we make contact with the object, we need to apply just the
right amount of force so that we do not damage the object and,
at the same time, it does not slip out of our hand. The compu-
tations underlying the former are largely mediated by mechan-
isms in the dorsal stream, since information about the size and
overall shape of the object, and its disposition with respect to
our hand, is readily available from the retinal array (Milner &
Goodale 2006). But any calculations about the initial grip and
load forces that need to be applied to the object must
also reflect the object’s mass, density, surface friction, and com-
pliance – characteristics that cannot be derived from the retina
directly. For this reason, it is highly unlikely that the dorsal
stream by itself could compute this information, and instead
the specification of the required forces would have to rely on
stored information about the material properties of the particular
goal object (or, in the case of novel objects, on predictions
derived from stored information about similar objects). The
retrieval of this stored information would depend on visual pro-
cessing in the ventral stream, which would enable us to recognize
a goal object and/or its material properties on the basis of a broad
range of cues, including both shape and surface properties. Thus,
real-time visuomotor control would appear to depend on interac-
tive processing in the dorsal and the ventral streams – in a
manner that is not dissimilar to what D&dH have suggested
happens in the two functional networks of the somatosensory
system.
It is worth emphasizing, too, that the control of the forces
required to pick up an object is heavily dependent on the close
integration of visual and somatosensory processing. Although
visual inspection of an object enables us to program the
amount of grip and load forces needed to lift the object, once
we have the object in our hand, somatosensory feedback from
our fingers enables us to fine-tune the forces, which were initially
based on visual processing alone. The result is force output that is
more closely matched to the intrinsic properties of the object.
Indeed, internal forward models of this kind have been
influential in demonstrating the interactions between visual and
somatosensory processing in the control of skilled movements
(Flanagan & Johansson 2002). A key aspect of these forward
models is the initial prediction that the model makes, which is
used to program relevant behaviour. In the case of the forces
required to grasp and lift an object, this prediction is based on
stored information about the material properties of that object
derived from the somatosensory system during earlier encoun-
ters with the object (or objects made of the same material).
But how does one access this stored knowledge about material
properties? One critical route that has been overlooked, at least
in the object-recognition literature, is via the visual surface
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properties of the object (colour, texture, and specularities, for
example) that are closely correlated with the object’s material
properties. In a recent functional brain imaging study, Cant
and Goodale (2007) showed that there are distinct pathways
within the ventral stream that appear to be specialized for
dealing with the surface properties of an object as distinct from
its form. Whereas form is processed more laterally in the
lateral occipital area (area LO), surface properties (particularly
texture) are processed more medially in the collateral sulcus
and the lingual and parahippocampal gyri. Presumably, the
identification of the surface properties of an object, particularly
in the case of novel objects, allows us to calibrate the initial
forces required to lift the object by invoking an association
between those surface properties and stored information
derived from the somatosensory system about previous encoun-
ters with the material from which that object is made.
Thus, not only do the ventral and dorsal streams work closely
together in the control of skilled movements, but they also have
intimate associations with the somatosensory system in both pro-
gramming and executing this control. Nevertheless, it is import-
ant to emphasize that the dorsal stream exercises its control over
actions in a direct and largely bottom-up fashion, whereas the
ventral stream makes its contributions to this control via indirect
and top-down mechanisms. Presumably, such distinctions in the
nature of the control will also be evident within the somatosen-
sory system. In any case, the division of labour that D&dH
have put forward for the somatosensory system is an important
first step in understanding how somatosensation-for-perception
and somatosensation-for-action work together in the production
of adaptive behaviour.
Close coordination between recognition and
action: Really two separate streams?
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Abstract: Somewhat in contrast to their proposal of two separate
somatosensory streams, Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) propose that
tactile recognition involves active manual exploration, and therefore
involves parietal cortex. I argue that interactions from perception for
action to object recognition can be found also in vision. Furthermore,
there is evidence that perception for action and perception for
recognition rely on similar processing principles.
In an important attempt to integrate different literatures, Dijkerman
& de Haan (D&dH) provide a scholarly review on somatosensory
processing. In analogy to the visual system, they propose two
distinct cortical somatosensory streams subserving perception
and action. They argue convincingly, albeit somewhat in contrast
to the notion of separate streams, that tactile object recognition
requires the active exploration of the objects with finger and
hand movements in order to capture properties like shape and
texture. Hence, recognition requires close coordination
between action-related and recognition-related processes, as
well as temporal and spatial integration of tactile information,
and therefore depends on an intricate collaboration of the pos-
terior parietal and the insular system (sect. 3.1). This proposal
goes beyond the idea of two strictly separate pathways for per-
ception and action, and raises three related questions which I
pursue here: How separate are perception and action in vision?
Is the posterior parietal cortex involved in visual recognition
and categorization? Do perception and action rely on different
processing principles?
First, given their close interrelation in somatosensory proces-
sing, are perception and action really separate in vision? In a
similar way as in tactile recognition, active exploration strategies
are used in visual recognition. For instance, observers systemati-
cally explore the visual scene with eye movements (e.g., Yarbus
1967). More generally, seeing has been regarded as a way of
acting, of exploring the environment (O’Regan & Noe¨ 2001).
Moreover, there is abundant evidence for perception-action
couplings in vision (Hommel et al. 2001; Prinz 1990, 1997;
Sommerville & Decety 2006). Studies investigating visuomotor
priming have demonstrated that observing manipulable objects
automatically potentiates actions (e.g., Craighero et al. 1999;
Pavese & Buxbaum 2002; Tucker & Ellis 1998; 2001; 2004). In
accordance, premotor and parietal areas are active when manip-
ulable objects are perceived that afford motor interactions, like
tools (e.g., see Chao & Martin 2000; Gre`zes et al. 2003). More
direct evidence for interactions from perception for action to
the object-recognition system comes from a study showing that
knowledge about motor interactions with objects improves recog-
nition performance even in a naming (recognition) task (Helbig
et al. 2006). Thus, there seems to be a strong coupling between
perception and action not only in tactile, but also in visual
recognition.
Second, is the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) involved in visual
recognition, as well? The target authors claim that posterior par-
ietal activity is specific for tactile recognition. According to the
proposals of two separate visual streams, object recognition and
categorization occur in the ventral stream and do not include par-
ietal cortex (Goodale & Milner 2004; Milner & Goodale 1995;
Ungerleider & Haxby 1994). However, there is evidence from
neuropsychological patients, monkey lesion studies, and neuroi-
maging studies that the visual recognition of misoriented
objects involves the parietal cortex (for a brief review, see Graf
2006). A recent experiment using transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation confirmed that the parietal cortex is involved in object
recognition (Harris & Miniussi 2006). The parietal cortex is
also active in the visual categorization of motion directions
(Freedman & Assad 2006; see also Ferrera & Grinband 2006).
Similarly, the categorization of distorted (dot pattern) prototypes
involves both lateral occipital and parietal activations (Seger et al.
2000; Vogels et al. 2002).
Third, are processing principles and reference frames in per-
ception and action really so different? The notion of two separate
streams is connected with the assumption that the streams are
based on different processing principles (Milner & Goodale
1995). Visuomotor control requires coordinate transformations,
because receptor surfaces and motor effectors rely on different
coordinate systems (e.g., eye centered vs. hand centered).
Object recognition, in contrast, is thought to rely on the detection
of enduring object properties. Similarly, it is assumed that visuo-
motor control implies egocentric reference frames, whereas rec-
ognition relies on object-centered representations (e.g., Milner &
Goodale 1995). Therefore, recognition should be achieved
irrespective of viewpoint (sect. 5 of the target article).
However, the large majority of findings indicate that visual recog-
nition performance is orientation (viewpoint) and size dependent
(for reviews, see Graf 2006; Tarr 2003; Tarr & Bu¨lthoff 1998),
suggesting that object representations are coded in viewer-
centered (i.e., egocentric) coordinates.
Interestingly, recognition performance is not only orientation
and size dependent, but shows orientation and size congruency
effects. The ability to identify a misoriented object is facilitated
if the object is preceded by a different object shown in the
same orientation (e.g., Graf et al. 2005). Therefore, it has been
proposed that object recognition is based on an adjustment of a
perceptual coordinate system (coordinate transformation) that
aligns memory and input representations. Recognition is facili-
tated if the coordinate system is already adjusted in the correct
orientation or size (because of the presentation of the previous
object). According to this approach, both object recognition
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and visuomotor control rely on coordinate transformations (Graf
2006; Graf et al. 2005); coordinate transformations can be
regarded as a common processing principle for visuomotor
control and object recognition (Graf 2006; Salinas & Abbott
2001; Salinas & Sejnowski 2001).
Similar processes seem to underlie tactile recognition. Tactile
recognition, too, is orientation dependent (Newell et al. 2001;
Pasqualotto et al. 2005), which suggests viewer-dependent refer-
ence frames. Moreover, the representations can be updated with
observer movement or scene context, both for visual and for
tactile recognition (Pasqualotto et al. 2005). This suggests
spatial updating processes with observer movement in tactile
and visual recognition, consistent with the notion that recognition
relies on transformations of a spatial coordinate system, defined
by scene context (Graf 2006).
To summarize, visual and somatosensory processing are even
more similar than proposed in the target article by D&dH.
Both in somatosensory and visual processing, perception for
action and perception for object recognition are not strictly sep-
arate, but seem to interact extensively. There is evidence that the
PPC is involved not only in tactile recognition, but also in visual
recognition and categorization. Moreover, the two streams seem
to rely on similar processing principles. Overall, it may be more
appropriate to assume two cortical streams that serve comp-
lementary purposes and tend to interact to overcome the
mutual deficiencies of each stream (Grossberg 2000).
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Abstract: Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) argue that body image and
body schema form parts of different and dissociable somatosensory
streams. We agree in general, but believe that more emphasis should
be placed on interactions between these two streams. We illustrate this
point with evidence from the rubber-hand illusion (RHI) – an illusion
of body image, which depends critically upon body schema.
The rubber-hand illusion (RHI), which is usually induced when a
participant’s hidden hand is stroked simultaneously and congru-
ently with visible strokes applied to a rubber hand, is regarded by
Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) as an illusion of ownership over a
body part, whereas others have also referred to it in terms of self-
attribution (Botvinick & Cohen 1998; Ehrsson et al. 2004; 2005a;
Ijsselsteijn et al. 2006; Tastevin 1937; Tsakiris & Haggard 2005;
Tsakiris et al. 2006). However, there are several sub-components
of the RHI, which may dissociate under the appropriate exper-
imental conditions. Such dissociation provides additional
support for the model proposed by D&dH, distinguishing
between perception and action streams in the somatosensory
system.
The illusion of ownership in the RHI is typically assessed by
means of a questionnaire, in which participants express strong
agreement, on average, with the statement: “I felt that the rubber
hand was my hand.” Strong positive responses (i.e., 75% of the
maximum rating on the scale) to this question have been obtained
in a number of studies (Armel & Ramachandran 2003; Botvinick &
Cohen 1998; Ehrsson et al. 2004), while weaker positive ratings are
given under several “virtual reality” conditions (50 and ,75%;
Ijsselsteijn et al. 2006). Finally, several RHI studies have shown,
on average, negative (,50%) responses to the same question
(Schaefer et al. 2006a; 2006b).
Accompanying the strong ratings of the “illusion of owner-
ship,” participants also tend to respond strongly to “it seemed
as if I were feeling the touch in the location where I saw it.”
Indeed, in the three studies with strong illusions of ownership,
and which included both questions, the tactile location illusion
(visual capture of touch) was more strongly rated than the own-
ership illusion (Botvinick & Cohen 1998: approximate values:
tactile location ¼ 100%, ownership ¼ 89%; Ehrsson et al. 2004:
89% vs. 83%; Ijsselsteijn et al. 2006: 80% vs. 72%). In addition
to, or instead of, these illusion ratings, researchers have also
measured “proprioceptive drift,” in order to quantify the extent
to which the felt position of one’s real hand changes during the
stimulation and illusion period (Botvinick & Cohen 1998;
Ehrsson et al. 2005a; Holmes et al. 2006; Tsakiris & Haggard
2005; Tsakiris et al. 2006).
Most interestingly for present purposes, proprioceptive drift
can be dissociated from the illusions of ownership and visual
capture. For example, simply viewing a rubber hand in a postu-
rally compatible position (optically superimposed over the real
hand by using a mirror) for as little as 10 seconds, can induce sig-
nificant biases in subsequent reaching and pointing movements
made with the exposed hand, but without inducing any illusion
of ownership or of visual capture (i.e., ratings were ,50%,
Holmes et al. 2006; see our Fig. 1 here).
Similarly, questionnaire ratings of the perceived drift of one’s
felt hand position (i.e., “I felt as if my hand was drifting towards
the rubber hand”) were consistently lower in the aforementioned
studies than ratings of the ownership and capture components
(drift ratings were only 6%–30%). Reaching and pointing
responses made with the illuded1 hand (Holmes et al. 2006), or
intermanual pointing with the non-illuded hand (Ehrsson et al.
2005a; Tsakiris & Haggard 2005; 2006), result in only a partial
bias in pointing towards the rubber hand (in all cases, ,30%
Figure 1 (Holmes & Spence). Dissociation between reaching
biases and illusions of body ownership. Illusory “ownership” of
the aligned rubber hand was significantly stronger (although,
on average still represented denial of the illusion) than the
misaligned hand, which was in turn stronger than the wooden
block. However, reaching biases in the aligned hand condition
were stronger than both the misaligned and wooden block
conditions. The latter two conditions did not differ significantly
from each other (data show mean+ SEM, redrawn from
Holmes et al. 2006).
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drift towards the rubber hand). Further, proprioceptive drift
increases over time-scales as short as 4 to 12 seconds (Holmes
& Spence 2005), and for up to 3 minutes of exposure to a
rubber hand (Tsakiris & Haggard 2005). In contrast to these
partial and incremental processes, the visual capture of tactile
location in the RHI appears to be an all-or-none phenomenon –
when participants were asked whether the touch appeared to
come from “somewhere between their own hand and the
rubber hand,” they typically disagreed (Botvinick & Cohen
1998: 28%; Ijsselsteijn et al. 2006: 32%).
In summary, research on the RHI supports the notion that
proprioceptive reaching and pointing responses can be disso-
ciated from the visual capture of tactile location, and from
higher-order bodily sensations such as ownership. This dis-
sociation parallels, in part, the classical notions of body schema
and body image. Head and Holmes (1911–1912), although
they did not use the terms “body image” or “body schema,” dis-
tinguished three elements of bodily processing which may dis-
sociate from one another following lesions of the spinal cord,
brainstem, thalamus, or cortex – a postural schema for the
appreciation of changes in position and movement of the body
(corresponding, perhaps, to the postural and visuo-motor func-
tions of the visual dorsal stream in D&dH’s model), a surface
schema for the localisation of cutaneous stimuli on the body
surface (which is not at present separated from postural or pro-
prioceptive information in D&dH’s model), and more conscious
visual images of the body (which may correspond to the body
image in D&dH’s model).
We do not see at present how the model proposed by D&dH
accounts in detail for two consistent findings in the RHI litera-
ture: (1) that proprioceptive and tactile aspects of the illusion
are dissociable, though often correlated; and (2) that postural
compatibility of the visible rubber hand is a necessary component
for induction of the RHI and related phenomena. At present, the
model does not appear to provide a direct link between postural,
proprioceptive, or visuomotor processing (related to the body
schema) and the conscious recognition and ownership of one’s
body (related to the body image). The RHI demonstrates that
we cannot incorporate rubber hands into our conscious body
image unless they are compatible with our unconscious body
schema.
NOTE
1. Patrick Haggard uses the word “illuded” for the “hand subject to the
illusion.”
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Abstract: The model developed in the target article is not as
comprehensive as might be desired on two counts: (1) in that how the
transition from proximal stimulation at the skin gives rise to the
perception of external objects is taken for granted; and (2) in that
another population of participants, the blind, constitute an important
group from which we can understand somatosensory processing and
neural plasticity.
Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) synthesize a diverse literature in
the development of their two-stream model of somatosensory
neural processing. I have few concerns regarding the value or
utility of their model, and I appreciate the synthesis. However,
I raise questions that have long lurked in the literature in
which investigations of perception by touch, blindness, and
neuroscience overlap, and which may be pertinent in judging
the comprehensiveness of D&dH’s model.
D&dH state in their introduction that tactile exploration
“informs us about the characteristics of external objects”
(sect. 1, para. 1), which, while true, glosses over an important
achievement: making an ontological transition from patterns of
proximal stimulation to objects and environment, making a
distal attribution. The basis by which perceivers come to attri-
bute patterns of proximal stimulation to objects and events
with which they are in contact, directly or indirectly, is funda-
mental to perception in all modalities. How it arises in the
somatosensory system is important because (among other
things) the sentient skin serves as the boundary between the
self and the environment. Perhaps it could be argued that
any contact at the skin surface, by definition, must be caused
by a distal object. But, as I illustrate further on, this is not
the case. Moreover, as D&dH explain, somatosensation has
multiple roles: to inform of the body’s internal states, as well
as to inform of the external world; and to yield descriptions
of the environmental objects, as well to contribute information
for guided movements with them. If the somatosensory system
reliably and accurately assigns causes to stimulation, an import-
ant issue is by virtue of what operations, in what neural
complexes, these different functions take place.
What psychological or neural operations give rise to the per-
ception that the proximal stimulation is caused by a distal
object in the environment making contact with the skin? To
cite an everyday example: A pencil held by the contact with
five fingerpads of one hand produces five distinct patterns of
stimulation but is perceived as an external, single object
(Gibson 1962). Moreover, it can be perceived as an object of
certain size, held at a certain location with respect to its
length (e.g., see Carello & Turvey 2000). Does the model
give clues as to how or where these important perceptual
achievements occur? Might the model explain how unusual
grips (such as crossed fingers) can give rise to the illusory per-
ception of multiple objects when only one is present (e.g.,
Benedetti 1985; 1986)? It is not clear how these questions
can be answered by the data marshalled by D&dH in develop-
ing their model.
It seems not to be the case that distal attributions arise
because such stimulation can only have been caused by an
external object literally contacting the skin. For example, the
tactile-vision substitution system (TVSS) developed by
Bach-y-Rita and his colleagues (e.g., Bach-y-Rita 1972; White
et al. 1970) revealed that digital camera images converted
into isomorphic vibrotactile patterns on the skin are perceived
by congenitally blind perceivers qualitatively differently,
depending on whether or not the perceiver has active control
of the camera. Proximal, skin-based attributions (e.g., “sharp”
and “ticklish”) predominate when the camera is still or pas-
sively moved, but distal attributions (objects perceived “out
there”) are rapidly made once sensorimotor control of the
camera is established. However, in these instances, the distal
attributions may well have been based on the users’ intellectual
understanding of the system that they were operating: someone
told them how it all worked. Would a naı¨ve perceiver ever be
able to make distal attributions without some independent
knowledge of the cause of stimulation at the skin; that is, by
being told how it works or by bringing other sensory modalities
into play (vision or audition) (e.g., Epstein et al. 1986)? What
conditions would be necessary for this to arise? Epstein et al.
(1986) suggested that although conscious awareness of the sen-
sorimotor contingencies takes place and may be necessary for
distal attribution, it does not appear be sufficient. Perceivers
tend to understand that self-movements cause proximal
changes in stimulation without necessarily attributing the
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proximal changes to distal objects. There appears to be some
other factor(s) that are required for the transition to occur.
Systems such as the TVSS raise important questions about the
nature and ontogenesis of perception in the somatosensory
system of the blind. The philosophically inclined may ask
whether such perception through the skin counts as “seeing”
(e.g., Morgan 1977; O’Regan & Noe¨ 2001). Experimental psy-
chologists seek the informational bases for the qualitative shift
from proximal to distal attributions. In terms of the neuroscience
of the somatosensory system, what neural structures would
support any long-term changes in perception via systems such
as the TVSS? It is conceivable that areas of cortex beyond
those identified by D&dH as part of the somatosensory proces-
sing network are recruited for perceptual purposes in the
blind. There is already considerable evidence that extensive
areas of occipital cortex (e.g., Amedi et al. 2003; Sadato et al.
1998) and cerebellum (Gizewski et al. 2004) are active in
Braille-related tasks by the blind. Hence, although D&dH
show how useful neural lesion data are to our understanding,
the blind (both congenital and adventitious) constitute a research
population whose increased reliance on somatosensation indi-
cates another crucial source of data for testing models of somato-
sensory processing.
Do intention and exploration modulate the
pathways to haptic object identification?
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Abstract: Our model of haptic object recognition points to the
importance of material, as well as geometric properties of objects.
Collectively, these can elicit a recognition response after an initial
contact, without sequential exploration. This model suggests a revision
of the authors’ proposals, which takes into account an individual’s
intention – whether it is for perception or action – and the extent of
exploratory movement.
In referring to tactile object recognition as “one major function of
the somatosensory system” (sect. 3.1, para. 1), Dijkerman & de
Haan (D&dH) echo a theme that has guided our research for
over 20 years. However, we would substitute the term haptic
for tactile: Whereas the latter refers primarily to skin sensation
(Loomis & Lederman 1986), object recognition by touch is
fully active, affording valuable kinesthetic, as well as cutaneous
information. That very activity is difficult for the present
authors to handle, because it points to an essential link
between perception and action that they seek to decouple.
D&dH’s arguments are weakened, we claim, for two reasons.
First, they confuse object primitives at proximal and distal
levels, as evidenced, for example, by the target article’s combin-
ing vibration, pressure, and roughness under the rubric of
“simple stimulus features” (sect. 3.1, para. 2). Second, they
underestimate the role that material properties play in haptic
object recognition. The first error leads to over-emphasizing
the role of spatiotemporal integration (via the posterior parietal
cortex [PPC]). The second error leads to discounting the richness
of material properties.
We have developed a model for haptic object recognition that
makes certain fundamental points. As a preliminary, it is
important to distinguish among distal and proximal descriptions
of objects accessed by the sense of touch. We differentiate
between proximal object primitives that arise at the receptor
level (e.g., heat flow, vibration) and distal properties of external
objects (e.g., apparent warmth, roughness) (Klatzky & Lederman
1999). Transitioning from proximal to distal representations
requires computation by neural systems. Further, we have
made a critical distinction between two broad categories of
distal object properties available to the sense of touch. There
are geometric properties, including size and shape features
(e.g., curvature) and material properties (e.g., roughness, compli-
ance, apparent warmth).
Given this partitioning, we can move to the first point our
model raises, which concerns how properties contribute to
object recognition. Generally, recognition refers to the assign-
ment of an instance to a category with a common name. It has
been demonstrated that there is a basic level of categorization,
corresponding to high-frequency names, which hierarchically
dominates subordinate categories (Rosch et al. 1976). Members
of a basic-level category tend to look alike; however, object cat-
egories at both basic and subordinate levels share non-shape fea-
tures as well, and these are effectively perceived by the sense of
touch. Lederman and Klatzky (1990) asked subjects to rate the
diagnostic features of objects that were to be categorized hapti-
cally at basic and subordinate levels. We found that, at the
basic level, shape was deemed important for touch, like vision,
but texture was also highly diagnostic; moreover, at subordinate
levels, categories were often defined by material properties. An
important implication of this work is that haptic object recog-
nition relies on material properties as well as, and in some
cases instead of, geometric ones.
Our second point is that when an object is recognized by
touch, correlations among object properties can be exploited. A
china plate is not only round and thin, but also cool, smooth,
and hard. The conjunctions of these properties diminish the diag-
nostic value of shape and can lead to a rapid identification
response without overt exploration. Although sequential
manual exploratory movements can be linked to perceived
object properties, they are not necessary for object recognition
by touch.
We have observed (Lederman & Klatzky 1990) a common two-
stage process for haptic object recognition. In Stage 1, people
begin by grasping and, where feasible, lifting the object. This
encompasses the exploratory procedures we call enclosure and
unsupported holding, which are sufficient to provide coarse
information about many geometric and material object proper-
ties (Lederman & Klatzky 1987). For objects being named at
the basic level, the grasp–lift movement is often sufficient.
Indeed, brief fingertip contact, without grasping, can suffice for
recognizing many objects (Klatzky & Lederman 1995). Stage 2,
which comprises extensive exploration, occurs when initial
contact, grasp, or a grasp-lift combination is insufficient. Particu-
larly when object categories are designated below the basic level
(a dull pencil), one observes exploratory procedures being used
that are optimal (most precise) for obtaining the desired diagnos-
tic information.
Our model casts a new light on the present proposal that the
anterior parietal cortex (APC)–PPC route guides action, includ-
ing exploratory procedures, whereas the APC–insula (þ right
PPC) route provides perceptual descriptions leading to recog-
nition. The model suggests that we need to further consider
two aspects of an object-recognition task. One is whether the
individual intends to perceive or to act; the other is whether he
or she performs purposive exploration, or merely Stage-1 contact.
With respect to whether the performer’s intention is to per-
ceive or to act, we note that similar actions can arise from differ-
ent motivations. When we close our fingers around an apple, we
may want to feel it to see whether it is ripe, or grasp it in order to
eat. Although these intentions are distinct, both have perceptual
consequences. Contact with an object has the consequence of
feeling, just as breathing has the consequence of smelling.
Importantly, the perceptual consequences may not be the
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same, given equivalent patterns of action. Just as the brain has
been found to gate the processing of odorants according to
whether the intent was to breathe or to smell (Zelano et al.
2005), it might gate the processing of touch sensations arising
from a grasp, depending on whether the actor’s goal was to
sense or to act.
Considering the second task feature, namely, whether the per-
former uses Stage-1 contact or, alternatively, extended purposive
exploration as the mode of touch, our model suggests that
sequential exploratory procedures will be observed only in the
case where there is an intention to perceive that is not satisfied
by grasping and lifting. Because the exploratory action is
invoked by the perceptual system, the ensuing processing will
then be gated toward object identification.
Our analysis suggests, ultimately, that two aspects of the per-
former’s action – intention and extent of exploration – define
three distinct cases that are likely to modulate the balance
between the two pathways identified by D&dH. When there
is an intention to act, not perceive, extended purposive
exploration will generally not be observed, and the APC–
PPC pathway will predominate. When purposive exploration
is directed toward perceptual consequences, the APC–insula
pathway would predominate, although the PPC would be
invoked for purposes of guiding action. Finally, if perceptual
consequences were intended but achieved through minimal
exploration, a more equal balance between these two pathways
would be found.
A call to arms: Somatosensory perception
and action
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Abstract: Somatosensory processing for action guidance can be
dissociated from perception and memory processing. The dorsal system
has a global bias and the ventral system has a local processing bias.
Autistics illustrate the point, showing a bias for part over wholes.
Lateralized differences have also been noted in these modalities. The
multi-modal dysfunction observed may suggest more an issue of
interhemispheric communication.
Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) propose that somatosensory pro-
cessing for the guidance of action can be dissociated from the
processing leading to perception and memory. Leisman (1989a;
1989b) showed that voluntary movement, like all other move-
ments, consists of operations in time and space specified by phys-
ical parameters. When, for example, a person lifts a cup to his or
her lips, the trajectory of the teacup, force vectors, acceleration,
velocity at every point, total length of the path, locus of origin,
and the time of onset specify the voluntary movement. Neurolo-
gically normal adults usually perform voluntary movements of
this kind quickly, precisely, and without information concerning
the total mass or its contents.
There are two types of explanations for the surprising precision
with which we move our limbs. One is, that the motor system
calculates in advance the values of movement parameters suffi-
ciently accurately to assure successful performance. The other
explanation is based on the fact that every muscular contraction
changes the state of receptors in muscles and tendons. These
receptors measure parameters of voluntary contraction and
transmit this information to the motor system. The motor
system is then thought to control voluntary contraction under
the guidance of sensory feedback from these receptors. Although
there is no contradiction between these two explanations, there is
disagreement as to the relative importance of specific motor
versus sensory feedback.
Other equally important dimension in the understanding of
the organisation of voluntary motor control include the question
of: (1) what are the levels of the central nervous system at which
the desired values of voluntary contraction parameters are calcu-
lated? (2) what is the extent to which voluntary contractions are
automatic, given that humans are able to consciously vary the
parameters of voluntary contractions in an infinite number of
ways?
D&dH suggest that the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) sub-
serves both perception and action, whereas the insula subserves
perceptual recognition and learning. The authors infer a close
relationship between the auditory system and the dorsal and
ventral visual systems. D&dH have provided an intellectual
genealogical extension of the work by Milner and Goodale,
who reinterpreted Ungerleider and Mishkin’s (1982) distinction
between the “what” and “where” visual systems (Goodale &
Milner 1992; Milner & Goodale 1995). Ungerleider and
Mishkin (1982) suggested that the ventral visual stream (genicu-
lostriate pathway projecting to the inferotemporal cortex) sub-
serves object identification, whereas the dorsal stream
(projections from the striate cortex and colliculi to the posterior
parietal cortex) subserves object localization. This suggests that
the function of the dorsal stream is better described as mediating
visually guided actions. Therefore, D&dH replace Ungerleider
and Mishkin’s what versus where distinction with a distinction
between what and how.
In the visual system, we see the dorsal and ventral stream
process different types of visual information. Specifically, the
dorsal system has a global bias focusing on lower spatial
frequency information, whereas the ventral system focus has a
local processing bias utilizing higher spatial frequency
information. The dorsal system tends to focus on global
form, whereas the ventral system focuses on details or parts of
wholes.
Autism is an excellent example where there exists a weighting
of one system and diminished processing of the other. Frith
(1996) proposed a theory of weak central coherence in autism
spectrum disorder (ASD). Additionally, her theory of enhanced
perceptual discrimination (Shah & Frith 1993) attempted to
explain the uneven profile of abilities and difficulties in ASD.
Central coherence refers to the ability to put information together
to extract meaning, to remember the gist of a story rather than its
details. Individuals with ASD show a bias for part over wholes –
often excelling at noticing and recalling detailed information.
Perception and processing features are believed to be superior,
possibly at the expense of processing global information.
Mottron et al. (2000) showed this same type of bias in the audi-
tory system of autistic individuals, along with sensory motor def-
icits, explained partly by a more ventrally based sensory motor
system focusing more on action and less on perception. Autistics
are believed to have poor body schema and spatial localization of
body parts. Many autistics cannot identify their body parts in a
mirror (Mitchell 1997). Even if they know the word “nose,”
they may still identify the wrong body part. They have poor pro-
prioception and are generally clumsy (Minshew et al. 2004;
Schmitz et al. 2003). These examples emphasize increased
action and decreased perception. This parallels what we see in
vision and audition with the emphasis on the ventral system
and decrease in the dorsal system. The mirror neuron system is
dysfunctional in autistics (Hadjikhani et al. 2006). This system
also seems to utilize similar processes to recognize movements
in an implicit manner for the extraction of meaning of intent,
and for emotion.
In normal individuals, motor activity suppresses mu wave
activity in the sensory motor cortex, but it is also suppressed in
normals when they observe someone else performing a motor
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act (Oberman et al. 2005). In autistics, we see that themu wave is
suppressed only with their own actions but not when they
observe others. This again would seem to show unevenness in
sensory motor modalities with an emphasis on action and dimin-
ished perception.
Lateralized differences have also been noted in these modal-
ities. It has been well established that, in vision, the right hemi-
sphere processes information primarily with the more globally
focused dorsal system (Melillo & Leisman 2004). The left hemi-
sphere tends to focus on detail similarly to the ventral visual
system. The same right/left hemisphere differences exist in the
auditory system. The right hemisphere is more spatially oriented
toward the dorsal where, whereas the left hemisphere is focused
on the ventral what. This is also believed to exist within the soma-
tosensory system, where the right hemisphere is more focused on
dorsal perceptual/sensory systems and proprioception, as well as
implicit knowledge of egocentric relationships, and the left hemi-
sphere is more focused on action or motor activity and conscious
awareness of body parts.
The multi-modal dysfunction observed in ASD may suggest an
issue of the adequacy of hemispheric function in the argument
presented by D&dH.
The perception-action interaction comes first
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Abstract:Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) study perception and action as
two independent processes. However, in all daily activities the processes
are completely intertwined, so it is difficult to separate one from the
other. Humans perceive in order to move and also move in order to
perceive. Understanding first how perception and action are
coordinated, leads us then to determine how each component works
independently.
In the target article, Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) argue “in
normal circumstances, . . . perceptual and action-based processes
must operate in a coordinated fashion” (sect. 7, para. 1). Accord-
ing to their account, healthy participants coordinate their percep-
tions and actions more than disabled participants do. However,
the authors do not explain how perception and action are coordi-
nated. They mostly focus their arguments on how these two pro-
cesses are separated from each other in the somatosensory
modality. We want to focus, instead, on the coupling between
perception and action. We argue that to begin any discussion
on perception and action, it is necessary to start from how per-
ception and action are linked before knowing how these two
systems are subdivided. We attempt to illustrate our argument
with two major points.
First, two decades of research have shown that inter-limb
relationships and environment-movement relationships can be
thoroughly understood if one first considers the so-called macro-
scopic level of coordination (Kelso 1995; Turvey 2004). In mul-
tiple experiments (Kelso et al. 1990; Stins & Michaels 1999;
Wimmers et al. 1992), experimenters showed that when one
oscillating limb is coordinated with an external stimulus, the
coordination is more stable when the phase difference between
these two components is in phase (synchronization) rather than
in anti-phase (syncopation). For instance, if the two components
are in anti-phase, then an abrupt phase transition to in-phase,
through a loss of stability, is provoked when the control par-
ameter of frequency (rate) is increased; if the initial phase
relation is in-phase, then the pattern of phase difference is
maintained over the same range of parameter change. Moreover,
at a neurophysiological level, the spontaneous changes from
syncopation to synchronization provoked by the variation of the
rate of the periodic stimulus is accompanied by a drastic reorgan-
ization of the large-scale cortical activity (Fuchs et al. 1992; 2000;
Mayville et al. 1999). These results are observable because one is
looking at the macroscopic level. To do so, one needs a measure
that affords a direct quantification of the relation between the
components, which corresponds, for instance, to the relative
phase between the actor and the environment. If we were to
try to study each component separately, we would not have
access to the crucial information about the actual stability of
the behavior. In the first place, stability indicates the particular
relations between movement and environment that can be main-
tained and, therefore, that are spontaneously selected. Secondly,
through stability changes one may address transitions between
coordination patterns that occur under variations of environ-
mental or internal parameters (e.g., rate of stimuli, attention
load).
Other experiments in interpersonal coordination using a dual
EEG set-up bring evidence for neural correlates specific to the
actual state of the coordination between the participants, quanti-
fied by the variability of the phase difference between partici-
pants’ movements, not by the variability of the phase for each
participant’s movements considered in isolation (Tognoli et al.
2007). In the case of multisensory integration, it was also recently
found that this macroscopic level is the relevant level of study to
understand the binding of movement and multiple senses. For
example, Lagarde and Kelso (2006) found with a basic paradigm
that the particular relationships between action (such as flexion
and extension of an oscillating finger) and periodic sensory mod-
alities (such as sound and touch) were determinants of the stab-
ility of multisensory integration and its breakdown. Together, this
empirical evidence proves that one should not consider lightly
the impact that the dynamic link between perception and
action has on the adaptive behavior of humans or animals, and
the non-trivial qualitative consequences of this link on the func-
tioning of both perception and action.
The second reason that we believe the link between action and
perception is a fundamental discussion point, is demonstrated by
Pagano and Cabe (2003; see also Pagano et al. 1993) in a study
where blindfolded participants had to recognize the shape and
length of simple rods. Results showed that participants accurately
judged the shape and the length of the rod by moving it with one
hand. In this case, it is the action that permits the perception rec-
ognition process. This illustration shows that not only is percep-
tion needed for an action, but also an action is needed for
perception. When considering the what (perception for recog-
nition) and how (perception for the guidance of action) of soma-
tosensory processes as proposed by D&dH, it is coordination that
prevails: some object’s properties are perceived via movement.
Following from Gibson’s perception view (Gibson 1979), this
very relevant example illustrates how movement creates the
information required to recognize the object’s properties.
Going further, Bardy and Laurent (1998) demonstrated that, to
control a somersault, gymnasts use peripheral optical flow infor-
mation. But the optical flow is produced by the somersault itself.
This example perfectly illustrates the inextricability of the “what”
and “how” and, by extension, perception and action as well.
Dissociating the two processes should not come first, and is
clearly applying a very restricted understanding of goal-directed
behavior’s adaptive properties – perception and action are
inseparable.
In understanding perception and action, the dynamic relation-
ship between the two components must be considered. From our
point of view, it is necessary to start from the coupling among
components in order to understand the macroscopic state of
the behavior, its stability, and hence its efficiency in a given
context. Understanding how perception and action are linked
will help us understand how each component works, because
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coordination is the hallmark of what people do every day in any
given movement and is the level at which the stability of behavior
ultimately lies.
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Abstract: Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) propose a somatosensory
perceptual pathway that informs a consciously accessible body image,
and an action pathway that provides information to a body schema,
which is not consciously accessible. We argue that the body schema
may become accessible to consciousness in some circumstances,
possibly resulting from cross talk, but that this may be detrimental to
skilled movement production.
Following Paillard (1999) and consistent with the conceptualiz-
ation of visual pathways for perception and action (e.g., Milner
& Goodale 1995), Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) claim that
the perceptual somatosensory pathway informs a body image
that is conscious, but that information in the action pathway is
interpreted within a body schema that is not consciously accessi-
ble. Paillard described the body image as an internal represen-
tation of body features. The body schema, on the other hand,
describes the position of body parts relative to one another as
represented by an internal sensorimotor body map. These defi-
nitions would suggest that the position of one limb, relative to
another, is not normally represented in consciousness, presum-
ing that vision of the limbs is unavailable.
D&dH present ample evidence from patients (e.g., see
Rossetti et al. 1995b; 2001) and healthy subjects (e.g., see
Westwood & Goodale 2003) to support their claims. However,
a growing literature within the movement sciences suggests
that we can become acutely aware of the position of our limbs
and their movement relative to each other (e.g., Beilock &
Carr 2001; Gray 2004; Masters & Maxwell 2004; Wulf et al.
2001), particularly when required to perform under adverse
psychological conditions (e.g., competitive pressure; Masters
1992) or in degraded sensory environments (e.g., Maxwell
et al. 2003). Maxwell et al. (2003) demonstrated that withholding
visual feedback about the outcome of a golf-putting task caused
subjects to focus their attention on the mechanics of their move-
ments. Also, Gray (2004) found that expert baseball players are
acutely aware of their batting action, particularly when playing
poorly – an observation supported by Maxwell and colleagues’
contention that performance errors tend to increase conscious
awareness of movement parameters (Maxwell et al. 2001;
Poolton et al. 2005; in press). Masters et al. (2004) also found
that Parkinson’s patients report being more aware of their move-
ments than healthy age-matched controls, which suggests con-
scious monitoring of their actions.
Furthermore, it is traditionally recognized that as expertise is
acquired, athletes become increasingly reliant on the availability
of proprioceptive information and less reliant on visual infor-
mation to control their movements and posture (Bardy &
Laurent 1998; Fleishman & Rich 1963; Robertson et al. 1994;
Robertson & Elliot 1996). Athletes, particularly those with
aesthetic aspects to their sport, also often practice with their
eyes closed, presumably in an attempt to enhance awareness of
proprioceptive feedback generated by their movements.
More controversial is evidence that newborn infants are aware
of their movements. Rochat and Morgan (1995) simultaneously
presented 3-month-old infants with two online video images of
their own kicking legs. The infants looked longer and generated
more leg activity while looking at the video image displaying their
leg movements in a direction different than they were producing
(i.e., the legs were displayed with a left-right inversion). Thus,
even preverbal infants may be aware of how they move body
parts relative to one another.
These observations suggest that both the body image and the
body schema may be consciously accessible in some circum-
stances or that the information normally contained within the
body schema is somehow represented by the body image.
However, Masters and colleagues also contend that conscious
access to this information may be detrimental to the production
of fluent, accurate movements (e.g., see Baumeister 1984;
Masters 1992; Masters & Maxwell 2004). Masters and Maxwell
(2004) argue that movement control should remain implicit
(automatic and unconscious), rather than explicit (controlled
and conscious), if optimal performance is desired. They reason
that conscious processing of movement parameters places a
heavy load on working memory resources (Baddeley 1986).
When working memory must process secondary information
(e.g., tactical decisions; Poolton et al. 2006), movements are sus-
ceptible to disruption. Implicit or unconscious processing does
not tax working memory and is, therefore, less susceptible to dis-
ruption from secondary tasks. Hence, Masters and Maxwell
suggest that the learner should not attempt to focus on the mech-
anics of their movements.
The detrimental effects of focusing internally, on the mech-
anics of movement, have also been repeatedly demonstrated by
Wulf and colleagues (for a review, see Wulf & Prinz 2001).
They argue that focusing internally constrains movement
parameters, interfering with their normally automatic execution
(McNevin et al. 2003). In contrast, focusing externally, on the
outcome of movement, has been shown to maximize
performance and promote automaticity. It could be argued that
focusing internally promotes conscious processing of the body
schema.
Masters and Maxwell (2004) have couched their implicit
motor learning theory within an evolutionary context, claiming
that implicit motor processes are more stable than explicit pro-
cesses because the former evolved first (Reber 1992). It is plaus-
ible that the neurological structures that support the action
pathway evolved before structures supporting the perceptual
pathway. Evolutionarily older processes tend to be less suscep-
tible to disruption from psychological stress, disorders, and dys-
functions; are relatively independent of developmental stage,
age, or general intelligence (IQ); and should demonstrate
lower inter-individual variability than younger processes
(Reber 1992). If this is true, then several dissociating character-
istics should be observable for D&dH’s somatosensory path-
ways. For example, incidents of neurological disruption to the
more explicit perceptual pathway should be more numerous
than to the more implicit action pathway. If we assume that con-
scious information is processed in working memory, then we
would also expect disruption to the processing of information
from the perceptual pathway when working memory is occu-
pied with a demanding secondary task. Disruption to infor-
mation from the action pathway should be seen only when it
has been made conscious.
In conclusion, the idea that the internal representation of a
body schema is always unconscious may be flawed. It is possible
that in certain circumstances the information becomes directly or
indirectly accessible to consciousness. Given the high degree of
interaction between the two pathways and the possibility of
cross talk, noted by D&dH, this seems a plausible suggestion.
However, current evidence suggests that elevating body
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schema information to the level of conscious awareness will be
detrimental to the performance of skilled movement.
Central role of somatosensory processes in
sexual arousal as identified by neuroimaging
techniques
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Abstract: Research on the neural correlates of sexual arousal is a growing
field of research in affective neuroscience. A new approach studying the
correlation between the hemodynamic cerebral response and autonomic
genital response has enabled distinct brain areas to be identified
according to their role in inducing penile erection, on the one hand,
and in representing penile sensation, on the other.
In their target article, Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) review
results suggesting that cortical somatosensory processing is
organised into distinct functional streams, and distinguish
between (a) processing for action versus perception, on one
hand, and between (b) processing for external target versus
stimuli related to the body itself, on the other hand. These dis-
tinctions are related to different neural pathways and neuroana-
tomical correlates.
According to numerous ethologists, sexual behaviour is one of
the most important goal-directed behaviours, and the brain plays
a key role at each step of its development (Pfaus 1999). Ignored
during a long period, the main results regarding this question
have come from animal studies, which often remain difficult to
extrapolate to humans. However, research on the neural corre-
lates of human male sexual arousal has been developing in
recent years thanks to the use of modern neuroimaging tools
such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Until recently, a classic
approach used for the statistical analysis of data followed a sub-
tractive approach that contrasted brain activations recorded
during a period of sexual stimuli presentation with those
recorded during a control condition. Such an approach has
produced many interesting results (for reviews, see Mouras &
Stoleru 2007; Stoleru & Mouras, in press). The presentation of
sexual stimuli induces a great number of behavioural responses,
ranging from emotional to autonomic reactions. However, neuro-
imaging regression models often contain hypothetical temporal
functions (block-type functions, for example, to describe periods
of different experimental conditions). Because of the large set of
neural responses involved, one can argue that models that
include more specific and objective functions would be more
suited to identifying the brain circuits involved.
Penile plethysmography, an objective method of measuring
genital response, was used successfully within an fMRI scanner
(Arnow et al. 2002; Ferretti et al. 2005; Moulier et al. 2006). Per-
tinent to the purpose of this commentary, Arnow et al. (2002) did
not identify many brain areas by performing subtractive analyses,
whereas in many areas the blood-oxygen level–dependent
(BOLD) signal was correlated with the penile response as
measured by circumferential plethysmography. In this study,
the highest correlation was reported in the right insular/subinsu-
lar region, in accordance with the role of insula in somatosensory
processes (Augustine 1996). In a recent study (Moulier et al.
2006), we used the higher sensitivity of volumetric plethysmogra-
phy (Kuban et al. 1999) to distinguish brain areas more involved
in penile-response command from those involved in genital
response cortical representation, by manipulating the time
window separating erectile and cerebral responses. Interesting
results have been found pertaining to the distinctions made by
D&dH.
Whereas the correlational analyses clearly identified insulae
bilaterally, our data suggested a role of the anterior portion of
the insula in mediating the erectile response (i.e., the genital
response, a cross-correlation led by the cerebral signal). This
was in accordance with the report of diastolic blood pressure
and heart rate variations after electrical stimulation of the
anterior insula (Oppenheimer et al. 1992). Conversely, a role of
the posterior portion of the insula in sensory integration was
suggested by a cross-correlation led by the plethysmographic
signal (for a voxel located in x ¼ 36, y ¼ 223, z ¼ 15 mm).
Accordingly, sexual stimulation of the penis has been shown to
strongly activate the right posterior insula (Georgiadis &
Holstege 2005), especially for a very close location (x ¼ 36,
y ¼ 224, z ¼ 14 mm).
Different areas were also distinguished with regard to penile
cortical representation. A positive correlation was found in the
paracentral lobules, which are located on the medial surface of
the hemisphere and correspond to the first localization of the
penile cortical representation of the homunculus (Penfield &
Rasmussen 1950). However, in the same correlational analysis
a second location was found more on the lateral surface of the
somatosensory cortices; this location became larger and had a
higher correlation coefficient when the plethysmographic signal
preceded the BOLD signal by 10 seconds. This result was in
accordance with previous recordings of evoked cortical potentials
by stimulation of the dorsal nerve of the penis (Bradley et al.
1998). Following these results, we then proposed a distinction
between two distinct penile representations: (a) one on the
medial surface of somatosensory cortices, corresponding to the
original one and related to the perception of genital response
proper; and (b) one on the lateral surface of the cortices, which
would be more related to superficial skin stimulation (Kell
et al. 2005).
Finally, our correlational approach allowed us to identify high
correlations between the cerebral and genital responses in
regions related to motor preparation and imagery processes,
such as left inferior parietal lobule, frontal opercula, ventral pre-
motor area, and supplementary motor areas.
Thus, many of the target article’s main arguments are largely
supported by studies of the neural correlates of human penile
response using, in particular, correlational analyses between
autonomic genital response and hemodynamic cerebral
response. Overall, the results of such studies support the
central role of the insula in penile sensation awareness – that
is, in higher-order somatosensory processing. Consistent with
D&dH’s viewpoint (see sect. 3.2 of the target article), the
insula could be involved in the emotional component of sexual
arousal (Redoute et al. 2000). Another striking point of conver-
gence between data reviewed by D&dH and our results in the
Moulier et al. (2006) study is that we found that the magnitude
of penile tumescence drives, with a lag of about 10 seconds,
the BOLD signal recorded from the paracentral lobule (part of
the posterior parietal cortex). This suggests that this area is
involved in the command of the penile response – which is
again clearly consistent with the role of Brodmann 5 in goal-
directed actions as reported by D&dH.
In conclusion, the recent application of penile plethysmo-
graphy within the neuroimaging setting allows the study of the
correlation between the cerebral and autonomic responses.
Moreover, the high sensitivity of volumetric plethysmography
enables brain areas more related to the conduction of the erectile
response to be distinguished from those areas more related to the
encoding of penile sensation, once the autonomic reactions
appear. The high correlations found for areas related to motor
imagery underline the central role of physiological reactions in
goal directed behaviours.
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Divisions within the posterior parietal cortex
help touch meet vision
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Abstract: The parietal cortex is divided into two major functional regions:
the anterior parietal cortex that includes primary somatosensory cortex,
and the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) that includes the rest of the
parietal lobe. The PPC contains multiple representations of space.
In Dijkerman & de Haan’s (D&dH’s) model, higher spatial
representations are separate from PPC functions. This model should be
developed further so that the functions of the somatosensory system
are integrated with specific functions within the PPC and higher spatial
representations. Through this further specification of the model, one
can make better predictions regarding functional interactions between
somatosensory and visual systems.
In external space, both somatosensory and visual systems
perform the critical functions of object localization and recog-
nition. In touch, the hand is a flexible exploring effector that com-
bines motor capabilities with sensory capabilities to actively find
objects in personal (on the body) and in peripersonal (within
reaching distance) space (Lederman & Klatzky 1987; Previc
1998). Once an object is located, the hand then executes a
series of exploratory procedures to extract information about
the material and geometric properties of the object (Klatzky
et al. 1989; Lederman & Klatzky 1987). Thus, in haptics, action
is inextricably part of perception. Most real, common objects
can be recognized in less than 2 seconds (Klatzky et al. 1985).
Nonetheless, haptic perception is best suited to extract local,
material properties from objects (Klatzky et al. 1987).
Information regarding the complex contours and part relations
of objects, especially for large objects that exceed the size of
the hand, is more difficult to apprehend. Although touch phys-
ically interacts with portions of the outside world, it needs infor-
mation about objects located in extrapersonal space, outside of
reach.
In contrast, perception is separate from action in the visual
system. Vision is well suited to obtain the information that
touch lacks and vice versa. In vision, the spatial layout of
objects in extrapersonal space is easily obtained, as are the
spatial relations of one object to another and the spatial relations
of object features. However, physical object properties need to
be inferred. By itself, vision cannot perform actions in the world.
Although touch and vision can find objects in peripersonal and
personal space and recognize them independently, they typically
function together. The motor/somatosensory system uses spatial
information from vision to help move the body through space in
order to help bring objects in extrapersonal space into periperso-
nal space, in which the haptic system can be effective. This
system also uses information regarding frames of reference and
spatial relations to help construct representations of object-
shape and object-part relations. In turn, the somatosensory
system provides the visual system with the means to perform
actions. The interaction of the systems expands the object
localization and recognition capabilities of both. Thus, neuro-
anatomical divisions within the posterior parietal cortex (PPC)
should aid this interaction by providing the lacking information
to each.
First, consider known divisions of labors within the visual
stream of processing. Creem and Proffitt (2001) proposed
that visual information processing can be divided into
“what,” “where,” and “how” pathways. The “what” pathway
is involved in object identification and follows a ventral
route from primary visual cortex to inferior temporal cortex.
The “where” pathway is involved in the coordination of
spatial maps and spatial frames of reference and follows a
more dorsal route to the inferior PPC. Finally, the “how”
pathway is involved in coordinating visual information with
action on objects and follows the most dorsal route to the
superior PPC.
Of interest is how these divisions of labor for vision within
the PPC relate to divisions of labor within touch. For tactile
object recognition, converging evidence from primate,
patient, and neuroimaging literatures points to a somatosensory
“what” processing stream: A modality-specific ventro-lateral
stream moves from the sensorimotor cortex to the secondary
somatosensory cortex (SII), the insula, and the inferior PPC
before connecting with modality-general portions of the
ventral object processing stream (Reed et al. 2004). A patient
with unilateral tactile agnosia (impaired tactile object recog-
nition) had left hemisphere inferior parietal damage (Reed &
Caselli 1994). Her object-recognition impairment did not influ-
ence other forms of spatial processing, but her specific errors
indicated a problem in integrating the different parts of
objects (Reed et al. 1996). For tactile object localization, data
from fMRI studies suggest a somatosensory “where” processing
stream that differentially involves bilateral superior PPC (Reed
et al. 2005).
At first glance, the somatosensory “what” and “where”
systems appear to be connected to the wrong parts of the
visual system: The somatosensory “what” system appears most
closely related neuroanatomically to the visual “where”
system, and the somatosensory “where” system appears most
closely related to the visual “how” system. However, when
one considers what information each system needs most to
perform specific functions, the divisions of labors may make
sense. The somatosensory recognition system includes inferior
PPC but requires information regarding spatial relations
among objects and their parts. The “where” system for
vision, also associated with the inferior PPC, contains this
information. Thus, when somatosensory “what” meets visual
“where,” more precise multimodal object recognition can
occur. Similarly, the somatosensory “where” system, associated
with superior PPC, contains information regarding sensorimo-
tor information in relation to body space. The visual “how”
system, also associated with the superior PPC, connects with
visual properties for object interaction with sensorimotor infor-
mation for more precise object-related actions. These proces-
sing streams in touch and vision allow for better transmission
of information for multimodal functioning.
In summary, Dijkerman & de Haan’s (D&dH’s) model is
underspecified with regard to the integration of the higher
spatial information with the PPC and how the PPC might be
functionally divided for the somatosensory system. These div-
isions have implications for how the somatosensory system inter-
acts with the visual system for the important functions of object
localization, recognition, and interaction. Nonetheless, the
model has achieved what the authors intended – it has provided
a model from which predictions can be made.
Pathways of tactile-visual crossmodal
interaction for perception
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X07001586
Norihiro Sadato,a,b Satoru Nakashita,a and Daisuke
N. Saitoa,b
aDivision of Cerebral Integration, Department of Cerebral Research, National
Institute for Physiological Sciences, Myodaiji, Okazaki, Aichi, 444-8585, Japan;
bJapan Science and Technology Corporation (JST) and Research Institute of
Science and Technology for Society (RISTEX), Kawaguchi, Japan.
sadato@nips.ac.jp nakashit@nips.ac.jp sdaisuke@nips.ac.jp
http://www.nips.ac.jp/fmritms/english/index.html
Commentary/Dijkerman & de Haan: Somatosensory processes subserving perception and action
218 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 30:2
Abstract: There is a task-specificity in the visual-tactile interaction
for perception: The polymodal posterior parietal cortex is related to the
comparison of the shapes coded by different sensory modalities,
whereas the lateral occipital complex is the part of the network
for multimodal shape identification. These interactions may be
mediated by some latent pathways potentiated by sensory deprivation
or learning.
In the target article, Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) propose that
the visual-tactile modalities interact closely through the polymo-
dal higher-order cortical areas such as the posterior parietal
cortex (PPC) and the lateral occipital complex (LOC), whose
functions may differ. They suggest that the PPC is involved in
multimodal coding of body-related configuration for the gui-
dance of action, whereas the LOC is a multimodal area involved
in perceptual representation of object form features. Here we
argue that these polymodal areas also show some specificity of
the cross-modal interaction for perception.
Mah-Jong is a Chinese game similar to card games, involving
two-dimensional plastic tiles with various marks carved on one
side; therefore, shape can be identified by both visual and
tactile inspection. Visual-tactile cross-modal shape comparison
with Mah-Jong tile activated the caudal part of the intraparietal
sulcus more prominently than did intramodal comparison
(Saito et al. 2003). This is consistent with the notion that the
two processing streams in both modalities project to the same
higher-order cortical areas that are involved in multimodal
sensory integration. Therefore, this finding may suggest that
the PPC is related to the comparison of shapes coded by different
sensory modalities.
Intramodal tactile shape comparison does not usually recruit the
visual cortex in activation (Harada et al. 2004). In contrast, during
three-dimensional object naming, Amedi et al. (2001) first demon-
strated consistent somatosensory activation in the LOC. They
suggested that cortical neurons in the LOC in humans may func-
tion as a part of the multimodal object-selective network (Amedi
et al. 2001). The activation in the LOC reflects stored object-
related visual information that can be accessed via cues from soma-
tosensory modalities, and possibly from other modalities as well
(Amedi et al. 2001). This argument suggests that direct inter-
actions among modality-specific sensory pathways underlie the
multimodal representation of objects (Amedi et al. 2001). Accord-
ing to this view, bimodal activation occurs in the visual cortex
rather than in the somatosensory areas because object recognition
relies primarily on vision. Hence, the LOC is related to the multi-
modal shape identification.
The involvement of the multimodal LOC in tactile processing
appears to be modified by learning (Saito et al. 2006) or sensory
deprivation (Sadato et al. 2004). Some well-trained Mah-Jong
players can identify the carved patterns of the tiles by touch.
The subjects who were well trained in the tactile comparison of
Mah-Jong patterns showed more prominent activation in the
visual cortex, including the LOC and V1, when performing this
task than did the naı¨ve subjects, who showed activation in the
LOC but not in V1 (Saito et al. 2006). Both the LOC and the
V1 of the well-trained subjects were activated during Braille
tactile comparison tasks to which they are naı¨ve. This is probably
due to cross-modal plastic changes produced by the effects of
long-term training on one set of cards (Mah-Jong) that general-
izes to an untrained set of cards (Braille) (Saito et al. 2006).
During tactile shape comparison with Braille characters, lately
blind subjects (i.e., those with late onset of blindness) who had
never learned Braille showed the activation of the association
visual cortex, including the LOC (Sadato et al. 2004). This may
be interpreted as that the visual deafferentation caused less
demand on bottom-up visual processing, which may in turn intro-
duce an opportunity for the expansion of tactile representations
in the visual association cortex.
Burton et al. (2004) showed that simple vibrotactile stimu-
lation activates both lower-tier visuotopic (e.g., V1, V2, VP, and
V3) and several higher-tier visual areas (e.g., V4v, V8, and BA 37).
Early blind participants showed the most extensive distribution
of activity. Lately blind participants exhibited activity in mostly
similar regions, but the response magnitudes declined with
the age of onset of blindness. Three sighted individuals had
supra-threshold activity in V1. These results suggest that vibro-
tactile inputs probably activate the visual cortex through some
latent pathway common to both blind and sighted subjects
(Burton et al. 2006). Burton et al. (2006) speculated that
visual deprivation alone induces reorganization of the visual
cortex, particularly in regions with already strong multisensory
properties, where a competitive shift to non-visual inputs may
readily follow visual deprivation (Sadato et al. 2004). In con-
trast, cross-modal reorganization of the lower-tier visual
areas, which are not cross-modally responsive in sighted
people, may be activated particularly through regular attention
to selected non-visual inputs. Such learning might be needed
to strengthen the more remote connections with multisensory
cortical areas (Saito et al. 2006). Cross-modal reorganization
of lower-tier visual areas may thus be triggered in sighted sub-
jects by learning such skills as Mah-Jong pattern identification
by touch.
In conclusion, visual–tactile interaction for perception is
mediated by task-specific pathways which are dynamically modi-
fied by sensory deprivation or learning.
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Abstract: We review evidence for multifaceted functional specialization
of somatosensory information processing, both within and outside
classical somatosensory cortex. We argue that the nature of such
specialization has not yet been clarified adequately to regard the
proposed action/perception dichotomy as being established. However,
we believe this is a good working hypothesis that can motivate further
work.
Although most investigators would agree on the existence of
functional specialization for processing somatosensory infor-
mation, we argue here that the nature of such specialization,
both within and outside classical somatosensory cortex, is far
from clear. In monkey primary somatosensory cortex (SI), focal
ablation of Brodmann’s areas 1 or 2 has been found to specifically
impair perception of texture or form, respectively (Randolph &
Semmes 1974); whereas, lesions of Brodmann’s area 3b
(Randolph & Semmes 1974) and of secondary somatosensory
cortex (SII) (Murray &Mishkin 1984) non-selectively impair per-
ception of both texture and form. Partly consistent with these
findings are neurophysiological observations in monkeys that
neuronal responses in SI and SII encode texture changes (Jiang
et al. 1997; Pruett et al. 2000; Sinclair et al. 1996) and that
neurons in Brodmann’s area 2 are shape-selective (Koch &
Fuster 1989).
These functional differences described in monkeys do not map
neatly onto humans. Somatosensory cortical lesions were for-
merly thought to produce complex discriminative deficits, as
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opposed to thalamic lesions resulting in simpler problems with
detection of touch or pain, but this clinical dogma has fallen by
the wayside in the era of neuroimaging (Sathian 2007).
Whereas SI lesions affect both texture and form discrimination
(Roland 1987), parietal opercular lesions seem to specifically
compromise form perception (Roland 1987; Caselli 1993; Reed
et al. 1996). However, another report indicates that SI lesions
cause deficits in kinesthesis and discriminative tactile perception,
whereas parietal opercular-insular lesions result in thermo-
nociceptive deficits and poststroke pain (Kim 2007). Thus, the
findings from studies of patients with somatosensory cortical
lesions have not yet led to a coherent picture.
Functional neuroimaging studies of somatosensory cortex have
led to similarly heterogeneous results. Some studies have noted
common regions of activation in the postcentral sulcus (PCS)
(O’Sullivan et al. 1994; Servos et al. 2001) or parietal operculum
(Ledberg et al. 1995) during perception of both texture and form.
We reported PCS activity selective for form relative to texture in
two independent studies (Peltier et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2004).
Since the PCS corresponds to Brodmann’s area 2 (Grefkes et al.
2001), form-selectivity in this region is consistent with the afore-
mentioned neurophysiological and lesion studies in monkeys that
implicate area 2 in form perception (Koch & Fuster 1989;
Randolph & Semmes 1974). Despite the implication of parietal
opercular activity in form perception (Reed et al. 2004), such
activity has not been shown to be form-selective. On the contrary,
parietal opercular activity is stronger during texture than form
perception (Roland et al. 1998; Stilla et al. 2006). It should be
noted that parietal opercular cortex, which was initially equated
with SII (for a review, see Burton 1986), actually contains mul-
tiple somatosensory areas, with evidence now for three areas in
monkeys (Fitzgerald et al. 2004) and four in humans (Eickhoff
et al. 2006a; 2006b).
There is, surprisingly, greater consensus on findings outside
classical somatosensory cortex, in regions now identified as multi-
sensory. Conjoint tactile and visual form-selectivity characterize
the visual cortical region known as the lateral occipital complex
(LOC) (Amedi et al. 2001; Peltier et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2004),
the anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) (Grefkes et al. 2002;
Peltier et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2004), and foci located more
caudally in the IPS (Peltier et al. 2007; Saito et al. 2003;
Zhang et al. 2004). Tactile texture-selectivity outside somato-
sensory cortex appears to be confined to medial occipital
cortex at the border between visual areas V1 and V2, where it
overlaps with visual texture-selectivity (Stilla et al. 2006).
Task-specific, modality-independent engagement of particular
cerebral cortical regions during perception seems to be a
general rule; that is, regions known to be specialized for proces-
sing particular aspects of vision are also recruited during
performance of corresponding tactile tasks (for a review, see
Sathian 2005).
So, what about the proposed dichotomy of processing? One
study (Reed et al. 2005) suggested distinct processing streams
for form and extrapersonal spatial processing, although selectiv-
ity was found only outside somatosensory cortex, involving
fronto-cingulate cortex and superior parietal cortex, respect-
ively. Another study (van Boven et al. 2005) described hemi-
spheric specialization within posterior parietal cortex, rather
than a dorso–ventral dichotomy, the left aIPS being preferen-
tially active during discrimination of grating orientation, and
the right temporo-parietal junction, during discrimination of
small differences in grating location on the fingerpad. We
have reported somewhat similar specializations, involving left
aIPS and left parieto-occipital cortex for tactile discrimination
of grating orientation, and the right angular gyrus for tactile
discrimination of grating groove width (Sathian et al. 1997;
Zangaladze et al. 1999; Zhang et al. 2005). Our findings of
selectivity for form in PPC foci and for texture in parietal oper-
cular cortex (Stilla et al. 2006) could be interpreted as consist-
ent with the proposed action/perception dichotomy of
somatosensory processing: The dorsally directed pathway into
PPC can be considered as specialized for grasping, which fits
with findings for the aIPS region in monkeys (Murata et al.
2000) and humans (Frey et al. 2005) – grasping is an action
closely linked to haptic form perception. The ventral pathway
via the parietal operculum into the insula, in contrast, might
be particularly concerned with material object properties,
such as texture, which are especially the province of touch
(Klatzky et al. 1987). Even the activity of the left aIPS
during mental rotation of tactile (Prather et al. 2004) and
visual (Alivisatos & Petrides 1997) forms, which we suggested
represents activation of the dorsal visual pathway on account
of spatial processing (Prather et al. 2004), could be viewed in
terms of manipulation of images, a kind of internal action.
However, given the multifaceted nature of somatosensory
specialization, we think the proposed action/perception dichot-
omy should be considered a working hypothesis of somato-
sensory processing to motivate further research, rather than
being regarded as established.
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Abstract: Neonatal behavioral data support the argument that multiple
relations exist between vision and touch. Looking at an object triggers
the motion of a neonate’s arm and hand towards it. A textured surface
that is seen can be recognized tactilely, but not a volumetric shaped
object in cross-modal transfer tasks. These data are supported by adult
neuroimaging data.
The relations between vision and touch in infancy have been
studied according to two paradigms: (1) Fine descriptions of
the visuo-prehensile coordination when infants attempt to
reach and grasp objects near them. (2) Looking or holding
times obtained in cross-modal transfer tasks between touch and
vision. The analysis of evidence obtained from the separate
bodies of literature (see Streri 1993) supports Dijkerman & de
Haan’s (D&dH’s) argument regarding dissociation between
somatosensory processing for perception and for action. On
one hand, cross-modal transfer of shape is not bi-directional
from birth. In these tasks, newborns were familiarized with an
object in one modality (touch or vision) and then, in the test
phase, they received the familiarized object and the novel one
in the other modality. A longer holding or looking time for the
novel object is taken as evidence of cross-modal recognition.
Newborns visually recognize a shape held previously (Streri &
Gentaz 2003; 2004), but they fail to recognize tactilely a shape
seen previously (Sann & Streri 2007). On the other hand,
visuo-prehensile coordination is also present at birth. The new-
borns, firmly seated on a chair inclined at 508 (with the chair sup-
porting their head and trunk) are able to move their arms towards
a target. The direction of movement is always correct, and this
gesture is considered as visually triggered. However, contact
with the object is rarely achieved (von Hofsten 1982). Neonatal
visuo-prehensile coordination is also uni-directional. When new-
borns hold an object, they never move it towards the eyes (Streri
& Gentaz 2003; 2004).
In short, when newborns hold an object, they do not attempt to
look at it, but are able to recognize it visually in a cross-modal
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transfer task. When newborns look at an object, they do not
recognize it tactilely, but attempt to reach and grasp it. This neo-
natal reaching is visually triggered, whereas perceptual recog-
nition is tactilely supported. During the course of development,
this scenario remains unchanged. Concerning cross-modal trans-
fer, the failure from vision to touch has been demonstrated in 2-
month-old infants (Streri 1987) and in 1-year-old infants (Rose
and Orlian 1991). Also, adults’ performances are worse in the
visual-tactile (V-T) modality than in the tactile-visual (T-V)
modality (Connolly & Jones 1970; Jones & Connolly 1970;
Juurmaa & Lehtinen-Railo 1988; Newham & McKenzie 1993;
cf. Hatwell 1994). Thus, from birth and throughout life, the
T-V modality appears to be performed better than the V-T
modality. Regarding visuo-prehensile coordination, by the age
of about 4–5 months, a child’s hand approaching an object is
guided visually and the focus of gaze switches back and forth
from the hand to the object to be grasped. Infants are able to
anticipate the trajectory of a moving target, and the hand is pre-
pared to receive visually gained information. This action has
several characteristics of the adult system (Jeannerod 1986; von
Hofsten & Ro¨nnqvist 1988).
We suggest that visuo-prehensile coordination is devoted
mainly to spatial process (Where). Because cross-modal transfers
require memory and recognition processes, they are mainly
devoted to the identification of the shape of objects (What).
This dissociation is supported by the neuroimaging data obtained
from studies on adults (Reed et al. 2005). Reed et al.’s data
provide direct evidence that neural regions for somatosensory
“what” are different from “where.”
Another dissociation in the somatosensory system can be
evoked by the processing of the characteristics of objects.
The somatosensory processing of microgeometric properties
(such as texture) has to be distinguished from the somatosen-
sory processing of macrogeometric properties (such as
shape). Support for this idea is based on two lines of evidence:
(1) our studies on newborns’ perception of both properties of
an object in bidirectional cross-modal transfer tasks between
vision and touch (Sann & Streri 2007), and (2) neuroimaging
data obtained in adults. The results of the former revealed
that cross-modal transfer of shape is not bidirectional. In con-
trast, cross-modal transfer of texture is bidirectional. Vision and
touch appear to be equivalent for gathering, exchanging, and
processing information about texture, but not about shape.
Regarding neuroimaging data obtained in adults, Roland
et al. (1998) suggest that a functional separation may exist in
the cortical processing of microgeometric and macrogeometric
cues: Shape and length discrimination activate the anterior part
of intraparietal sulcus more than does roughness discrimi-
nation. Merabet et al. (2004), using repetitive transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (rTMS), showed that a transient disruption in
the somatosensory cortex impairs microgeometric (texture)
judgment, while a transient disruption in the visual cortex
impairs macrogeometric (distance) judgment. More recently,
a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study investi-
gated the activity and the connectivity of parietal and occipital
cortical areas during haptic, and (in separate runs) visual,
shape or texture perception (Peltier et al. 2007). The results
revealed that a network of cortical regions is selectively acti-
vated during haptic shape perception compared to haptic
texture perception. The intraparietal sulcus and the lateral
occipital complex appear to be shape-selective in the tactile
modality, as well in the visual modality.
Taken together, these data suggest that, from birth, somato-
sensory processing is organized into several functional streams,
and its evolution appears stable. Neonate behavioral data and
adult neuroimaging data provide an answer to the major question
concerning the visual influences on somatosensory processing.
These influences differ for action and for perceptual recognition.
They also differ according to the perceptual processing of object
properties.
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Abstract: Our commentary addresses two issues that are not developed
enough in the target article. First, the model does not clearly address the
distinction among external objects, external body parts, and internal
bodies. Second, the authors could have discussed further the role of
body schema with regard to its dynamic character, and its role in
perspective and in imitation.
Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) propose a model that takes into
account the role of the somatosensory system in perception and
action, in analogy with the dual-route model of the visual cortical
system. In our commentary, we address two issues that are not
developed enough in the target article.
One of the core aspects of D&dH’s model is that, differently
from the dual-route model of the visual system, it distinguishes
between internal and external stimuli, that is, between somato-
sensory processing of one’s own body and of external objects.
First, despite the target article’s wide review of literature on
body image, we believe the model does not clearly address the
distinctions among external objects and external body parts,
and internal bodies as regards body image. Second, the target
article should have discussed further the role played by body
schema. The authors do not sufficiently underline the dynamic
character of body schema. In addition, even though they admit
that the neural correlates of visual representation of the obser-
vers’ own body has received scarce attention, they do not
address the behavioral and neural literature focusing on the
role of one’s own as well as others’ perspective in body schema.
Finally, we think that D&dH should take into account the role
of the body schema in the imitation of action. Here, we consider
these two aspects in turn.
D&dH do not clearly discuss how the bodies of others are pro-
cessed: Are they considered as external objects or as external
bodies? For example, their model is not fully able to explain
how tactile recognition of others’ body parts takes place. This is
an important issue, because both neuropsychological and exper-
imental studies on body image suggest that a common supramo-
dal representation is used for representing the bodies of others,
as well as one’s own body (Bosbach et al. 2006; Buxbaum &
Coslett 2001). This is suggested, for example, by the inability of
autotopagnosic patients to locate body parts on their own body,
on another’s body, or on a mannequins’ body (Buxbaum &
Coslett 2001; Ogden 1985; Semenza 1988; Sirigu et al. 1991),
and by the results of a test with healthy participants by Reed
and Farah (1995). A possible way for explaining how this recog-
nition takes place might be to assume that an external hand is
tactilely recognized and activates its corresponding represen-
tation in semantics (as suggested by the link between the
tactile object-recognition module and the semantics module,
which also includes the semantic knowledge about the body).
However, because of the lack of a direct link between semantics
and the internal body image, it is difficult to understand how
another body’s hand can, for example, be recognized as being a
right or a left hand. D&dH should at least add a link between
the internal body image and semantics. In this regard, a clarifica-
tion is needed concerning terminology. The authors distinguish
between body schema, body image, and some form of semantic
and conceptual representation of the body. However, in the
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recent literature a more clear terminology is proposed. For
example, Schwoebel et al. (2004) distinguish between body
schema, body image, or body semantics, and body structural
description. In sum, even though D&dH discuss the existence
of a semantic and conceptual representation of the body, they
do not relate body image to semantics in their model.
The authors do not discuss enough the role of body schema as
far as three aspects are concerned: its dynamic character, the role
of perspective, and the role of body schema in imitation. The
dynamicity of body schema is clearly demonstrated by the
neural and behavioral literature focusing on the enlargement of
the body schema on account of tool use (for a review, see
Maravita & Iriki 2004). We believe that this interaction
between the body and objects conceived of as extensions of the
body should be at least briefly considered.
Moreover, the target article does not develop enough the role
played by perspective-taking. The authors dismiss the literature
in this field by arguing that there is ample evidence for egocentric
coding of external targets, and that the neural correlates of visual
representation of the observers’ own body have received less
attention. However, the role of perspective is an important
issue: Perspective is one of the visual characteristics that
enables us to distinguish our own body from the body of
someone else. According to the in-use terminology, “egocentric”
refers to the perspective consistent with looking at one’s own
body, whereas “allocentric” refers to the perspective that is con-
sistent only with looking at someone else’s body (Saxe et al. 2006).
Both neural and behavioral studies have provided evidence for
distinct representations for self and others with respect to
visuo-spatial perspective taking. Much neural evidence confirms
our sensitivity to action perspective (Carey et al. 1997; David
et al. 2006; Jackson et al. 2006; Knoblich 2002; Ruby & Decety
2001). On the behavioral side, evidence of the role of perspective
is more scarce. However, Vogt et al. (2003) suggest the existence
of two different priming effects: a visuomotor priming effect,
driven by a visual stimulus (a hand) that automatically evokes a
motor response, and a motor visual priming, driven by planning,
which enhances the visual processing of body parts in the ego-
centric perspective.
Finally, we think that the authors should at least briefly con-
sider the role of dynamic body schema in action imitation, as
shown by recent neuropsychological and brain-imaging studies
(Buxbaum et al. 2000; Chaminade et al. 2005; Goldenberg
1996). Indeed, there is a common code linking different body
parts and their spatial configuration that is independent of differ-
ent modalities and perspective (Goldenberg & Karnath 2006).
Haptic perception is a dynamic system of
cutaneous, proprioceptive, and motor
components
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Abstract: A general shortcoming of the localist, decompositional,
approach to neuroscientific explanation that the target article
exemplifies, is that it is incomplete unless supplemented with an
account of how the hypothesized subsystems integrate in the normal
case. Besides, a number of studies that show that object recognition is
proprioception dependent and that cutaneous information affects
motor performance make the existence of the proposed subsystems
doubtful.
Dijkerman & deHaan’s (D&dH’s) target article can be seen as an
effort to apply the kind of dissociative organization proposed by
Milner and Goodale for the visual system (see Goodale &
Milner 1992; Milner & Goodale 1995), to somatosensory pro-
cesses. Such a strategy is an example of a decompositional
approach to neuroscientific explanation: It starts with a functional
analysis of a cognitive process and decomposes it into different
subsystems (each one supposedly responsible for processing
different kinds of information); and then tries to determine the
neural bases of each subsystem. The proposal is considered suc-
cessful if these subsystems can be differentially correlated with
different neural paths and regions, either by neuroimaging
studies or by neuropsychological (double) dissociations.
However, a common problem of such explanations is that they
are not complete until they can show how these different subsys-
tems integrate and work together in normal, healthy subjects.
The idea that the brain processes different information in differ-
ent places at different speeds is fine, but the model must also
offer an account of the time course of the different processing
paths, how these different paths may conflict and integrate,
how the internal activity evolves in interaction with the specific
kinds of information available in the environment, and how the
brain is able to organize its resources, so that on a given occasion,
a given informational pathway may take over (Gomila & Calvo,
forthcoming).
In this case, however, we think there are grounds for doubt-
ing D&dH’s functional analysis in the first place. Their article
proposes that tactile object recognition and body image consti-
tute a different system from the one involved in proprioception.
This implies that somatosensory processes involved in percep-
tion are different from somatosensory processes involved in
action. Unfortunately, this distinction does not take into
account results, like those obtained in the field of dynamic
touch (Turvey 1996), that support a more comprehensive view
on touch. In fact, it only focuses on what, following Jones and
Lederman (2006), may be called tactile sensing, as opposed to
haptic sensing (which involves exploratory procedures, that is,
hand movements for haptic object perception (Lederman &
Klatzky 1990). There is plenty of evidence obtained from
these more comprehensive approaches that shows, on the one
hand, that proprioceptive information is relevant to object rec-
ognition (Blanco & Travieso 2003; Pagano & Turvey 1998;
Pagano et al. 1996), and, on the other hand, that cutaneous
stimulation may contribute to motor control through the body
schema (Travieso & Lederman, under revision; Westling &
Johansson 1984).
To illustrate the relevance of proprioceptive information in
object recognition, we will focus on a concise length and
weight perception task. In such a task (Amazeen & Turvey
1996), a subject is asked to estimate the length and weight of a
non-visible object which cannot be grasped completely (it can
only be handled). What Turvey’s group has been able to prove
is that, in order to perform this task, the subject needs to
extract the rotational inertial properties of the object. These
are obtained from the antigravitational force required by the
muscles to hold the object (their rotational dynamics). The invar-
iant tensor of inertia, which according to Turvey (1996) is the
physical quantity we extract, can be obtained only from the mus-
cular effort required to move the object. Hence, this example
clearly shows that intentional movement is necessary for haptic
length or weight object perception. Furthermore, the same infor-
mation is used to perceive both our own body and the external
object (Pagano & Turvey 1998; Pagano et al. 1996), which contra-
dicts D&dH’s functional separation.
With respect to the contribution of cutaneous information to
motor control, several studies have shown that cutaneous infor-
mation contributes to proprioception. It is well known that the
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perception of hand position and orientation is mediated by
cutaneous information, but recent studies show, as well, that
the contribution of cutaneous information also extends to the
perception of other body parts (Collins et al. 2005). On the
other hand, cutaneous deficits also affect motor dexterity
(Moberg 1983; 1991). For example, Travieso and Lederman
(under revision) have found inverse correlations between the
spatial resolution thresholds at the fingertips and the time
needed to perform motor-dexterity tests and to recognize
three-dimensional objects, together with deficits in texture per-
ception (Travieso & Lederman, under revision; Travieso et al.
2001). These results also contradict the separation of different
somatosensory processes for perception and action proposed by
D&dH.
As a last point, we want to highlight that the authors them-
selves implicitly acknowledge in the target article that their pro-
posed functional decomposition does not really fit with the
neuroanatomical data, given that the posterior parietal cortex
plays a role both in recognition and in action, which rather
suggests common processing. That their functional analysis is
problematic can also be seen, for example, in how they interpret
the performance of patient G.L. in a pointing task (Fig. 3). In
section 3.2, paragraph 3, D&dH review different studies that
claim that different representations of the body are used for
the guidance of movements and for perceptual judgments. In
this context, they interpret the results obtained by Paillard
(1999) when studying patient G.L. as showing a dissociation
between a normal “perceptual” representation (because she is
able to recognize objects and point to a picture of her hand)
and an impaired “sensorimotor” representation (because she
has problems when pointing towards haptic stimuli). However,
what we think the results show is that G.L. was simply poor at
pointing without vision: she was equally good at pointing with
vision towards her hand or towards a picture. Her problem was
not with the action itself, but with the use of haptic information
alone (without vision). This example shows a problem shared by
all those models which try to establish strict functional separ-
ations between perception and action: When looking for exper-
imental support for the dissociation, it is never clear whether a
task is really a “perceptual task” or an “action task” (for an
example, see Franz 2003), or whether the tasks chosen are
really equivalent and comparable (for a discussion of this issue
in the case of vision, see, e.g., Franz 2001; Franz et al. 2001).
This is so because perception and action are closely intertwined
in our interaction with the world, as our example of haptic length
and weight perception shows.
In summary, we think that a comprehensive view on touch
cannot be reduced to a twofold perception-action system with
corresponding independent neural pathways. In particular, the
dynamic properties of perception-action loops must be taken
into account to provide a satisfactory explanation of the haptic
system.
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Abstract: The model presented in the target article includes feature
processing and higher representations. I argue, based on
neuropsychological evidence, that spatial representations are also
involved in perceptual awareness of somatosensory events. Second,
there is an asymmetry, with a right-hemisphere–based bilateral
representation of the body. Third, the specific aspect of bodily
awareness concerning motor function monitoring involves a network
that includes the premotor cortex.
The somatosensory processes supporting perception and action
discussed by Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) do not involve
major hemispheric asymmetries, as illustrated by their
Figure 1. These are briefly mentioned with reference to tactile
object recognition and tactile agnosia. The role of spatial proces-
sing and of the right hemisphere, and the effects of unilateral
spatial neglect after damage to the right posterior parietal
cortex (PPC), are considered. D&dH’s conclusion is that tactile
agnosia may be caused by – and possibly through different
underlying pathological mechanisms – both left- and right-
sided brain damage.
A hemispheric asymmetry exists, however, at the much more
basic level of pain sensation and proprioception. In a study of a
large, unselected series of left- and right-brain-damaged patients,
Sterzi et al. (1993) reported that these somatosensory deficits, as
assessed by a clinical, standardized neurological exam, are more
frequent after right-brain damage than after left-brain damage.
This result contrasts with the time-honored view, which still
informs clinical neurology (Ropper & Brown 2005), that there
is no hemispheric asymmetry in the more “elementary,” non-
cognitive stages of sensation. The asymmetry is not confined to
the somatosensory domain and extends to the visual and motor
systems: Both visual half-field and motor deficits (hemianopia
and hemiplegia), contralateral to the side of a hemispheric
lesion, are more frequent after right-hemispheric damage
(Sterzi et al. 1993).
One interpretation relates the higher incidence of left somato-
sensory deficits to disorders of spatial processing and, more
specifically, to unilateral spatial neglect, which also are more fre-
quent and severe after right-brain damage (Bisiach & Vallar
2000). In line with this view, in right-brain–damaged patients
the detection of left single and simple somatosensory stimuli
(touches) is definitely, though temporarily (for about 30 min),
improved by the physiological maneuvers, such as caloric vestib-
ular stimulation, that also ameliorate other aspects of the neglect
syndrome, in both extra-personal and personal space (for
reviews, see Rossetti & Rode 2002; Vallar et al. 1997). Although
the empirical data are definite, the precise nature of the relation-
ships between somatosensory awareness and spatial processing is
open to interpretation.
I take the view that in the somatosensory, as well as in the
visual domain, perceptual awareness of a sensory event – that
necessarily occurs in space – involves not only the more periph-
eral stages of sensory analysis, but also its localization in the
sector of extra-personal (as in the case of visual stimuli), or per-
sonal, bodily (as in the case of somatosensory stimuli) space
where the event takes place. Accordingly, in patients with
right-brain damage, visual and somatosensory (left-sided in reti-
notopical and somatotopical reference frames) deficits improve,
when the stimuli are presented in the right, preserved, side of
space, with regard to spatial egocentric coordinate frames
(Kooistra & Heilman 1989; Smania & Aglioti 1995). A partially
preserved spatial processing may give rise, in the tactile modality,
to the phenomenon of “blind touch” (analogous to “blind sight”),
whereby patients can localize by pointing – possibly by using
more automatic and implicit sensorimotor loops – stimuli of
which they are not explicitly perceptually aware (i.e., unable to
detect and identify) (see also the review by Gallace & Spence
2007).
The hemispheric asymmetry of the neural underpinnings of
these spatial reference frames, that support perceptual aware-
ness in the somatosensory domain, is further elucidated by a
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recent study: Bottini et al. (2005) showed that right hemianesthe-
sia in left-brain–damaged patients is also temporarily improved
by caloric vestibular stimulation, provided, however, that the
type (cold water) and the side (left ear) of stimulation are those
which activate the right cerebral hemisphere, and have
proved to be able to ameliorate left hemianesthesia in right-
brain–damaged patients (Vallar et al. 1993). Interestingly, in
two brain-damaged patients the brain regions activated by vestib-
ular stimulation during the temporary recovery of contralesional
somatosensory deficits included the insula (right-brain–damaged
patient R.F.; Bottini et al. 1995), the right temporoparietal
junction, the secondary somatosensory cortex (SII), and the
supramarginal gyrus (left-brain–damaged patient L6; Bottini
et al. 2005) (See Figure 1 here.)
The observation that a caloric vestibular stimulation (cold water
in the left ear canal), activating mainly the right hemisphere, tem-
porarily improves both left hemianesthesia in right-brain–
damaged patients and right hemianesthesia in left-brain–
damaged patients, suggests that a right-hemisphere–based
neural network supports a representation of both sides of the
body (Bisiach & Vallar 2000; Mesulam 2002). Specifically, there
is some evidence that in the right hemisphere the somatosensory
representation of the ipsilateral right side may be based on non-
crossed afferent projections to SII (Bottini et al. 2005).
The hypothesis of a right-hemisphere–based network support-
ing a bilateral representation of the body is also consistent with
the well-known hemispheric asymmetry of disorders involving
delusional beliefs about the ownership of body parts (somatopar-
aphrenia) (Bisiach & Geminiani 1991), and of anosognosia for
hemiplegia (Pia et al. 2004; Vallar & Ronchi 2006). As to the rel-
evant brain regions, there is neuropsychological evidence in
brain-damaged patients that associates lesions of the right
insula with disownership of contralesional body parts (patient
F.B. reported by Bottini et al. [2002] and patient 4 reported by
Cereda et al. [2002]; see also the two patients reported by
Moro et al. [2004]). These impairments may be listed under
the rubric of body image disorders, separate from the mainly pro-
prioceptive-motor, and largely unconscious, body schema (Vallar
& Papagno 2003). Within bodily awareness, and the “body
image,” a distinction should be drawn, however, between the
sense of ownership of body parts (the deficit being somatopar-
aphrenia) and the monitoring of motor function (the deficit
being anosognosia for hemiplegia) (Vallar & Ronchi 2006). In
the latter disorder, the main lesion correlate may be the right
frontal premotor cortex (Berti et al. 2005), rather than the right
insula (Karnath et al. 2005). The close association of these
higher-order disorders of different aspects of the internal rep-
resentation of the body (somatoparaphrenia and anosognosia)
with unilateral spatial neglect may reflect the damage to
common components of a network, specifically related to the
integration in spatial reference frames of somatosensory and
motor representations. Relevant components may include SII,
the PPC, the insula, and, as regards the monitoring of the
motor function of the body, the frontal premotor cortex.
Damage to single components of this network may gives rise to
selective, and spatially constrained, disorders of bodily aware-
ness, ranging from the inability to report single somatosensory
stimuli to the higher-order deficits of somatoparaphrenia and
anosognosia for hemiplegia.
In sum, D&dH’s flow chart (target article, Fig. 1) may be
enriched by three additions: (1) What is termed “higher
spatial representations,” and is based on the activity of net-
works comprising the PPC and the insula, is involved not
only in “tactile object recognition,” but also in the more
basic ability of detecting somatosensory stimuli, and, more gen-
erally, in perceptual and motor bodily awareness. (2) Bodily
awareness, as far as the monitoring of motor function is con-
cerned, involves the premotor cortex. (3) There is a hemi-
spheric asymmetry, with the right side of the brain
supporting a bilateral representation of the body.
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Abstract: The commentaries have raised important points
regarding different aspects of our model. Some have queried
the nature of the proposed dissociations, whereas others have
requested and provided further details regarding aspects we
had glossed over. Here we suggest that our approach to
identify major processing streams based on the processing goal
does not preclude interactions between them. We further
specify details regarding body representations, haptic object
recognition, and crossmodal processing, but are also aware that
several features of the model require further filling in.
R1. Introduction
We were pleased to receive comments on a wide range of
aspects of our proposed model. Some commentaries pro-
vided supportive evidence from areas we had not touched
upon in our review (e.g., development of body represen-
tation, Christie & Slaughter), others had important
comments on the nature of the proposed dissociations
Figure 1 (Vallar). Physiological effect of left caloric vestibular
stimulation (CVS) on touch in a left-brain–damaged patient
(L6). The area of significant interaction of left CVS with right-
sided touches in Patient L6 (left) is displayed on her magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) scan. The bar plot shows the average
fMRI blood oxygenation level–dependent signal change
(compared with rest in that brain region) before CVS (2 ),
after CVS (+), and at a 30-minute delay (CVS-2). The values of
signal change are mean-centered. Images are displayed
with the anatomical right (R) on the right side.
(Reprinted from Bottini et al. 2005, figure 2, with permission
of Neurology.)
Response/Dijkerman & de Haan: Somatosensory processes subserving perception and action
224 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 30:2
between functional and neural entities and possible
interactions between them (e.g., Brozzoli, Farne`, &
Rossetti [Brozzoli et al.]; Drewing & Schneider;
Holmes & Spence), and some found fault with general
idea of separate processing pathways for action and per-
ception in the somatosensory system (e.g., Graf; Marin
& Lagarde; Travieso, Aivar, & Gomilla [Travieso
et al.]). Finally, several comments were related to
detailed aspects of the model, which we had not filled
in sufficiently (de Vignemont; Hughes; Klatzky &
Lederman; Tessari & Borghi; Vallar). As a first
response, we feel encouraged by the overall positive reac-
tions to our ambition to summarize the existing literature
into a comprehensive and testable model of somatosen-
sory processing. We hope that it will serve as a platform
for generating new research, and the comments we
have received suggest that we have already succeeded
to some degree.
. We have organized our detailed response in separate
sections, each dealing with commentaries on specific
parts of our target article. The following aspects are
discussed: (1) the nature of the anatomical and functional
dissociations and comparison with the visual system; (2)
body representations; (3) haptic object recognition; and
(4) crossmodal interactions (see Table R1).
R2. The nature of functional and anatomical
dissociations and comparison with the visual
system
One of the starting points of our review was the analogy
with the visual system in which two separate processing
streams have been identified by Milner and Goodale
(1995) for visuomotor control and object recognition.
Several commentators question the strict distinction
between processing for perception and action for the
somatosensory, as well as for the visual system (Graf;
Marin & Lagarde; Travieso et al.). All three commen-
taries cite evidence in favour of close interactions
between perception-related and action-related processes,
but from different angles. With respect to the commen-
taries of Marin & Lagarde and Travieso et al., part of
the differences in opinion seems to be related to differ-
ences in definition of what perception constitutes. Both
commentaries implicitly seem to equal perception to “pro-
cessing of sensory signals.” In contrast, within the context
of the perception-action dichotomy, we use the term per-
ception in a more strict sense. Here, “perception” is
conceptualized as a goal for processing, in this case, recog-
nition and conscious experience. This may cause confusion
as visual sensory processes, such colour or texture extrac-
tion, are in this view not perception. These are the primi-
tives that may be used to achieve perception.
Another confusion concerns the erroneous interpret-
ation of our model that there is a strict division between
the two pathways from different types of peripheral
sensory input up to high-level processes (i.e., conscious
perception or action). For instance, Travieso et al.
suggest that proprioceptive input aids object recognition,
and, on the other hand, cutaneous input is involved in
motor control, which would contradict our model.
However, we entirely agree with this idea and have
never meant to suggest that tactile input is solely related
to object recognition and proprioception to action. In
section 2 of the target article, we state the following:
Indeed, certain types of input may be more important for
certain tasks, with proprioceptive input contributing more to
action-related processes, and the skin receptors providing
more information for perceptual purposes. However, this
mapping of different somatosensory submodalities to output
is by no means absolute. (sect. 2, para. 4)
As we suggested before, it is not the input characteristics
rather than the purpose of sensory processing that deter-
mines the processing routes. Therefore, several examples
provided by Marin & Lagarde and Travieso et al. do
not, in our opinion, contradict our model (e.g., haptic
involvement in object recognition [mentioned earlier
here]; cutaneous involvement in motor control; phase
synchronization).
A central issue is raised by Graf, who questions the val-
idity of this distinction in vision. He suggests that – as we
proposed for the somatosensory modality – that there are
substantial interactions between the two visual pathways,
as well. He discusses three lines of evidence, which are
mainly concerned with the idea that the ventral object rec-
ognition stream uses visuospatial information and invokes
parietal activation. First, perception and action operate
conjunctively when eye movements actively explore a
visual scene. Second, regions within the parietal cortex
are recruited in certain recognition tasks, such as
Table 1. An overview of the commentaries for each section of this
response
Topic Commentaries
The nature of functional and
anatomical dissociations and
comparison with the visual
system
Graf
Travieso et al.
Marin & Lagarde
Drewing & Schneider
Franz
Goodale & Cant
Garraghty
Sathian et al.
Mouras
Brozzoli et al.
Vallar
Fiehler et al.
Body representations Christie & Slaughter
De Vignemont,
Holmes & Spence,
Maxwell et al.
Tessari & Borghi
Leishman & Melilo
Tactile object recognition Binkofski et al.
Hughes
Klatsky & Lederman
Crossmodal interactions Goodale & Cant
Brozzoli et al.
Sadato, et al.
Sathian et al.
Reed
Streri & Sann
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misoriented or distorted images of objects. Finally, Graf
argues that the processing principles in the “what” and
the “how” streams might be more comparable than
Milner and Goodale have put forward. These comments
are important as they concern our conceptualisation of
two separate processing steams. Drewing & Schneider
express similar concerns. They suggest that we have put
forward a convincing case for a functional dissociation
between “how” and “what” streams but have failed to dis-
entangle the functional description from structure. They
point to the act of manipulating external objects as the
most poignant example of a situation that requires heavy
interactions between structural areas. We are grateful to
Graf and to Drewing & Schneider for raising this issue
in such an eloquent manner as this provides us with an
opportunity to clarify our position on this matter (which
has been commented on by others, too, e.g., Brozzoli
et al.; Franz; Goodale & Cant).
We envisage a cumulative approach in which it is useful
to delineate the major processing steams first. The work of
Milner and Goodale was exemplary here as they proposed
one of the first models of vision that focussed on the objec-
tive, to which end information was being processed – that
is, vision for action versus vision for recognition. The dis-
tinction between these pathways was further corroborated
by the finding of parallel processing. Neuropsychological
double dissociations (Milner & Goodale 1995), differential
activations in imaging studies (Culham et al. 2003; James
et al. 2003) and distinct differences in behavioural tasks
(Pelisson et al. 1986) have all supported the idea that
one stream can function independently of the other.
However, these observations do not preclude the possi-
bility of cross-talk between the processing streams. It
was always likely that this was the case in vision, given
the anatomical connections between the ventral route
and the dorsal route, and it is logically necessary in soma-
tosensory processing. Milner and Goodale (1995) already
stated that the two streams are not “hermetically sealed”
(see also Goodale & Cant). In sum, we agree with Graf
that there is evidence for cross-talk in the visual system,
but in our view this strengthens the idea of separate path-
ways. This probably applies to vision, audition, and soma-
tosensory processing. In order to prevent circularity of
arguments and to allow the model to be falsifiable, clear,
a priori descriptions are required of the type of tasks in
which interactions between the pathways occur, and the
putative neural mechanisms. These descriptions should
allow testable hypotheses to be developed.
The suggestion by Drewing & Schneider that it is
“attention” that forms the “glue” between the two
systems is interesting and requires further study. It
appears to us, however, that a substantial amount of pro-
cessing that depends on both pathways does not require
conscious attention. The issue of attention is also discussed
by Franz. She suggests that it is the allocation of attention
that determines which pathway is engaged. Again, we have
no problem with this suggestion, although we would like to
see a more tangible definition of attention and especially of
the concept of allocation. There is a risk here of reverting
back to the idea of a homunculus in charge of an army of
talents. Franz’s suggestion that attention might to some
extent “define the functions of different systems . . . atten-
tion itself might be a guiding principle” (para. 6) is beyond
the scope of our model. Our proposal is less ambitious and
merely tries to define the function of somatosensory sub-
components in terms of goal-specific processing.
Another issue that is brought up in several commen-
taries concerns the nature of the processing characteristics
within the two visual streams. In particular, it has been
suggested that other distinctions or dichotomies (than per-
ceptual and action) may be more appropriate to describe
the ventral and dorsal stream functions (Brozzoli
et al.). As previously described by Milner and Goodale
(1995), and summarized in our target article, a distinction
based on what the sensory input is used for, does have con-
sequences for the processing characteristics in each
stream. That is, accurate performance of a goal-directed
grasping movement may require different visual par-
ameters than, for example, successful recognition of an
object. As a consequence, the characteristics of visual pro-
cessing in the dorsal stream (real-time egocentric) differ in
a number of aspects from ventral stream processing (view-
point-independent and storage over a longer period).
Milner and Goodale further suggest, as we mentioned,
that ventral stream processing may be required for
several aspects of visuomotor action, for example, when
a delay is introduced between the stimulus display and
the motor action (see also Goodale et al. 1994; Milner
et al. 2003). This is also true during the visual control of
grip force (asGoodale & Cant describe in their commen-
tary) or, indeed, when the motor response depends on an
allocentric spatial representation. The recent observation
of a dissociation between ego and allocentric task perform-
ance of patient D.F. (Schenk 2006), therefore, does not
seem inconsistent with the original proposal put forward
by Milner and Goodale and indeed has been reported pre-
viously (Carey et al. 2006; Dijkerman et al. 1998; Murphy
et al. 1998). We suggest that action-related processing and
perception-related processing in the somatosensory
system differ with respect to a number of characteristics.
For example, several authors have suggested that the
somatosensory characteristics contributing to different
body representations differ, with the action-related body
schema representation being mainly fed by bottom-up
signals from the entire body and being less enduring
than the perceptual body image that can also be prone
to local inconsistencies (Tsakiris et al. 2006) (see also
section R3 on “Body representations”).
Brozzoli et al. wondered whether action is less suscep-
tible to somatosensory illusions. There now is evidence
from at least four different somatosensory illusions that
suggest task-dependent differences of these illusions.
The effects of a haptic size contrast illusion on grasping
and perceptual size matching responses were described
by Westwood and Goodale (2003). Differential effects of
the vibrotactile illusion have been reported by Marcel
(2003) and Kammers et al. (2006), and the rubber-hand
illusion is discussed in section R3. In addition, we have
recently obtained opposite patterns for size matching and
grasping responses involving Weber’s illusion (Anema
et al., submitted b). We are therefore confident that differ-
ential effects of somatosensory illusions on perception-
related and action-related responses do exist, although
we do not claim that motor responses are always more ver-
idical. Whether they are also present for the after-effect
described by Brozzoli et al. remains to be tested.
The discussion by Garraghty regarding the physio-
logical data on somatosensory processing across species
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is crucial. The suggestion that cats and primates may have
a different architecture is important to the degree that we
should not over-generalise data from other species (see
also Sathian, Lacey, Gibson, & Stilla [Sathian et al.]).
More important are the suggestions concerning the role
of the different modality-specific processing areas. Gar-
raghty and others will have noticed that we have omitted
the use of the term primary somatosensory area (SI) in
our target article, because we were aware of the ongoing
debate about the specific role of these primary somatosen-
sory areas. More research is needed to define the precise
distribution of labour here. Furthermore, Sathian et al.
comment on differences in cortical areas involved in pro-
cessing of different somatosensory submodalities, with
the anterior parietal cortex (APC) being associated with
kinaesthesis and tactile input and the parietal opercular-
insula region being involved in thermo-nociceptive pro-
cessing. We are, of course, aware of input from touch
thermal and pain receptors to the insula, bypassing the
APC (Craig 2002; Olausson et al. 2002). Indeed, the
work of Craig described in our article has been particularly
relevant, and this input may be especially important for
the affective aspects of body representations as mentioned
in section 3.2. The data presented by Mouras in his com-
mentary are also consistent with the idea of involvement of
the posterior insula in sensory processing for affective
body representations. However, the context in which he
defines goal-directed behaviour is somewhat different
from ours.
The neural basis of somatosensory processes is also dis-
cussed by Vallar. His insightful commentary provides
several important additions and specifications to our pro-
posed model. He is correct when he observes that we
have not always been very specific about laterality differ-
ences regarding somatosensory processing. His suggestion
that higher spatial representations related to the right
hemisphere not only play a role in tactile object recog-
nition and higher-order perceptual body representations,
but also in the more basic ability to detect somatosensory
stimuli, is convincing. Indeed, in addition to temporary
improvement of tactile detection after left caloric stimu-
lation, we have also observed a long-term improvement
in tactile pressure sensitivity and proprioceptive finger-
position sense after adaptation to rightward-displacing
prisms in a patient with a right hemisphere lesion
(Dijkerman et al. 2004). A second suggestion made by
Vallar concerns the role of the premotor cortex. Our
model has mainly been concerned with posterior cortical
areas, but we agree that the premotor cortex is also import-
ant for bodily awareness and ownership. Evidence for this
comes from patient studies (e.g., see Arzy et al. 2006a) and
functional imaging studies using the rubber-hand illusion
(Ehrsson et al. 2004; 2005a).
A further comment regarding the neural basis of soma-
tosensory processes was made by Fiehler, Engel, &
Ro¨sler (Fiehler et al.). The neural areas involved in
memory for haptically explored objects (secondary soma-
tosensory cortex [SII], insula, and posterior parietal
cortex [PPC]) and haptically encoded spatial positions
(SII and PPC) are similar to the areas we proposed to be
involved in haptic object recognition and spatiotemporal
integration. The idea of storage of somatosensory rep-
resentations for actions is in our opinion more controver-
sial. Fiehler et al. cite evidence from a hand-movement
recognition task, showing activation of APC, SII, and
PPC. Although not described in detail, the hand-move-
ment sequences made in this task were probably not
goal directed and may involve different somatosensory
processes, compared with goal-directed grasping move-
ments (this distinction is similar to that made between
optic ataxia and apraxia in the visual modality). Again,
the maintenance of hand-movement sequences which
increase in length may require greater temporal-spatial
integration, resulting in activation of the PPC. In contrast,
the numbsense patient studied by Rossetti et al. (2001)
reverted to chance-level performance when reaching
movements were made after a delay of only a few
seconds. This finding suggests little, if any, memory
capacity when somatosensory target input is processed
for guidance of a goal-directed action.
R3. Body representations
The commentaries raised several important points regard-
ing the functional characteristics of different body
representations. Interesting supportive evidence for
different body representations for perceptual and action-
related responses comes from developmental studies.
Christie & Slaughter suggest different developmental
trajectories for sensorimotor representations (present
before birth) and recognition of one’s own body (present
at 5 months of age). This is followed by manual exploration
of objects at about 6 months of age, while higher-level
visuospatial and higher-level body representations
appear even later. These findings are consistent with the
idea of multiple body representations, although they by
no means rule out a certain interdependence between
the development of the different representations.
The commentaries by Holmes & Spence and by
Maxwell, Masters, & van der Kamp (Maxwell et al.)
both relate to possible interactions between action-
related and perception-related representations. Holmes
& Spence describe the effect of the rubber-hand illusion
on different measures of limb displacement. They
suggest that the visual capture effect and the feeling of
ownership result in a larger displacement as compared
to proprioceptive drift (as measured by pointing move-
ments). This is consistent with a differential effect of the
illusion on action-related responses as compared to per-
ceived position and body ownership. Recent work from
our lab also confirms that the rubber-hand illusion has a
stronger effect on perceived position of the hand as com-
pared to motor localisation responses (Kammers et al.,
submitted). Holmes & Spence, however, argue that a
link is required between the body image and the body
schema representations, as the illusion is significantly
stronger when the rubber hand is placed in an anatomi-
cally compatible position. This suggests that input from a
postural schema is used during the rubber-hand illusion.
In our view, this finding is also compatible with the idea
that structural knowledge about the body is important
for inducing the arm displacement in the rubber-hand
illusion. Structural knowledge about the body would be
related more to perceptual body representations as com-
pared with sensorimotor representations (see also,
Buxbaum & Coslett 2001; Schwoebel & Coslett 2005).
Note that this does not mean that we consider the body
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image and body schema as entirely separate represen-
tations without any scope for one to influence the other.
There are probably many instances in which perceptual
representations influence sensorimotor representations
(see sect. R2). Here of course the danger of a non-falsifi-
able model resurfaces, and one of the current challenges
is to define the specific conditions and circumstances in
which such interactions occur.
Maxwell et al. suggest that the body image may not
always be unconscious. They describe several instances
in which performers are aware of how their body moves
during their actions, and they describe how this usually
has a detrimental effect on the performance of the move-
ments. Although it feels intuitively plausible to consider
that the input one is aware of is the same that is used to
guide one’s actions, this may not necessarily be the case.
Studies with somatosensory illusions, such as the vibrotac-
tile illusion (Marcel 2003; Kammers et al. 2006), but also
the rubber-hand illusion (as discussed earlier), suggest
that the position of where one consciously perceives
one’s arm to be is not necessarily the position one’s
motor system “considers” the arm to be at. Rather, the
effects described by Maxwell et al. suggest that the per-
ceptual body image may be able to influence the motor
system, but is less proficient in doing so.
Holmes & Spence’s comments regarding the effect of a
postural schema on the rubber-hand illusion also relate to
the precise definition of the different body representations.
Uniformity in definitions unfortunately is rather lacking, as
de Vignemont and Christie & Slaughter point out. We
have tried to be clear in our definition by linking it to some
of the most well-known descriptions of body image and
body schema made by Paillard (1999) and Gallagher
(2005). But a detailed description is wanting. De Vignemont
and Christie & Slaughter are, therefore, right to suggest that
further specification and more precise definitions are an
important next step. De Vignemont provides some useful
suggestions about which criteria to use and which pitfalls
to avoid, and she also suggests that a distinction between
action-oriented and recognition-oriented body represen-
tations may not be such a clear criterion as we assume.
Of course, these are very broad categories which can
easily be further subdivided, and we agree that this may
be necessary. Nevertheless, we suggest that a basic organ-
isation principle of sensory systems, including the somato-
sensory system, is that processing depends on task
requirements; and considering that these are different
for action-related and perception-related responses, we
assume different processing characteristics. Indeed, body
representations may be dynamic in nature, in that they
draw upon different input sources (visual, proprioceptive,
tactile, semantic, and structural knowledge) to different
extents, depending on task requirements. The basic differ-
ence between body representations may be their access to
certain input sources. For example, the action-related
body representations may not be influenced by semantic
and other cognitive knowledge about the body, whereas
the body image is. Tessari & Borghi also comment on
the definitions of different body representations and
suggest we did not relate the body image to semantics in
our model. Indeed, we have not been very explicit, in
either the target article text or in its Figure 1, about the
link between body image and semantics, although we do
mention this in the text. As described earlier in this
response, we do consider this link to be important and a
characteristic that distinguishes body image from body
schema. Other aspects that are mentioned by Tessari &
Borghi and by Brozzoli et al. are the dynamic nature of
the body schema (in that it can be modified during tool
use) and perspective taking. We agree that the dynamic
nature of the body schema is an important characteristic
and one that may be less applicable to the body image
(Gallagher 2005).
Regarding perspective taking, this has been an issue
mainly with respect to visual representations of body
parts. As somatosensory input is inherently egocentric,
this topic has received considerably less attention (but
see Newell et al. [2001] for the role of perspective taking
for haptic object recognition). Nevertheless, it would be
of interest to assess whether haptic input can lead to rep-
resentations from a third person’s perspective, and we are
currently planning such experiments. With respect to imi-
tation, an accurate representation of one’s own body no
doubt plays an important role as suggested by Tessari &
Borghi; however, this is not only fed by somatosensory
input, but also by visual input. Indeed, the studies
mentioned by Tessari & Borghi – Buxbaum et al. (2000),
Chaminade et al. (2005), Goldenberg (1996) – mainly
deal with visual imitation and do not specifically assess
the role of somatosensory input pertaining to the body.
We would hypothesize that if the somatosensory body
schema, as defined in our target article, is impaired, this
may affect visual imitation. However, to our knowledge
this has so far not been tested.
One interesting aspect touched upon by Leishman &
Meillo is the difference between global and local proces-
sing. They suggest that, for visual input, global processing
is generally related to dorsal stream processing, whereas
local processing is related to the ventral stream. A
similar suggestion has been put forward with respect to
body representations. Gallagher (2005) suggested that
the body schema functions in a holistic and more inte-
grated way, in contrast to the body image, which may
involve partial or local representations of the body (and
therefore also be more susceptible to inconsistencies
such as those evoked by the rubber-hand and vibrotactile
illusions). We, therefore, view this as another example of
similarities in functional organisational principles
between different modalities.
R4. Haptic object recognition
Across the commentaries, comments regarding the tactile
object recognition emphasize the interaction between
somatosensory processing for perception and for action
(Binkofski, Reetz, & Blangero [Binkofski et al.];
Graf; Marin & Lagarde; Reed; Travieso et al.). As
several commentaries deal with visual, as well somatosen-
sory, processing, they are discussed in different sections.
Binkofski et al. focus their commentary on the role of
area intraparietal sulcus (AIP) in object recognition. They
suggest that this area appears to be involved in haptic
object recognition, as well as exploratory finger move-
ments. They proposed that AIP may be a crucial interface
between perceptual and action-related processes. This is
entirely consistent with our ideas and indeed has been
mentioned in section 3.1 of the target article.
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Klatzky & Lederman suggest that haptic rather than
tactile object recognition is a more accurate description,
because recognition of objects does not only involve
tactile but also proprioceptive input. This is, of course,
correct, and we do agree that haptic may be a more accu-
rate description. However, especially in the neuropsycho-
logical and functional imaging literature, the term tactile
object recognition is commonly used, which is why we
adopted it. More importantly, Klatzky & Lederman
further specified different stages during object recog-
nition, based on their model (Lederman & Klatzky
1990). We agree that haptic object recognition does not
necessarily always involve extensive exploratory finger
movements and that Stage 1 (grasping, and where appro-
priate, lifting) may be sufficient. Again, considering the
wide scope of the target article, we were unable to
discuss different strategies to achieve object recognition
in detail, and we are grateful to these authors for stressing
this point in their commentary. Klatzky & Lederman’s pro-
posal of variations in the involvement of the APC-PPC and
APC-SII-insula routes, depending on the extent and
purpose of exploration, is interesting and warrants
further investigation. We would like to add that different
components of the APC-PPC route may be involved in
the movements made during Stage 1 (grasping and
lifting) and Stage 2 (extensive exploration). For example,
neurons in area 5 in monkeys have been related to grasp-
ing (Stage 1) (Debowy et al. 2001; Gardner et al. 1999; Ro
et al. 2000), whereas AIP is involved in exploratory finger
movements, as mentioned by Binkofski et al., and in
grasping (Culham et al. 2003). Whether right hemisphere
dominance for haptic object recognition may also be par-
ticularly related to Stage 2, or is involved in other aspects
of somatosensory processing as suggested by Vallar,
remains to be tested.
Klatzky & Lederman and Hughes further mention
the difference between distal and proximal levels. The
main point raised by Hughes relates to the mechanism
that produces a transition of proximal stimulation of the
skin to an object representation through distal attribution.
He describes the example from Gibson (1962) which illus-
trates how, when holding a pencil, contact with five-finger
pads can result in the percept of one object. Hughes
wonders how the question of distal attribution can be
answered by the data used for developing our model.
We have glossed over this important issue, and we are
grateful to Hughes for raising it. Although the mechanisms
through which distal attribution is achieved are far from
clear, we hypothesize that the APC-SII-insula route
would be particularly important. This would involve a
combination of increasingly complex feature processing
within this route, crossmodal interactions, and top-down
influences from higher-order perceptual and semantic
systems situated within the infero-temporal cortex. Inter-
estingly, the examples provided by Gibson (1962) and
Benedetti (1985; 1986) suggest that the spatial configur-
ation of the hand influences perceptual processing of
external stimuli. Recent experiments on finger agnosia in
a patient with Gerstmann’s syndrome also support this
point. This patient was impaired when asked to state verb-
ally, or point to a line drawing of a hand, which finger had
been touched (Anema et al. 2006). Nevertheless, she per-
formed normally when asked to point directly to the
touched location, suggesting a perceptual “finger image”
impairment with intact “finger schema” (cf. Paillard
1999). She additionally showed an impairment in percep-
tual integration of tactile stimuli in external space across
fingers, suggesting that internal perceptual body represen-
tations can influence perception of external tactile stimuli
(Anema et al., submitted a) This suggests that represen-
tations of the body influence representations of external
stimuli, similar to interactions between perceptual and
sensorimotor processes. An important challenge for
future research is to establish when and how these inter-
actions occur.
R5. Crossmodal interactions
There is now abundant evidence for a close collaboration
between the sensory modalities. This means that any
model concerned with sensory processing should take
these interactions into account. In our target article, we
have addressed a number of issues in this realm, but we
have not covered all possible crossmodal phenomena.
One such omission is commented on by Goodale &
Cant, who remind us that calculating the grip force and
load force during reaching movements requires adequate
knowledge about the material properties. More impor-
tantly, they emphasize the close collaboration that is
required between the visual and somatosensory systems
for the act of manipulating external objects. Vision
guides us towards objects, whereas somatosensory feed-
back informs us in detail about the weight and size. This
information is used to fine-tune the forces applied to the
object. Functional imaging studies have discerned dedi-
cated areas within the ventral system that encode
objects’ surface characteristics, such as texture, that help
to define the material properties. We completely agree
with the suggestion that this information, in addition to
stored knowledge about objects, is used in modulating
reaching movements. In fact, it is reminiscent of our pro-
posals regarding the interactions between the two somato-
sensory streams. Streri & Sann’s commentary concerning
the developmental trajectories of visuo-tactile interactions
also supports the idea of a separate crossmodal system for
sensory processing for perception and action because the
influence of vision differs. In addition, a further distinction
can be made between macro- and micro-geometric prop-
erties with respect to perceptual crossmodal interaction.
Perhaps this may also be the case when contrasting the
development of the relation between grip force and size
and texture cues in the action system.
Brozzoli et al. also point to recent data that question a
strict division between the two pathways in vision. By
implication, it is suggested that such a division cannot be
absolute in somatosensory processing either. Again, we
want to stress that we feel that the interactions between
the different pathways that we identified are a central
feature of the model, and, second, that the model is postu-
lated in order to refine the descriptions of these inter-
actions. In addition, Brozzoli et al. point to an important
aspect of visual-tactile interaction, which is, that perceived
(visually or somatosensory) variations of limb positions in
peri-personal space modulate localisation performance in
the other modality. We agree that the model should incor-
porate a multisensory peri-personal space representation
to deal with these findings.
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The interaction between the visual modality and
the somatosensory modality for object recognition in
peri-personal space is critically reviewed by Reed, who
argues that close scrutiny of the intermodal connections
suggests that the visual “what” system connects to the
somatosensory “where” system, and vice versa. Although
the evidence presented is in our view preliminary, we
concur that this is an interesting idea that deserves
further exploration, and we agree that this kind of detailed
filling in of the model is required.
In their commentary, Sathian et al. point to the
complex structure of the somatosensory cortex, and, in
general terms, we agree with their observation that
important details are missing in the model we have pro-
posed. It was intended to be, as they phrase it, a working
hypothesis. In addition, they point to the observation
that particular cerebral cortical regions are activated in
functional imaging studies in a “task-specific, modality-
independent” manner, suggesting that crossmodal proces-
sing is a general rule in perception (Sathian 2005). Regions
known to be specialized for processing particular aspects
of vision are often also recruited during performance of
corresponding tactile tasks. In our review, we focussed
on the question of whether there is specificity in the cross-
modal interactions with somatosensory processing. More
specifically, do processes in other modalities influence
somatosensory processing for action differently, compared
with perceptual recognition? The additional data reported
by Sathian et al. suggesting that regions that are special-
ized for processing particular aspects of vision may also
be recruited during performance of corresponding
tactile tasks, do not contradict our proposal.
Sadato, Nakashita, & Saito (Sadato et al.) provide
further evidence from functional imaging for specificity
in visual-tactile interactions. Their studies suggest that
the PPC is involved in the comparison of shapes presented
in the two modalities. Perhaps more relevant, their data
support our notion that the lateral occipital complex is
important for object recognition whether the object is pre-
sented visually or through touch. Interestingly, their
results suggest substantial plasticity in crossmodal effects
in the lateral occipital complex, as subjects with a large
amount of visual and tactile experience with the objects
showed significantly more activation.
R6. Epilogue
The target article on somatosensory processing was
intended to bring together different strands of research
in order to postulate a model that would enable the formu-
lation of testable hypotheses. We feel that we have
touched upon an emerging area within the cognitive
neurosciences. This exercise was instructive for more
than one reason: Among others, it showed us that there
is so much work going on in different scientific realms
that do not communicate on a regular basis. There is
already gratification in the idea that we might have pro-
moted further interdisciplinary discourse.
The replies have been very instructive and have brought
a number of central issues to the fore. First, the perception-
action dichotomy, whether in vision, audition, or haptics,
appears to be – at the same time – both a viable organis-
ational principle of the functional neuroarchitecture and
a simplification that impedes a true understanding of the
brain. It depends who you talk to. We are convinced that
the idea of the purpose of processing as an important
guiding principle when describing the organisational struc-
ture of cortical somatosensory processing (which has led to
the formulation of the perception-action dichotomy)
remains valid. Second, despite the similarities between
modalities, somatosensory processing has unique proper-
ties. The intricate relationship between perception and
action, as exemplified by the exploratory movements of
the fingers and the hand during tactile recognition, is,
perhaps more than in any other sensory systems, a defining
feature of haptic processing. Third, the monomodular
exploration of individual sensory systems is a methodologi-
cal shortcut, but we are acutely aware that these systems
are intertwined. For a more complete understanding,
future research will need to expand in order to incorporate
these crossmodal interactions. Fourth, the commentaries
have raised several important points regarding the func-
tional characteristics of different body representations. In
this context, we sense a great allegiance to the late
Jacques Paillard, who first suggested many of the ideas
we incorporated in our model. His distinction between
body schema and body image remains a guiding principle.
But of course more work is needed.
The exploration of the processes and brain structures
involved in somatosensory processing is now gaining
momentum, but it will require more and more multidisci-
plinary investigation. Only from this synergy will evolve a
better understanding, or, as Seneca would have put it:
“One hand washes the other.”
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